Does America Have an Anti-War Majority?

A new Zogby America poll claims: "A majority of likely voters -- 52% -- would support a U.S. military strike to prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon, and 53% believe it is likely that the U.S. will be involved in a military strike against Iran before the next presidential election" ("Zogby Poll: 52% Support U.S. Military Strike Against Iran," 29 October 2007).

It should be noted that this Zogby poll showing a pro-war majority is an exception to other recent polls: e.g., the 12-14 October 2007 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll reports that only 29% favor "military action in Iran" and 68% oppose it; and the 4-8 September 2007 CBS News/New York Times poll says that a mere 9% want "military action now," 59% go for "diplomacy now," and 24% even think that Iran is "not a threat" requiring any action ("Iran," PollingReport.com, 31 October 2007).

Why does the Zogby poll show such a dramatically different result than others?

The Zogby poll came out the way it did because it gave another option to support a military strike against Iran beyond a simple three-way choice of "favor, oppose, or unsure," the option appealing to "cruise missile liberals" who don't trust the Bush White House but are waiting for a liberal feminist empire presided over by the next POTUS Hillary Rodham Clinton:

There is considerable division about when a strike on Iran should take place -- if at all. Twenty-eight percent believe the U.S. should wait to strike until after the next president is in office while 23% would favor a strike before the end of President Bush's term. Another 29% said the U.S. should not attack Iran, and 20% were unsure. The view that Iran should not be attacked by the U.S. is strongest among Democrats (37%) and independents, but fewer than half as many Republicans (15%) feel the same. But Republicans are also more likely to be uncertain on the issue (28%). (emphasis added, "Zogby Poll: 52% Support U.S. Military Strike Against Iran," 29 October 2007)

Among the four camps of Americans, the No War camp is still the largest, and we'll continue to have an anti-war majority till the end of George W. Bush's term, but we have to think about how to sway, directly or indirectly, the 23% who say "the U.S. should wait to strike until after the next president is in office."

New Prophets of the Proletariat

Historical materialism, in so far as it is a variety of materialism, takes nature, human and non-human, into account. One of the most important factors for social change in this century will be natural disasters, whose intensity and frequency are likely to increase due to climate change.

The business-as-usual scenario yields an increase of about five degrees Fahrenheit of global warming during this century. . . . How much will sea level rise with five degrees of global warming? Here too, our best information comes from the Earth's history. The last time that the Earth was five degrees warmer was three million years ago, when sea level was about eighty feet higher.

Eighty feet! In that case, the United States would lose most East Coast cities: Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, and Miami; indeed, practically the entire state of Florida would be under water. Fifty million people in the US live below that sea level. Other places would fare worse. China would have 250 million displaced persons. Bangladesh would produce 120 million refugees, practically the entire nation. India would lose the land of 150 million people. (Jim Hansen, "The Threat to the Planet," New York Review of Books 53.12, 13 July 2006)

James Hansen, Goddard Institute for Space Studies, NASA, Presentation at Albany Law School, April 18, 2006.

James Hansen, Goddard Institute for Space Studies, NASA, Presentation at Albany Law School, April 18, 2006.

The world at the end of the 21st century, if not sooner, may very well look like demographic and environmental nightmares of Mike Davis re-mixed, amplified, and in an endless loop. The impacts of climate change will be especially severe in the global South. Disasters will displace and dispossess untold numbers, and weak states unable or unwilling to provide for the newly displaced and dispossessed will be in for legitimation crisis.

Old priests of capitalism will be challenged by new prophets of the proletariat of global slums. The new prophets, however, are unlikely to speak the language of Marx. "Indeed, for the moment at least, Marx has yielded the historical stage to Mohammed and the Holy Ghost. If God died in the cities of the industrial revolution, he has risen again in the postindustrial cities of the developing world" (Mike Davis, "Planet of Slums," New Left Review 26, March-April 2004). Can the new prophets, unlike the old ones, prevail?

Egypt: Islam, Democracy, and Labor Unrest

A story that Lenin's Tomb, Hossam el-Hamalawy, Joel Beinin, etc. have been covering well has finally percolated down to the corporate media.

The weeklong strike last month ended peacefully when the government-owned company made concessions on wages and profit-sharing bonuses that fell short of workers' demands. But the mill and its 27,000 employees have become a focal point of the labor unrest. Nearly a year ago, the same workers struck for several days, igniting solidarity across Egypt as work stoppages spread to railway, flour and other industries whose salaries and benefits have not kept pace with sharp rises in the cost of living.

"This is the largest, most militant strike wave since the 1940s," said Sameh Naguib, a labor expert and sociology professor at the American University in Cairo. "Hundreds of thousands of workers are involved and it's spreading quite rapidly. . . . The question is how this labor movement may play into a larger democratic movement against the government."

Mubarak's economic reforms, including privatization and lower corporate tax rates, have led to 7% economic growth in each of the last three years. Those otherwise impressive statistics have not benefited workers whose stagnant salaries have been decimated by wildly surging prices that have recently pushed inflation to monthly rates as high as 15%. This has created resentment among the lower and middle classes, who say Mubarak's economic liberalization has benefited only those with government connections.

The strikes come as Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party, or NDP, has cracked down on political opposition, jailed journalists and editors, closed a human rights organization and imprisoned hundreds of members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Egyptian officials contend that the Muslim Brotherhood, which adheres to strict Islamic law and has been accused of inspiring militants, and other anti-Mubarak elements, including the secular Kefaya political organization, are attempting to radicalize the nation's unions.

The textile workers say they are not influenced by outside forces, but by disillusionment over salaries and what they see as corrupt union leaders poorly representing them during Egypt's opening of its economy.

"Of course we will see more strikes, and the reason is clear to everybody," said Kamal Abbas, head of an independent worker advocacy group that was shut down by the government this year on charges of inciting labor unrest. "This union is totally subordinate to the state, and all its members are appointed by the state security services. There must be a [genuine] union that represents workers."(emphasis added, Jeffrey Fleishman, "Discontent among Egypt's Workers," Los Angeles Times, 27 October 2007)

Rarely do workers en masse rebel against corporatist "trade unions" (a common problem from post-socialist to post-nationalist states that have degenerated from enlightened despotism to mere despotism) as well as their employers at the same time, so what's happening in Egypt is noteworthy. Mubarak's NDP charges "outside agitators" like the Muslim Brotherhood (whose economic program, while criticizing some aspects of privatization, unemployment, etc., is extremely cautious: "The Electoral Programme of the Muslim Brotherhood for Shura Council in 2007," Ikhwanweb, Cairo) and Kifaya with causing trouble, but that is not the case . . . yet. If Egypt's political opposition do not support workers fed up with economic liberalism as well as political corporatism, and vice versa, they cannot challenge the Mubarak regime. Neither workerism nor electoralism nor activism in "civil society" alone suffices.

Iran's Military Budget: "Roughly the Same as Sweden's"

The US power elite want Americans to believe that Iran will dominate the Middle East if America doesn't stop it. Paul Krugman expertly deflates the politics of fear: "we're talking about a country with roughly the G.D.P. of Connecticut, and a government whose military budget is roughly the same as Sweden's" ("Fearing Fear Itself," New York Times, 29 October 2007). Even compared with its neighbors', Iran's defense spending is quite modest. See Kaveh Ehsani's table below ("Iran: The Populist Threat to Democracy," Middle East Report 241, Winter 2006).

	Total Defense Spending (in dollars)	Per Capita Defense Spending (in dollars)	Percentage of GDP	Active-Duty Armed Forces (thousands)
Iran	4.1 billion	60	2.7	420
Turkey	10.1 billion	146	3.3	514
Israel	9.7 billion	1,561	8.2	168
Saudi Arabia	21 billion	810	8.8	199
Kuwait	4 billion	1,770	7.8	15
UAE	2.6 billion	1,025	2.8	50
Pakistan	3.3 billion	20	3.5	619
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2005-2006 (London, 2005)

See, also, "What Is Hegemonic about Iran?" Neo-Resistance, 29 October 2007.

The Right to Organize an Independent Labor Union in Iran

In 2001, Saeed Rahnema and Haideh Moghissi wrote:

For the workers' movement in particular, nothing is more crucial than an opportunity to form independent trade union organizations, and this cannot be achieved without weakening the power of the present autocratic clerical regime.

Such developments will create real possibilities for the century-old movements for democracy, freedom of conscience, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, respect for minority rights, women's rights, economic development, and social justice to succeed. Such objective circumstances favoring action by the secular left will almost inevitably arise, if the existing equilibrium, or "the balance of fear" -- a popular term used to define the hesitation of various factions within the ruling bloc to strike the final blow -- continues. This impasse within the Islamic reform movement will undoubtedly intensify the push for radical change and will give the secular opposition a chance to actively participate in the struggle for establishing -- as a first step -- a secular democratic state in place of the existing clerical oligarchy.("Clerical Oligarchy and the Question of 'Democracy' in Iran," Monthly Review 52.10, March 2001)

I'm afraid things didn't turn out the way Rahnema and Moghissi hoped. Among the candidates for the 2005 Presidential Elections in Iran, there was one who came out for the right to organize an independent labor union -- Mostafa Moin, "the candidate representing 'progressive reformists'":

Moin's backers also reached out to workers by acknowledging their rights to strike and to establish independent unions. Since the revolution, all unions have been organized under the auspices of the Labor Ministry. If it is not just a symbolic statement, this acknowledgement would signal a change in orientation by the reformist politicians toward the reality that Iranians will not simply trust them to be wiser and more just stewards of the Islamic Republic than the conservatives. (Arang Keshavarzian and Mohammad Maljoo, "Paradox and Possibility in Iran's Presidential Election," Middle East Report, 17 June 2005)

Moin received only 14% of the vote, finishing in fourth place in the first round. Not surprising, since "the reformists surrounding Moin continued to direct their appeals to the middle classes, and openly spoke of themselves as a party of 'the elite' (nokhbegan, a term which, unfortunately, does not have the negative connotations it carries in English)" (Kaveh Ehsani, "Iran's Presidential Runoff: The Long View," Middle East Report, 24 June 2005).

Iran's labor activists will have to first get their fellow Iranians interested in workers' self-organization. Unfortunately for them, ardent support of the labor wing of the empire for "free, independent trade unions" in Iran will likely be a minus, not a plus, for their cause in the eyes of a majority of Iranians.

I Am Iran -- Do Not Bomb Me

The best anti-war slogan for Iranian-Americans is "I Am Iran -- Do Not Bomb Me." Here are two photographs with signs that say just that (plus one that shows a really lovely young woman) seen at the 27 October 2007 demonstration in San Francisco.

Photo by Jahanshah Javid ("'I Am Iran, Do Not Bomb Me': Photo Essay: San Francisco Anti-war Rally," Iranian.com, 28 October 2007)

Comments left on Javid's photo essay at Iranian.com show, however, that Iranian-Americans are far from united around this slogan.

One commentator observed: "Imagine if it was a gugush concert. More would show up. That's sad." True, but this is just a beginning. More Iranian-Americans will rediscover their love for Iran.

How Can Anybody Be Persian?

Comment peut-on être Persan ? par Manouchehr Mottaki Dans son chef-d'oeuvre Les Lettres persanes, publié en 1721, le grand philosophe français Charles-Louis de Montesquieu s'interroge sur les comportements surprenants des Français : lorsque Rica, son voyageur iranien arrivé à Paris, décide de s'habiller à la française, il constate avec étonnement que ses amis français ne le traitent plus avec l'admiration qu'ils lui portaient auparavant. Ce dualisme dans le comportement de la société française du XVIIIe siècle conduit le voyageur à se demander comment il est possible d'être iranien et de vivre dans un autre monde, à savoir l'Occident. L'histoire du dossier nucléaire iranien repose la même question. En effet, il y a trente ans, alors qu'un régime dictatorial régnait sur l'Iran, la décision de la République française de coopérer à la politique nucléaire d'un tel régime avait reçu l'approbation de tous les hommes politiques jusqu'au plus haut niveau. Au cours de ces années, les Français ne se sont posé aucune question concernant les objectifs du chah. Bien au contraire : la France proposa la participation iranienne à Framatome, puis à Eurodif, allant même jusqu'à inviter le chah à visiter les sites nucléaires français à Saclay et ne montrant aucune inquiétude concernant la coopération dans le domaine nucléaire, y compris militaire. Des années plus tard, lorsque le peuple iranien a mis fin au régime dictatorial et, s'inspirant des principes suprêmes de l'islam, a décidé de fonder une République ayant pour principe l'indépendance et la liberté (les valeurs mêmes de la Révolution française et de la Ve République), il s'attendait à ce que les dirigeants français accueillent positivement ce grand soulèvement, oeuvrant pour le développement de la démocratie en Orient. Or, la véritable tragédie est survenue lorsque l'Iranien de l'ère nouvelle, comme le personnage de Montesquieu, décida de bénéficier des moyens modernes du développement. Depuis, les coopérations pour le développement se sont arrêtées et les relations bilatérales se sont assombries au point que les armements français ont été généreusement mis à la disposition d'un autre tyran, nommé Saddam Hussein, afin qu'il prenne pour cible le peuple sans défense des villes iraniennes et détruise avec des armes françaises une partie du patrimoine historique grandiose d'un pays aussi ancien que la Perse. Un pays tel que la République islamique d'Iran, avec son potentiel régional et international, n'a pas besoin de se livrer à des marchandages pour défendre ses droits et poursuivre son développement économique et social. Œuvrer pour l'avenir des générations futures est notre devoir sacré et ne tolère aucune hésitation. Bien évidemment, dans cette voie, la République islamique d'Iran n'a pas opté pour une logique de confrontation. La coopération avec l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique, l'acceptation de l'initiative des pays européens en 2003, la mise en oeuvre volontaire du protocole additionnel et la suspension de l'enrichissement pendant deux ans, etc. sont des illustrations de la bonne foi de l'Iran. La question est donc de savoir ce qui s'est passé pour qu'un certain nombre de nos amis français, sans prendre en compte la place historique de leur pays en Europe, aient opté pour un ton très éloigné de celui qu'on pouvait attendre d'une vieille diplomatie. Nos documents de négociations démontrent qu'à l'été 2003, au début des négociations avec les Européens, nos amis français ont précisé qu'ils prenaient en main ce dossier afin de renforcer le poids de l'Europe sur la scène internationale et de tirer le bateau britannique vers le continent. Or, lorsque j'ai entendu le ministère britannique des affaires étrangères annoncer qu'il soutenait avec enthousiasme la demande française pour des sanctions unilatérales, et qu'en face l'Espagne, l'Italie, l'Autriche et l'Allemagne ont annoncé leur préférence pour davantage d'efforts diplomatiques, je me suis demandé si ce n'était pas le bateau britannique qui depuis 2003 tire le continent désemparé vers lui ? Même s'il convient de patienter un peu avant de se prononcer sur l'attitude du nouveau gouvernement britannique. Le président de la République française estime, à juste titre, que le développement insuffisant des pays de la région entraîne l'instabilité et l'accroissement de l'insécurité. Ce développement passe par celui de l'énergie nucléaire. La République islamique d'Iran ne souhaite donc pas que sa politique en matière nucléaire fasse l'objet d'une vision discriminatoire de la part de la France. Aussi, l'Iran poursuivra ses activités nucléaires et l'enrichissement d'uranium à des fins civiles, dans le respect des accords de sauvegarde et sous la supervision de l'AIEA, et en coopération avec les autres pays du monde. Il le fera sans se préoccuper de l'éventualité d'une attitude discriminatoire. Les préoccupations de la République islamique d'Iran ne sont nullement hypothétiques. Dans l'histoire des relations bilatérales, il existe en effet de nombreux exemples d'une approche discriminatoire de la part de la France (notamment l'embargo sur la vente d'avions de transport civil, de matériels médicaux et des radars pour la lutte contre le trafic des stupéfiants ou l'immigration clandestine). "Comment peut-on être Persan ?", se demandait l'ami français du voyageur des Lettres persanes. Montesquieu en tirait la conclusion que la pensée étroite de cet homme ne lui permettait pas d'admettre qu'il y ait, dans l'univers, d'autres personnes que des Français.

How Can Anybody Be Persian? by Manouchehr Mottaki In his masterpiece Persian Letters, published in 1721, the great French philosopher Charles-Louis de Montesquieu ponders the surprising behaviors of the French: his Iranian traveler Rica, arriving in Paris, decides to dress like the French and learns with astonishment that his French friends no longer treat him with admiration that they previously had for him. This dualism in the behavior of French society of the 18th century leads the traveler to wonder how it is possible to be Iranian and to live in another world, namely the West. The history of the Iranian nuclear issue raises the same question. Indeed, thirty years ago, when a dictatorial regime reigned in Iran, the French Republic's decision to cooperate with such a regime on nuclear policy received the approval of all the politicians up to the highest level. In those years, the French did not ask any question about the objectives of the Shah. Quite to the contrary: France proposed the Iranian participation in Framatome, then in Eurodif, even going so far as to invite the Shah to visit the French nuclear sites in Saclay, without exhibiting any unease about cooperation in the nuclear field, including military. Years later, when the Iranian people put an end to the dictatorial regime and, inspired by the highest principles of Islam, decided to found a republic on the principles of independence and freedom (the very values of the French Revolution and the Fifth Republic), we expected the French leaders to positively welcome this great uprising, working for the development of democracy in the East. However, a veritable tragedy occurred when the Iranians of the new era, like Montesquieu's character, decided to benefit from modern means of development. Thereafter, cooperation for development was halted, and the bilateral relations darkened, so much so that French weapons were generously placed at the disposal of another tyrant, named Saddam Hussein, so that the tyrant could target the defenseless people of Iranian cities and destroy, with French arms, a part of the magnificent historical heritage of a country as old as Persia. A country such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, with its regional and international potential, has no need to give itself up to haggling in order to defend its rights and to continue its economic and social development. Work for the future of coming generations is our sacred duty, and it doesn't admit any hesitation. Obviously, in this path, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not choose a logic of confrontation. Its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, its acceptance of the initiative of the European countries in 2003, its voluntary implementation of the additional protocol, its suspension of enrichment for two years, etc. illustrate the good faith of Iran. The question is thus what caused a certain number of our French friends to -- without taking their country's historic place in Europe into account -- choose a tone very far from what we would expect from venerable diplomacy. Our documents of negotiations show that, in the summer of 2003, at the beginning of the negotiations with the Europeans, our French friends explained that they took charge of this issue in order to reinforce the weight of Europe on the international scene and to pull the British ship towards the continent. However, when I heard the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs announce that it enthusiastically supported the French demand for unilateral sanctions, though Spain, Italy, Austria, and Germany in opposition announced their preference for more diplomatic efforts, I wondered whether it wasn't the British ship that, since 2003, had been drawing the lost continent towards it. Even if it is advisable to have a little patience before coming to a conclusion about the attitude of the new British government. The president of the French Republic rightly believes that insufficient development of countries leads to regional instability and heightened insecurity. This development goes through that of nuclear energy. The Islamic Republic of Iran thus does not wish its nuclear policy to become the target of a discriminatory vision on the part of France. Therefore, Iran will continue its nuclear activities and uranium enrichment for civilian purposes, respecting the safeguard agreements and under the supervision of the IAEA, and in cooperation with other countries of the world. It will do so without worrying about the possibility of a discriminatory behavior. The concerns of the Islamic Republic of Iran are by no means hypothetical. In the history of bilateral relations, there indeed exist many examples of a discriminatory approach on the part of France (in particular embargo on the sale of civil transport aircraft, medical equipment, and radars to combat drug trafficking or illegal immigration). "How can anybody be Persian?" wondered the French friend of the traveler of Persian Letters. Montesquieu drew the conclusion from it that the narrow thought of this man did not permit him to admit that there are, in the universe, other people besides the French.

Manouchehr Mottaki is the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  This essay was first published in Le Monde on 25 October 2007.  English translation by Yoshie Furuhashi.   Read it in Persian at Entekhab News.

For Left Unity, of All Its Currents

Hisham Bustani, a Jordanian Marxist, says that Islamists are "the only real political force on the Arab scene today" and calls upon them to "open up internally to other non-religious forces (Marxist and nationalist) and espouse a civil, secular liberation program" (As'ad al-Azzouni, "Surmounting Sectarianism in the Middle East: An Interview with Hisham Bustani," MRZine, 28 October 2007):

Islamists who see themselves on the side of political clarity must comprehend the impossibility of attaching a liberation program to a subordinate authority structure, and they must decide on their options by removing themselves from a so-called pragmatic approach that enables containment and manipulation by international and regional powers. Islamists must open up internally to other non-religious forces (Marxist and nationalist) and espouse a civil, secular liberation program; and they must learn from the experiences in Lebanon and Iraq, where the religious and sectarian element was the basis for the game of hegemony and the foundation for fragmentation setting people against each other instead of being united against their common enemy.

This is not to say that Islamists are opportunists while secular forces are not. My concentration on Islamists is because they are the only real political force on the Arab scene today. There are two trends in the Islamic movement, one opportunist and the other principled. And the principled Islamists should pay heed, because in the light of this analysis they will be the first to be sacrificed by their opportunist brethren in faith and struggle.

Of course, there are also opportunist leftists (NGO beneficiaries and Marxists-turned-liberals) and xenophobic nationalists (with fascist tendencies against Iranians, Kurds, and Turks), but these phenomena are only trivial, since their currents are too weak to take the streets and challenge existing power.

Overall and as a prime desideratum, there is a huge and pressing imperative today for Left unity, of all its currents: the left of the Islamic movement, the left of the nationalist movement, and the left of the leftist progressive and revolutionary movement, on the basis of a program of resistance, liberation, and political clarity. The opposing Right of all those currents is already united and taking action.

Secular Marxists and nationalists wouldn't like to be told that "their currents are too weak to take the streets and challenge existing power"; and few Islamists, even those who are already working with other forces externally, are ready to make radical changes in their movements' internal structures and political programs and make that public (even when they have already made such changes in practice, they are often loath to alter their movements' founding documents). And yet, it is undeniable that "Left unity, of all its currents" is indeed "a prime desideratum."

"The Russians Know Very Well What Would Happen to Them if a Pro-American Government Was in Power in Tehran"

Putin compares the US plan for a missile shield in Europe to the Cuban missile crisis: "Putin Invokes Cuban Missile Crisis" (Tony Barber, Financial Times, 26 October 2007). It is possible that Putin also sees Iran as the USSR saw Cuba -- only more is at stake this time, as Iran is closer to Russia than Cuba. Putin must have considered a possibility: what if Washington succeeds in its "regime change" campaign, installing a pro-American and anti-Russian regime in Iran, under the pretext of Iran's nuclear dossier and its support for its friends in Iraq and Afghanistan? Indeed, Iran's Leader Ali Khamenei said as much: "The Russians know very well what would happen to them if a pro-American government was in power in Tehran" ("Iranian TV: Ayatollah Khamene'i Speaks on Khomeyni's Death Anniversary (2), Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television," Trans. the Open Source Center, 4 June 2006, available online at Informed Comment). Washington has so far failed to understand the seriousness with which Putin is taking what he probably sees as the empire's steady march toward Russia, from both the European and West Asian fronts. Therein lies Iran's chance, if its leadership does not overplay its hand.

The Labor Wing of the Empire

The history of the labor wing of the US-led multinational empire -- such as the International Trade Union Confederation (the result of the 2006 merger of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World Confederation of Labour) with which the International Transport Workers' Federation is allied -- claiming to promote free, independent trade unions, i.e., trade unions that are independent of Communist parties and governments, and to act in solidarity with workers of the global South has not been a pretty one: see, for instance, Beth Sims, Workers of the World Undermined: American Labor's Role in U.S. Foreign Policy (South End Press, 1992). The end of state socialism and the Cold War did not change its fundamental role. A more recent history of it has been documented by such labor writers as Harry Kelber and Kim Scipes among others. Here is an example from Haiti: Jeb Sprague, "Failed Solidarity: The ICFTU, AFL-CIO, ILO, and ORIT in Haiti" (Labor Notes, June 2006). Leftists inside and outside Iran ought to be aware of what the labor wing of the empire does.¹

The labor wing of the empire, like other vehicles of "democracy assistance," seizes upon a real problem of most post-revolutionary governments, whether they are Communist, nationalist, or Islamic: the fact that space for autonomy for organizations of workers and others is restricted to various degrees for reasons of national security (lack of autonomy is nearly complete under a one-party state-socialist state). The absence of autonomy eventually undermines the social gains of revolution when either the rulers abandon their commitment to the ideology that made revolution possible or the ruled become depoliticized and self-centered or both (the history of state socialism in China, Russia, and Eastern Europe is a cautionary tale for the Iranians, just as the history of the overthrows of Mossadegh, Arbenz, Allende, and others is). However, workers who turn to the labor wing of the empire to solve this undeniable problem usually come to grief.

Workers of the North, especially in the USA, are normally unaware of the dilemma faced by workers under post-revolutionary government in the South, who must fight for their class interests without undermining their national interests (especially defending their nation from the empire). In many cases, trade union members in the USA aren't even aware of what their unions are doing at home, let alone abroad. Naturally, they do not realize that intensified global competition, workers of formerly socialist or nationalist countries now competing with them for jobs, has come about in part because of the exertion of top labor bureaucrats of the North who were supposed to protect their interests.

In the meantime, workers of the North are also finding out how good their free, independent unions are, some of which are going far beyond business as usual of concession bargaining and giving up the right to strike altogether. See, for instance, Sam Gindin, "The CAW and Magna: Disorganizing the Working Class" (MRZine, 22 October 2007).

It is possible that, in the near future in the North, only French workers will remember how to strike, if not to win new gains, at least to defend their way of life. Even the still impressive national solidarity of French workers, however, may eventually be undermined by the gap between the public and private sectors: "nearly 20 points separates the rate of sympathy [for the 18 October 2007 strike] in the public sector (69%) from that in the private sector (49%)" (Christelle Chabaud, "The Majority Strike in Public Opinion," MRZine, 18 October 2007).

1 For instance, "On 15 February 2006, the ICFTU and its International Transport Workers' Federation coordinated rallies and protests outside Iranian legations world-wide" (Andreas Malm and Shora Esmailian, Iran on the Brink: Rising Workers and Threats of War, Pluto Press, 2007, p. 120), officials of the AFL-CIO and James P. Hoffa of the US Teamsters Union taking the lead. Malm and Esmailian celebrate this as "an unequalled manifestation of global solidarity with a labour movement in the Middle East" and "the most awe-inspiring show of global opposition to the labour politics of the Islamic Republic ever recorded" (Malm and Esmailian, pp. 120-121). Note, however, that nothing of the sort was done for any other Iranian workers, let alone workers of other countries in the Middle East, especially those of the empire's client states like Egypt.

Other Iranian labor activists took note of this contrast. Malm and Esmailian report that "The activists of Mohsen Hakimi and the other council communists of Komiteye Hamahangi, on the other hand, limited themselves to issuing a few statements, one of which was a condemnation of the global day of action" mentioned above (Malm and Esmailian, p. 121). The condemnation in question stated: "It means that the ICFTU . . . in the realm of the current conflict among the bourgeois government of Iran and other bourgeois governments [sic] has wanted the false defense of the demands of workers in Iran [to] be made a pretext in order to support one sector of the bourgeoisie in contrary to another sector" (qtd. in Malm and Esmailian, p. 121). While the translation is awkward, you get the drift. Malm and Esmailian cite it only to dismiss it as "[u]ltra-leftist gibberish," but that says more about their own lack of understanding of the labor wing of the empire, of which some Iranian workers are aware.

So do some workers of the North. Take Zenroren, an ally of the Japanese Communist Party, for instance. This year, there was an "ITF/ITUC International Action Day on Thursday 9 August in solidarity with union leaders Mansour Osanloo and Mahmoud Salehi," the day of action in part organized by the State Department-funded Solidarity Center. Rengo joined them, but Zenroren did not. Communists of Japan, no longer Marxists, still know better than getting involved in labor imperialism.

Far from it, JCP leaders actually attend the celebrations of the Iranian Revolution held at the Iranian Embassy in Japan and take other actions for the purpose of what they call Yato Gaikou, "opposition party diplomacy": see, for instance, "イラン革命記念レセプションに 志位委員長が出席," Akahata, 11 February 2003; "イラン革命記念レセプション: 不破議長が出席," Akahata, 11 February 2004; "イラン革命記念レセプション: 志位委員長が出席、ハラジ外相とあいさつ," Akahata, 11 February 2005; "イラン大使と志位委員長が懇談," Akahata, 21 December 2005; and "イラン革命記念レセプション: 市田書記局長が出席", Akahata, 10 February 2007.

Not that they agree on everything. The JCP, like most political parties in the world, is committed to a two-state idea on Israel/Palestine, whereas Iran is just about the only country in the world whose government is officially committed to a one-state solution based on the referendum of all people who live in historic Palestine and Palestinian refugees (though Iran's government adds that, whatever the Palestinians accept, it will also accept it), and the party candidly discusses its concerns with Iran's ambassadors (see "イラン大使と志位委員長が懇談," Akahata, 21 December 2005).

What's Good about Islam?

What's behind David Horowitz's "Islamo-Fascism Awareness" week? A short supply of pinkos in the USA, observes Alexander Cockburn: "The left in America is really in very poor shape: near zero Commies, and really only a sprinkling of radical black profs, militant Lesbians and kindred antinomians to beat up on" ("So Much for Islamo-Fascism Awareness," CounterPunch, 27-28 October 2007). Right he is.

Leftists in the USA have built neither a mass communist party nor a mass social democratic party. The Red Purge of the fifties was so successful that few Reds remain in trade unions. There are only two institutions that leftists have managed to "capture" through a "long march" in the USA: academia and mainline Protestantism.¹ The former has been a target of Horowitz for a long time, as its conquest was never complete, its summit (boards of trustees and top administration) firmly in the enemy camp. It's only a matter of time before he turns to the latter.

Cockburn also contends in the aforementioned article: "Coalitions have formed to combat Horowitz's version of Awareness with superior Progressive Awareness about what is good or not so good about Islam" (27-28 October 2007). This I doubt. Rare are secular leftists who, though quick to point out what's "not so good" about Islam, wouldn't stumble if asked to explain what's "good" about it.

Average secular leftists are, in reality, as uncomfortable about encounters with Muslims as rightists. They, unlike rightists, tolerate Islam and even defend Muslims when they become victims of right-wing Islamophobia, but that is as far as they are willing to go. They still think it is a "tragedy" that Muslims, especially Muslim women, adhere to their faith, assuming it to be inferior to their own secular ideology: "Liberal-Leftist Islamophobia Watch (Part I)," Ihsan, 18 September 2007; and "Left-Liberal Islamophobia Watch (Part II)," Ihsan, 23 October 2007.² That won't do. We expect the religious to recognize that the irreligious are morally equal to them. So would they in turn. Unless and until secular leftists realize that Islam is as good a theology of liberation as Christianity and historical materialism, and vice versa, solidarity won't be forever.

1 Left-wing Jews might have "captured" at least Reform Judaism if not other branches had they remained within their faith community, but they have tended to reject their faith altogether. Indeed, Zionists' hegemony of major institutions, secular or religious, that claim to represent Jews is so complete that some Jewish leftists, exasperated, would even consider resigning from "the Jewish people":

Did you ever wonder what your last thought would be just before you died or believed you might die? Well, I did, and a few years ago in the waning moments before going under the knife for a life threatening operation I got my answer. As the nurses wheeled me into the operating room, what burst upon my consciousness was not, as might be expected, the fear of dying but a terrible angst at the idea of dying a Jew. I was appalled to finish my life with my umbilical cord still tied to a people with whom I can no longer identify. That this should be my "last" thought greatly surprised me at the time, and it still does.

What did it mean . . . and why is it so hard to resign from a people? (Bertell Ollman, "Letter of Resignation from the Jewish People," Dialectical Marxism)

2 For secular leftists' criticisms of Islamophobia on the Left, see, for instance, Deepa Kumar, "Danish Cartoons: Racism Has No Place on the Left," MRZine, 21 February 2006; Deepa Kumar, "Fighting Islamophobia: A Response to Critics," MRZine, 3 April 2006; Richard Fidler, "Ontario's 'Sharia Law' Controversy: How Muslims Were Hung Out to Dry," MRZine 27 May 2006; Rami El-Amine, "Anti-Arab Racism, Islam, and the Left," MRZine, 3 September 2006;

"We Would Like to See Them Work Together"

From Dictatorship Watch, via Al Musawwir

Revolutionary Leaders

There exists an image of ideal-typical class struggle in the imagination of many a leftist: the working class, united across borders, fight against the capital-states. That has never happened, and that never will.

Jay Gould, who reportedly said, "I can hire one half of the working class to kill the other half," understood class struggle much better than any Marxist.

Class struggle in the real world is a cross-class political faction fight. When class struggle becomes revolutionary, it tends to polarize, pitting one faction consisting of peasants, workers, the petit-bourgeoisie from whom revolutionary leaders usually arise, and even a section of the bourgeoisie, against the other faction made up of peasants, workers, the petit-bourgeoisie, and the bulk of the bourgeoisie.

Why is it that revolutionary leaders tend to come from the middling sort? Because they are better educated and more ambitious than those below them and yet those above them block their advancement in the existing order. Only by destroying the existing order and establishing a new one can they make full use of their education and fulfill their ambition.

Their objective circumstances are not unlike those of Julien Sorel and Jude Fawley, but they are temperamentally Anti-Juliens and Anti-Judes: unlike Julien, they are not individualists; and unlike Jude, they are not defeated.

Intellectuals cannot become revolutionary leaders, however, unless the masses endow them with charisma. It is not intellectuals who choose the masses but the other way around. How the masses do so has been little studied by Marxists. For that, we must turn to Max Weber and Weberians, especially Pierre Bourdieu.

El socialismo, el estadio más alto de la democracia y el republicanismo

El socialismo, el estadio más alto de la democracia y el republicanismo

Por Yoshie Yuruhashi
Traducción Julio Fernández Baraibar

Hay una tendencia, entre los laicistas, tanto izquierdistas como liberales, a adoptar un punto de vista conspirativo frente a la aparición de un "Islam político": el imperio o las clases dominantes "compradoras", o ambas, lo implantaron entre las masas inocentes que previamente eran "tan sólo musulmanas". Esto es un punto de vista simplista. El Islam como movimiento político de masas no puede ser implantado desde afuera, así como el socialismo como movimiento político de masas no puede ser implantado desde afuera. Las clases dominantes, extranjeras o locales, sólo pueden ayudar a desarrollar y deformar lo que ya existe entre las masas, así como los socialistas sólo pueden ayudar a desarrollar, reformar y revolucionar lo que ya existe entre ellas.

Un punto de vista conspirativo del "Islam político" soslaya un examen empírico de las condiciones políticas y económicas, sociales y culturales del pueblo trabajador que lo acepta y lo hace propio. Esta negligencia no ayuda para nada a los izquierdistas laicos a cualquier aproximación que quieran hacer hacia alguna variedad de Islam, a darle un apoyo crítico, como los comunistas libaneses han estado haciendo con el Hizbollah, por ejemplo, o a combatir, tal como deben hacer, sectas terroristas voluntaristas y aventureras del tipo Al Qaeda, o a tratar de alguna manera con cualquier otro grupo (como el AKP¹, los Hermanos Musulmanes², etc.)

Los izquierdistas laicos deben acordar con un hecho: las variedades del Islam son una parte esencial de la cultural de las masas nacional-populares de muchos países, especialmente aquellos que son los más cruciales para el Gran Juego del Siglo XXI (la caza de energía en el contexto de una declinante hegemonía del dólar), tal como lo son las variedades de cristianismo en Latinoamérica. Y dentro de la misma cosmovisión religiosa de las masas existen semillas tanto de liberación como de reacción. Cuando los intelectuales orgánicos de la izquierda, laica o religiosa, que son "concientes de estar encadenados orgánicamente a las masas nacional-populares"³ fallan en levantar y crear una ideología nacional-popular que haga justicia a las semillas de liberación en la conciencia religiosa de las masas, las clases dominantes sacan ventaja de las semillas de reacción en esa misma conciencia.

Los izquierdistas laicos deben aprender a descartar la ilusión de que las masas trabajadoras religiosas deben primero ser secularizadas y luego, y sólo luego, serán receptivas a la idea radical de revolución. Aquellos que estén tentados por esta ilusión necesitan, tan sólo, mirar al Japón: la clase obrera japonésa es, quizás, la más secularizada del mundo y a la vez, y desde hace mucho, está entre las menos revolucionarias.

La historia muestra que una revolución social auténtica puede ocurrir a través de una ideología secular (Francia), una ideología religiosa (Irán) o una creativa combinación de ambas (Venezuela). Las experiencias de auténticas revoluciones sociales, así sean religiosas o seculares, jacobinas o bolivarianas, son más importantes para la educación política de las masas acerca de la democracia y el republicanismo que el laicismo autoritario impuesto desde arriba por déspotas ilustrados (sean nacionalistas o socialistas) o la secularización molecularmente efectuada por el consumismo capitalista (que tiende, primero, a pacificar las masas y, luego finalmente, invita a la reacción cuando el despotismo ilustrado degenera en mero despotismo, y esto despolitiza al pueblo y los hace más pasivos que ninguna otra ideología, religiosa o secular). Y por lo que luchamos es la democracia y el republicanismo: después de todo, ¿qué es el socialismo sino el más alto estadio de democracia y republicanismo?


1 Partido religioso turco, vencedor en las últimas elecciones. Expresa puntos de vista de centro derecha y enfrenta el tradicional secularismo kemalista, que ha gobernado el país durante varias décadas y ha sido, después de la guerra, un aliado estratégico de los EE.UU. Nota de JFB.

2 Movimiento religioso revolucionario egipcio, de creciente influencia política en oposición al régimen laicista pro norteamericano. Los Hermanos Musulmanes son el movimiento político más numeroso de Egipto y, oficialmente, han sido proscriptos. Nota de JFB.

3 Antonio Gramsci, El Príncipe Moderno. Nota de JFB.

Varieties of Secularism

Secular leftists as well as liberals tend to think that religion is an ideology, a product of alienation, whereas secularism isn't. Secularism, however, is a political doctrine, and as such, it is as much of an ideology as religion.

What kind of ideology is secularism?

There are at least three major varieties of this ideology that we need to study:

• republican secularism (secularism won from below through authentic social revolution, seen, for instance, in France and Mexico);


• authoritarian secularism (secularism imposed from above, for instance, Kemalism, an ideology invented as much to dissociate Turkey from its own region and make it a member of the mythical West¹ as to pacify the working masses by dictating and controlling their ideology, purging religion here, promulgating a state-sanctioned variety of it there);


• the American separation of church and state (which makes the state legally secular but makes religion, both good and bad varieties, flourish in civil society).

Not all varieties of religion are valuable, nor are all varieties of secularism. Among the three, only republican secularism may serve as a path to the proletarian Enlightenment, political or intellectual, that empowers them.

Nevertheless, even republican secularism, if the Left is not careful, can be deformed by the power elite into an instrument of social control, for example, as a weapon of xenophobic attack on predominantly proletarian migrants from France's former colonial possessions in the MENA region. An uncritical approach to secularism just helps make the empire more powerful at the expense of working people, in the North as well as the South.

1 Initially, Kemalism was an ideology of modernization as Westernization. The European Union's reluctance to admit Turkey as its member, however, has begun to change it. Mustafa Akyol, deputy editor of the Turkish Daily News, recently observed:

What is most striking in this nationwide division is that the so-called Islamists are generally on the liberal pro-Western side, while the secularists are often on the other. In the general election held on July 22, the "Islamist" AKP had the most strongly pro-E.U. platform, whereas the ultra-secularist Republican People's Party tried to woo voters with Euro-skeptic rhetoric. (The AKP won the elections with a clear victory of 47 percent, while its main secular rival took 21 percent.) The AKP is also a strong proponent of free markets and foreign investment, whereas most secularist politicians see such things as "imperialist" and favor a state-protected economy. As Ziya Onis, a political economist at Koc University in Istanbul, said recently, the current power struggle in Turkey is between "conservative globalists" and "defensive nationalists" -- including the ultra-secular Kemalists. ("The Protocols of the Elders of Turkey," Washington Post, 7 October 2007, p. B2)

It is in this context where the strangest variety of anti-Semitism, which peddles "a conspiracy theory about a Zionist plot to create an Islamist state" in Turkey, has emerged among Kemalists.

Look in just about any bookstore in Turkey, and you'll see some of the strangest bestsellers imaginable. The cover of "The Children of Moses," the first and most popular book in a series of four, shows the country's devoutly Muslim prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in the middle of a six-pointed Star of David. Inside, you'll find a head-spinningly weird argument: that Erdogan and his conservative allies in Turkey's ruling pro-Islamic party are actually crypto-Jews with secret wicked ties to the conspiratorial forces of "global Zionism."

The books are hardly a fringe phenomenon. They're arrayed in chic bookstores along Istiklal Avenue, the funky pedestrian mall that's the heart of secular Istanbul. They're openly displayed alongside Orhan Pamuk novels at Ataturk International Airport. And they're even sold on tiny bookstands on the Princes' Islands, the vacation destinations in the Sea of Marmara that many well-off Turks view the way Manhattanites do the Hamptons. By the publishers' figures, they've sold about 520,000 copies since the books started rolling out this year -- a staggering figure for a nation of about 71 million people.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ergun Poyraz, who wrote the series, is a self-declared "Kemalist," the term used here to describe the committed followers of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the resolutely secular war hero who founded modern Turkey in 1923. The politicians whom Poyraz is out to skewer define themselves as sensible conservatives, but they're derided as closet fundamentalists by their foes among Turkey's traditional elites, who are still deeply suspicious of any intrusion of Islam into the public sphere. Poyraz's books argue -- apparently in all seriousness -- that "Zionism" has decided to steer Turkey away from its time-worn secular path and turn it into a "moderate Islamic republic." It is hard to believe that "Zionism" (let alone any sane Israeli leader) would prefer an Islamist Turkey to a secular one, but Poyraz is convinced that a mildly Islamic state would be more easily manipulated by foreign powers than a staunchly nationalist one. (Akyol, 7 October 2007, p. B2)

Iran and Egypt

Electoral turnouts are one indicator of the legitimacy of government. I'll compare Iran and Egypt, the most important powers in the MENA region.

• Iran
  
  2005 Presidential Elections
  Turnout: 62.7% (the first round) and 59.6% (the second round)
  
  2004 Parliamentary Election
  Turnout: 50%


• Egypt
  
  2005 Presidential Election
  Turnout: 22.9%
  
  2005 Parliamentary Election
  Turnout: 23%

I'd venture to say that Iran's electorate regard their government as more legitimate than Egypt's electorate do theirs.

But guess which government is Washington's target for "regime change," and which government is the second largest recipient of US aid after Israel?

Idealists and Materialists

Islam is the only medium of effective internationalism that can resist the empire on the front line of the Great Game of the 21st century: an energy hunt in the context of the declining dollar hegemony. Secular leftists have become decisively marginalized in nations of the MENA region, and secular leftists elsewhere, even those in Latin America, lack transnational infrastructure that Muslims have built over time to move money, manpower, hardware, and software for resistance in the region. Ironically, it is "idealists," Muslims, who have material means to combat the empire in its chosen battlefield, whereas in most cases "materialists," secular leftists, have only ideas. Muslims alone can only resist and cannot prevail, however. In the end, everything depends on the Russians and the Chinese, "materialists" of another category altogether.

Socialism, the Highest Stage of Democracy and Republicanism

There is a tendency, found among secular leftists as well as liberals, to take a conspiracist view of the emergence of "Political Islam": the empire, its comprador ruling classes, or both implanted it among the innocent masses who were previously "just Muslims," just like that. That is a simplistic view. Islam as a mass political movement cannot be implanted from outside, just as socialism as a mass political movement cannot be implanted from outside. The ruling classes, foreign or domestic, can only help develop and deform what already exists among the masses, just as socialists can only help develop, reform, and revolutionize what already exists among them.

A conspiracist view of "Political Islam" slights empirical examinations of political and economic, social and cultural, conditions of working people who consent to it and make it their own. This neglect does not help secular leftists at all in any approach they may take toward any variety of Islam, in giving critical support to it, as the Lebanese Communists have been doing for Hizballah for instance, or in combating voluntarist and adventurist terrorist sects of Al Qaeda varieties as they must be, or in dealing with anything else (like the AKP, the Muslim Brotherhood, etc.) in any way.

Secular leftists must come to terms with a fact: varieties of Islam are an essential part of the culture of the national-popular masses of many nations, especially those who are the most crucial to the Great Game of the 21st century (an energy hunt in the context of the declining dollar hegemony), just as varieties of Christianity are in Latin America. And within the same religious worldviews of the masses there exist seeds of both liberation and reaction. When organic intellectuals on the Left, secular or religious, who are "conscious of being linked organically to a national-popular mass" fail to arise and create a national-popular ideology that does justice to the seeds of liberation in the religious consciousness of the masses, the ruling classes take advantage of the seeds of reaction in the very same consciousness.

Secular leftists must learn to discard the illusion that religious working masses must be first secularized, and then and only then they will be receptive to the radical idea of revolution. Those who are tempted by this illusion need only look at Japan: the working class of Japan are perhaps the most secularized in the world, and yet they are also among the least revolutionary, as they have been for a long time.

History shows that authentic social revolution may come about through a secular ideology (France), a religious ideology (Iran), or a creative combination of both (Venezuela). Experiences of authentic social revolutions, whether they are religious or secular, Jacobin or Bolivarian, are more important in schooling the masses in democracy and republicanism than authoritarian secularism imposed from above by enlightened despots (whether they are nationalists or socialists) or secularization molecularly effected by consumerist capitalism (the former tends to first pacify the masses and then eventually invite reaction when enlightened despotism degenerates into mere despotism, and the latter depoliticizes people and makes them passive more than any other ideology, religious or secular). And it is democracy and republicanism that we should aim for -- after all, what is socialism but the highest stage of democracy and republicanism?

Update

Yoshie Furuhashi, "El socialismo, el estadio más alto de la democracia y el republicanismo," Traducción Julio Fernández Baraibar, Critical Montages, 25 October 2005.

Sex and Race

Reactions against racism of James Watson -- who said "he is 'inherently gloomy about the prospect of Africa' because 'all our social policies are based on the fact that their intelligence is the same as ours -- whereas all the testing says not really'" -- came very fast: Robin McKie and Paul Harris, "Disgrace: How a Giant of Science Was Brought Low" (Observer, 21 October 2007). It may be a sign that the scientific establishment now accepts as the scientific norm that race, IQ, or both are social constructs rather than immutable biological essences, scientists such as the late Stephen Jay Gould having successfully educated their fellow scientists and the general public.

It has not gotten that far when it comes to gender, though, probably because most people, even many scientists, still think that gender, unlike race, has a biological foundation called sex. However, the concept of sex has changed as much as gender -- for instance, from the one-sex/two-gender model (according to which a woman is an "imperfect" man) before modernity to the two-sex/two-gender model (which has us believe that men and women are "opposite" sexes) after modernity in the West (see Thomas W. Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud, Harvard University Press, 1990) -- demonstrating that it, too, is a social construct.

The Most Powerful Pacific Weapons of the New World Order

The political economy of transnational "human rights" NGOs, even better ones like Amnesty International, is essentially a racket that commodifies morality and privatizes politics. They are even less accountable to "[p]eoples, including future generations, whose rights we seek to protect and advance" (in the extraordinarily arrogant words of the International Non-Governmental Organization Accountability Charter to which AI is a signatory) than governments they criticize. Unlike governments, they can't be voted out in elections or overthrown through revolution.

They say, "Our right to act is based on universally-recognised freedoms of speech, assembly and association, on our contribution to democratic processes, and on the values we seek to promote." But democracy is undermined, not promoted, when transnational moral corporations headquartered in the global North, accountable to no people (much like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), promote their "values" in the global South. Even though a few of them have come to occasionally criticize problems (such as violations of prisoners' rights) of some governments of the North, a majority of their targets are still in the South. The ideology that the empire of NGOs cannot do without is one that would have us believe that people of the South need help of people of the North but not vice versa -- a fundamentally racist, imperialist ideology.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri put it memorably in their book Empire (Harvard University Press, 2000):

What we are calling moral intervention is practiced today by a variety of bodies, including the news media and religious organizations, but the most important may be some of the so-called non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which, precisely because they are not run directly by governments, are assumed to act on the basis of ethical or moral imperatives. . . . Such humanitarian NGOs [e.g., Amnesty International, Oxfam, Medecins sans Frontieres, and other orgs for relief work and human rights protection] are in effect (even if this runs counter to the intentions of the participants) some of the most powerful pacific weapons of the new world order -- the charitable campaigns and the mendicant orders of the Empire. (pp. 35-6)

While Hardt and Negri do not reject the empire and its "charitable campaigns and the mendicant orders" outright, we should.

Revolutionary Realpolitik

Lenin (of Lenin's Tomb) wants socialism as "revolutionary realpolitik," "realpolitik for the poor."

Socialism is . . . realpolitik for the poor, the working class and oppressed. That involves an attempt to understand, and to detect potential temporary allies and obstacles. If it rules out certain alliances, it isn't on a priori moralistic grounds (they're eeeevvvillll, they're violent, they're ruthless, they're communalist, they're against democracy!).

Proceeding from a political economy of Political Islam demands a much more complicated set of responses than that. It would suggest, I think, that it is right for the Left in Lebanon to work with Hezbollah for a limited series of objectives, while retaining critical independence; similarly, it is right for the Left in Pakistan to utterly reject the Jamaat e-Islami, even while defending their right not to be murdered by the Pakistani state. It is certainly right for Palestinian socialists to cooperate with Hamas, and it was a sectarian mistake for some socialist groups to refuse to work with them given the gravity of the challenges faced. ("A Rational Approach to Political Islam," Lenin's Tomb, 20 October 2007)

Quite good. Machiavelli and Benjamin, Foucault and Gramsci, against liberal progressivism and Amnesty Internationalism in the North, against the India/Brazil/South Africa model (liberal democracy) in the South. Get that right, and we'll be (theoretically if not practically) ready for temporary marriage with Islam, the most important religion for the 21st century, and defense of the Bolivarian Revolution, which is likely to lose most liberal supporters it recently acquired.¹

The next step is to divorce class analysis from the implicit imperialist economism that infects much of the Marxist and other traditions on the secular Left.

1 Cf. Yoshie Furuhashi, "Reading Arendt in Caracas," Critical Montages, 18 August 2007; Steve Ellner, "The Trial (And Errors) of Hugo Chavez," In These Times, 27 August 2007; Edgardo Lander, "Party Disciplinarians: the Threat to Dissidence and Democracy in the United Socialist Party of Venezuela," Transnational Institute, 28 September 2007; and Human Rights Watch, "Venezuela: Disturbing Plan to Suspend Due Process: Chávez Supporters Seek to Suspend Rights in Emergencies," 16 October 2007.

Socialists in Europe

Socialists in Europe have to ask themselves. Is socialism possible in Europe? If so, what kind of socialism? And when? If not now or any time soon, what is to be done in the meantime? In their nation, and the European Union? Is their nation to become or remain a member of the European Union? If no, then what? If yes, what kind of Europe? How to get there?

The interval between the No vote on the European Constitution in 2005 and the elections in France this year, more than anything else, showed that the absence of clarity and of vision with regard to the aforementioned questions is a great problem. The defeat of the Left made France itself more Atlanticist -- and it can take Europe even closer than it is to the USA as well, which will be a great setback for the Third World.

We live in an age when populists of the Third World, religious or secular, have a more forward-looking vision¹ than European Marxists. That must be rectified, immediately.

1 "Ahmadinejad: Europe Can Save Itself," Press TV, 18 October 2007; Lucian Kim, "Iran, Venezuela Form Oil Venture to Rival Shell, Eni (Update1)," Bloomberg, 18 October 2007; and "Russian and Iranian Presidents' Joint Statement,' ITAR-TASS, 17 October 2007.

Russian and Iranian Presidents' Joint Statement

Juan Cole made "Russian and Iranian Presidents' Joint Statement" (translation by the United States government's Open Source Center) available at his blog Informed Comment. This is an extremely important text.

Russian and Iranian Presidents' Joint Statement
ITAR-TASS

Wednesday, October 17, 2007

Tehran, 16 October: A joint statement has been signed following today's talks in Tehran between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad. Here is its full text.

On 16 October 2007, which corresponds to 24 Mehr 1386 in the Iranian calendar, Russian President Vladimir Putin, at the head of a high-ranking delegation, paid a working visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran on the invitation of President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mahmud Ahmadinezhad. This was the first visit to Iran by a Russian head of state in the whole history of relations between the two countries.

During his stay in Tehran, Russian President Vladimir Putin took part in the Second Caspian Summit, met and held talks with Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i and President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mahmud Ahmadinezhad.

During the talks, which were held in the atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding, the sides discussed key aspects of Russian-Iranian relations and cooperation in various areas, exchanged views on important regional and international issues and reached the following agreements.

1. The sides confirmed that mutually beneficial cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and other areas, as well as cooperation on the international stage, meet the national interests of the two sides and play an important role in supporting peace and stability in the region and beyond.

2. The sides expressed their determination to further contribute to the steady development of multifaceted Russian-Iranian relations, keeping with the spirit and the letter of the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Relations and Principles of Cooperation, which was signed in Moscow on 12 March 2001.

3. On issues of trade and economic cooperation between Russia and Iran, the sides spoke in favour of increasing efforts to further expand economic ties between the two countries, especially in areas like the oil and gas, nuclear power, electricity, processing and aircraft-building industries, banking and transport. Both sides are convinced that the Permanent Russian-Iranian Commission for Trade and Economic Cooperation will make a valuable contribution to this work.

4. Special attention was paid to cooperation in the extraction and transportation of energy resources. The sides agreed to develop direct contacts between the two countries' oil and gas companies in order to sign concrete, mutually beneficial commercial agreements on joint work in all segments of the oil and gas sectors.

5. The sides confirmed their interest in coordinating marketing policies in oil and gas exports, attracting Russian companies to the development of oil and gas fields in Iran, including the Southern Pars gas field, and creating in Iran industrial facilities to produce, store and export natural gas.

6. Both sides confirmed their interest in continuing cooperation in the energy sector, including the modernization of thermal and hydro-electric power plants built with Russia's help and the construction of new ones, including the Tabas coal thermal power plant in Iran.

7. The sides noted bilateral cooperation in the area of peaceful nuclear energy and confirmed that it will continue in full compliance with the requirements of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard they also noted that the construction and launch of the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be carried out in accordance with the agreed timetable.

8. The sides noted with satisfaction the signing of a contract to supply Iran with five Tu-204-100 aircraft. In this regard they expressed interest in deepening cooperation in the area of aviation industry further. The sides support the on-going talks between the relevant organizations of the two countries on the supply to Iran and the production in this country of Tu-334 and Tu-214 commercial aircraft and Kamov civilian helicopters. They also expressed their support for a speedy preparation and signing of contracts on these projects.

9. During their meeting the presidents deemed it necessary to continue work on the creation of favourable legal, economic and financial conditions for joint investment in Russia and Iran. In this context the sides noted the need to sign as soon as possible a memorandum between the government of the Russian Federation and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the development of long-term trade and economic, industrial and scientific and technical cooperation and an agreement on facilitating and protecting capital investment.

10. The sides agreed to continue work on the development of the north-south international transport corridor, including its automobile, rail and maritime components, in the interest of further strengthening trade and economic ties between Russia and Iran, as well as other countries of the region.

In this regard the sides agreed to speed up the consideration of the issue of resumption of road transport communication between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran through the territory of (Russia's) Republic of Dagestan.

11. The sides expressed their satisfaction with the steady development of regional cooperation between the Russian Federation's constituent parts and provinces of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard they expressed confidence that the resumption of operations in the city of Rasht by the Russian Consulate General and the opening of Iran's Consulate General in the city of Kazan, Russia, will facilitate further strengthening of interregional ties between the two countries.

12. The sides discussed pressing regional problems, expressed interest in bilateral and multilateral cooperation in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus with the aim of strengthening stability and security in these regions, including by way of closer cooperation between the countries of the region on the basis of mutual respect and interest.

13. Russia and Iran advocate the development of equal and constructive cooperation between member and observer states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on matters of mutual interest.

14. The presidents of the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran confirmed the two sides' aspiration to solve all the issues arising on the Caspian Sea solely by peaceful means, through cooperation on equal footing between the five Caspian littoral states. They agree that the relevant norms of the agreements of 1921 and 1940 between Iran and the former Soviet Union remain in force until there is a convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

Taking into account the vulnerability of the environment of the Caspian Sea, the sides call on everyone to refrain from taking steps that could harm the environment, to maintain a reasonable balance between the efforts to develop energy resources and protect the marine environment of the Caspian Sea.

The sides invite the other Caspian littoral states to start talks, as soon as possible, on issues of cooperation in maintaining peace and strengthening security and stability on the Caspian. They advocate the exclusion from the Caspian of military presence of non-Caspian littoral states.

The Second Caspian Summit, which took place in Tehran on 16 October 2007 (24 Mehr 1386), and its declaration -- the first political document adopted by the five countries -- were assessed as highly significant. Satisfaction was expressed with the Caspian littoral states' positions on key issues of status, security and cooperation on the sea drawing closer to each other.

15. The sides confirmed the understanding of special responsibility of the littoral states for ensuring security on the Caspian Sea, including as regards countering new challenges and threats. In this regard the sides think that the implementation of the idea to create on the Caspian a naval group for operational cooperation (Casfor) would facilitate the elimination of the threat of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, the fight against illegal trafficking of arms and narcotics and human trafficking and facilitate the protection of the Caspian littoral states' economic interests, the strengthening of stability and security in the region and the development of cooperation and interaction in addressing common tasks. They call on all the littoral states to actively join in this project and start talks on the parameters of their cooperation for this purpose as soon as possible.

16. The Russian and Iranian presidents noted the closeness of Russia's and Iran's approaches to the tackling of key issues of world politics and confirmed their readiness to expand cooperation with the aim of building a fairer and more democratic world order which would ensure global and regional security and create favourable conditions for stable development.

It was stressed that such a world order should be based on collective principles and the supremacy of international law with the United Nations Organization playing a central coordinating role, while any international and regional conflict and crises should be settled in strict compliance with the UN Charter and norms of international law, taking into account the legitimate interests of all the sides involved.

The sides confirmed their refusal to use force or threat of force to resolve contentious issues, and their respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states.

17. The presidents stated that Russia and Iran resolutely condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, confirmed the inadmissibility of equating terrorism with any nation, culture or religion.

The sides spoke in favour of strengthening the United Nations Organization's central coordinating role in the fight against international terrorism and other new challenges and threats. They will closely cooperate in implementing the UN's global antiterrorist strategy, ensuring strict observation of norms of universal antiterrorist conventions, as well as in promoting the soonest possible completion of the process of coordinating the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.

Being concerned by the ideological expansion of terrorism, Russia and Iran pay attention to the need for a consistent implementation of all the UN Security Council resolutions which condemn terrorism and call for every possible development of global dialogue.

The sides continue their cooperation in the fight against terrorism and other new challenges and threats at the regional level, above all on the basis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, laying prime emphasis on curbing terrorist and drugs threats emanating from the territory of Afghanistan and creating anti-drugs and financial security belts around it.

The presidents noted the importance of increasing bilateral cooperation between Russia and Iran in the fight against terrorism and spoke in favour of continuing the practice of exchanging views between the ministries of foreign affairs of the two countries on the subject of countering new challenges and threats, making contacts between relevant bodies more active and giving them practical content.

18. When discussing the situation in Afghanistan, the sides expressed their concern over the continued worsening of the situation in that country, an increase in terrorist threats on the part of Taliban and other extremist forces. The presidents confirmed Russia's and Iran's intention to continue to take part in the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan and are interested in strengthening its statehood and the process of that country becoming a peaceful, democratic, independent and flourishing state.

19. The sides expressed their concern over the difficult humanitarian situation in the occupied Palestinian Territories, especially in connection with the effective isolation of Gaza Strip.

The presidents noted that the restoration of Palestinian-wide consensus and unity through dialogue is a necessary precondition for the implementation of national aspirations of the Palestinian people, including the creation of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state.

The Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran confirmed their adherence to reaching a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict.

20. The sides noted the need to strengthen the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon and maintain national unity, stability, security and peace in that country. The sides support efforts to achieve accord between various Lebanese movements to enable them to make decisions vital for Lebanon, within the framework of the constitution, with the participation of all political forces of the country, without any interference from abroad. The sides believe that this is the only way to take the country out of the present crisis.

21. The Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed vigorous support for Iraq's territorial integrity and sovereignty and for an end to foreign military presence in that country on the basis of the relevant schedule.

Supporting Iraq's government and parliament, which was elected on the basis of the constitution, the sides express hope that inter-faction strife, which negatively affects their work, will be soon overcome through a comprehensive pan-Iraqi dialogue.

22. Acknowledging the strategic importance and sensitivity of the Gulf region, as well as the importance of supporting security and stability there, the sides noted a need for collective cooperation of all littoral states in ensuring peace and security in the region and developing tools to ensure security within the framework of international law.

The sides noted the importance of reducing foreign military presence in the region and drawing up common measures of trust between regional and other states in order to ensure stability and security in the Gulf region.

23. The presidents of Russia and Iran noted the need to settle the issue of Iran's nuclear programme as soon as possible by political and diplomatic means through talks and dialogue and expressed hope that a long-term comprehensive solution will be found.

After the visit to Iran, Russian President Vladimir Putin thanked President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mahmud Ahmadinezhad for hospitality and warm welcome and invited him to visit Russia at his convenience. The invitation was received by the Iranian president with gratitude. The sides will agree on the date of the visit through diplomatic channels.

Note that Russia is now consciously positioning itself as a counter-power to the USA in the Middle East, including the crucial Persian Gulf region.

Opium for the Masses

The US-led multinational empire holds up Shining India as an example of what liberal democracy can do for the Third World: "Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush today declare their resolve to transform the relationship between their countries and establish a global partnership. As leaders of nations committed to the values of human freedom, democracy and rule of law, the new relationship between India and the United States will promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace throughout the world" ("Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh," 18 July 2005).

But liberal democracy in the Third World, for instance, lets 99.6% of its population who are in need of palliative care do without it, "spending their last days writhing in agony, wishing death would hurry":

Although opium was one of the chief exports of British India and the country still produces more for the legal morphine industry than any other country, few Indians benefit. They end up like millions of the world’s poor -- spending their last days writhing in agony, wishing death would hurry.

About 1.6 million Indians endure cancer pain each year. Because of tobacco and betel nut chewing, India leads the world in mouth and head tumors, and has high rates of lung, breast and cervical cancer. Tens of thousands also die in pain from AIDS, burns or accidents.

But only a tiny fraction -- Dr. [M. R.] Rajagopal ["India's 'father of palliative care'"] estimates 0.4 percent -- get relief.

Clinics dispensing morphine are so scarce that some patients live 500 miles from the nearest. Calcutta, a city of 14 million, has only one. (Donald G. McNeil, Jr., "In India, a Quest to Ease the Pain of the Dying," New York Times, 11 September 2007)

The world's largest democracy does have occasionally useful parliamentary Communists, and one of the things that they are reportedly good at is prescribing opium for the masses:

The exception is Kerala, where Dr. Rajagopal practices and about 80 percent of India’s palliative care is delivered. A small slice of the southwest coast, it is sort of India’s Massachusetts: it has a mere 3 percent of the population, but high literacy rates, responsive local leadership and a bent for bucking central government.

The state government allows any doctor with six weeks of training -- which Dr. Rajagopal provides -- to prescribe morphine. (McNeil, Jr., 11 September 2007)

Antiquities

"Under Saddam you were likely to be tortured and shot if you let someone steal an antiquity; in today's Iraq you are likely to be tortured and shot if you don't." -- Abbas al-Hussaini, "the head of Iraq's supposedly sovereign board of antiquities and heritage," as paraphrased by Simon Jenkins ("In Iraq's Four-year Looting Frenzy, the Allies Have Become the Vandals," Guardian, 8 June 2007)

If I keep reading things like this, I'll be tempted to give not only Iran's sexy President but also its Islamo-Stalinist Leader a blank check for defending his country -- and the cultural heritage of humanity that exists there -- from vandals by any means necessary.

Armenians in Iran

By the way, do you know that there live in Iran about 400,000 Armenians? On the 24th of April every year, they commemorate the Ottoman massacre of Armenians: "Iranian Armenians Gather in Tehran to Commemorate the 24st April", Cultural Heritage News Agency (see Hossein Salmanzadeh's photos of the 2006 commemoration).

One of the best Iran Studies scholars, Ervand Abrahamian, is an Armenian born in Iran and raised in Britain. Abrahamian notes: "As a gesture of goodwill toward the Christians, the Islamic Republic issued a postage stamp bearing Jesus' silhouette and a Koranic verse in Armenian -- the first time Armenian had appeared on a stamp since the fall of the Armenian Republic in 1921" (Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic, Berkeley: University of California, 1993).

Iran's relation with Armenia is also good: "Armenian President Rejects Sanctions against Iran," Islamic Republic News Agency, 10 July 2007.

Armenians, Dalai Lama, and Other Good News

Check this out: Neela Banerjee, "Armenian Issue Presents a Dilemma for U.S. Jews" (New York Times, 19 October 2007). The Armenian genocide resolution, alienating Turks from Washington and putting the ADL, the AJC, and Co. (who oppose it because "Israel’s relationship with Turkey is the second most important, after its relationship with the United States" in the words of ADL national director Abraham H. Foxman) in hot water, is a Democratic gift that just keeps giving. They should bring one up every year! Meanwhile, the Congress also gave Dalai Lama a Congressional Gold Medal, angering China: "Strong Protest Lodged over US Congress Award to Dalai Lama" (China Daily, 19 October 2007). Perfect. If only they could also call for an international tribunal of the killings of Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko or do something equally foolish!

At the same time, Indian Communists are making themselves useful. On the front page of the Hindu today: "Left Parties Will Not Allow India to Be Junior Partner of U.S., Says Karat" (19 October 2007); and "Manmohan Rules Out Resignation" (19 October 2007), which means that the Indo-US nuclear deal is dead.

Turkey as a Eurasian Player

The Democrats, for once, have done the Syrians and the Iranians a favor. Anything that further alienates Turks from Washington¹ is good for Syria and Iran, and the Armenian genocide resolution manages to anger Turks nearly across the political spectrum (rightists object on nationalist grounds, leftists object on anti-imperialist grounds).

The AKP, in any event, has been improving Turkey's relations with Iran and Syria for some time. Ankara, Damascus, and Tehran are united in opposition to the US backing of Kurds.² The Turks, whose country is a NATO member, have the most freedom among them to threaten the Kurdish guerrillas and terrorists in Iraq, which indirectly benefits Iran and Syria, especially if the Turks can do so without undermining Iran's Kurdish friends.³ The AKP has also deepened Turkey's energy ties with Iran (especially the Nabucco gas pipeline) and Russia (especially the Blue Stream pipeline and the Blue Stream Two extension), having them compete with each other. By doing so, the AKP has smartly positioned Turkey as the key player in the energy networks that link Europe, Russia and its Central Asian periphery, and Iran.

That all these actions have been taken by a political party strongly backed by not just European but also American ruling classes (as you recall the Western media's largely positive coverage of the AKP during the Turkish elections this year) in a country that has been one of the most important links in the US-led multinational empire in the Middle East, overriding Washington's strong objections, says a lot about the decline of US hegemony.

The Iraq War, as well as the weakening dollar hegemony, is indeed beginning to give birth to a new Middle East -- just not the kind that Trotskyist-turned-neo-conservative revolutionaries had wished for.

1 Even before the resolution became an issue, most Turks had become profoundly alienated from the US and the EU:

Turkish feelings toward the United States and European Union have continued to cool, with warmth toward the United States dropping from 20 degrees in 2006 to 11 in 2007 on a 100-point thermometer scale, and from 45 degrees to 26 toward the European Union. . . .

Turkish respondents continued to have the most critical views of U.S. and EU leadership in world affairs, with 74% of Turkish respondents who viewed U.S. leadership in world affairs as undesirable, an increase of five percentage points since 2006. For the first time, a majority (54%) also viewed EU leadership as undesirable, an increase of seven percentage points since 2006. Similarly, only three percent approved of President Bush's handling of international policies and 83% disapproved.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Turkish support for NATO has continued its decline since 2004, with Turkish respondents divided almost equally: 35% of respondents (–9 percentage points from last year) agreed that NATO is still essential for their country's security, while 34% said it is no longer essential, and 31% did not know or refused to answer. (German Marshall Fund, "Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2007,", pp. 21-22)

2 PEJAK's base area is said to be the same as its sister party PKK's.
3 The AKP has to be also careful about two domestic risks in its confrontation with the PKK: empowering the Kemalist military establishment; and alienating Kurdish voters, an increasing number of whom have voted for the party. However, it is said that the PKK itself had already lost many of its erstwhile supporters and sympathizers: Sabrina Tavernise, "As Kurds’ Status Improves, Support for Militants Erodes in Turkey," New York Times, 2 November 2007.

Updated on 3 November 2003.

Beauty in Islam

I'm intrigued by sartorial aspects of Islam, the way they both invite and forbid the gaze, in the mirror of the Western imagination. The mirror fetishizes the veil -- as the symbol of not only manifest oppression but also secret sexuality, a harem that is haram and haraam as it were -- in particular and makes it a synecdoche for the whole Islamic tradition, a mirror image of the Islamist imagination.

What should a feminist, especially a Muslim feminist, do? Don't look into the Western and Islamist mirrors. Instead, play with Orientalism and Occidentalism in aesthetic elaboration of Islamic civilization, inventing a new tradition of beauty in Islam and defamiliarizing it at the same time.

A man who was beautiful came to the Prophet (peace be upon him). He said: Apostle of Allah, I am a man who likes beauty, and I have been given some of it, as you see. And I do not like that anyone excels me (in respect of beauty). . . . Is it pride? He replied: No, pride is disdaining what is true and despising people. -- Sunan Abu-Dawud, 32.4081

Vision of a Europe for a Eurasian Century

In the new alignment of the US, the UK, and France, the weakest link is, of course, France.

Socialists are not sold on Bernard Kouchner's line,¹ and Sarko the American is likely to prove as much of a divider² as Bush.

The French Left, however, need a vision thing. What kind of vision? Like this. The 21st century shall be a Eurasian century, in which European nations for the first time become Europe, under Franco-German leadership, a Europe that recognizes Islam as a Eurasian religion, an integral part of the Western Civilization that ought to have existed but never did. And this Europe shall have a foreign policy of its own, independent of Washington's, and come to terms with nuclear Iran, push the Jewish state from the sea to the river to give voting rights to Palestinians in the OPTs, and re-invite Turkey, a friend of Iran and Israel, in good faith to become a member of the European Union.

1 Check out the Socialist Party line on Iran:

Mohammad EL BARADEI, Directeur général de l'AIEA, déploie des efforts considérables pour tenter de trouver une solution à la crise, en mettant en place une méthode de solution des principaux points en litiges et fait état des signaux encourageants en ce sens.

Il ne voit pas aujourd'hui de danger clair concernant le programme nucléaire iranien. C'est le moment qu'ont choisi Nicolas SARKOZY et son ministre des Affaires Etrangères pour préconiser des sanctions hors Nations Unies et des préparatifs de guerre. La position de Nicolas SARKOZY, s'engageant à nouveau dans un scénario à l'Irakienne ne peut s'expliquer que par son alignement sur l'administration Bush. Cet alignement affaiblit l'autorité de l'ONU, met en danger la crédibilité, les intérêts et la sécurité de la France et est en contradiction avec les engagements de notre pays au Moyen-Orient.

Le Parti socialiste estime que l'AIEA doit mener jusqu'au bout la procédure de vérification du programme nucléaire iranien et la mise en œuvre d'un système rigoureux de contrôles internationaux. La France ne peut s'engager avec autant de légèreté dans des confrontations militaires dans une région si instable et mouvementée.

Le Parti socialiste demande qu'un débat soit engagé rapidement au Parlement sur ce dossier.

Communiqué du Secrétariat international ("IRAN: Déclaration de Bernard Kouchner," 17 septembre 2007)

Nor is the rest of the European Union eager to follow Sarko and Kouchner's plan to further Americanize Europe: "A number of EU states -- such as Germany -- say the EU must not start applying a raft of sanctions wholly outside the UN framework, arguing that this would risk fragmenting the UN process" (James Blitz and Fidelius Schmid, "EU Seeks to Step Up Pressure on Tehran," Financial Times, 16 October 2007).

2 See Elaine Sciolino, "Is Nicolas Sarkozy's Honeymoon Over?" International Herald Tribune, 16 October 2007; and Associated Press, "French Transport to Stand Still in First Major Strikes against Sarkozy's Reforms," 17 October 2007.

Putin in Iran

This is the energy front of the Great Game of the 21st century: "In Iran, Putin Warns against Military Action" (Nazila Fathi, New York Times, 17 October 2007); and "Putin Heads to Iran, Seeking Tighter Grip on Europe's Energy" (Lucian Kim, Bloomberg, 15 October 2007). If Iran and Russia can come up with a win-win solution for them, while getting Europeans to consent to it, it will be a great leap forward to checking US hegemony. It is not impossible, for Post-Soviet Russia and post-Khomeini Iran, less ideologically dogmatic on both sides, have certain common interests, unless the Russians think it is more important to prevent Iran's rise as a gas exporter than to deny US hegemony in Central Asia.

Putín en Irán

He aquí el frente energético del Gran Juego del Siglo XXI: "In Iran, Putin Warns against Military Action" (Nazila Fathi, New York Times, 17 Octubre 2007); y "Putin Heads to Iran, Seeking Tighter Grip on Europe's Energy" (Lucian Kim, Bloomberg, 15 Octubre 2007). Si Irán y Rusia llegan a una solución mutuamente beneficiosa y consiguen que los europeos la acepten, será un gran paso adelante para ponerle límites a la hegemonía estadounidense. La Rusia post-soviética y el Irán post-jomeinista son menos dogmáticos que en otros tiempos; no es imposible que tengan ciertos intereses comunes, a no ser que los rusos piensen que impedir el ascenso de Irán como exportador de gas es más importante que negar la hegemonía estadounidense en Asia Central. (Traducción Néstor Gorojovsky)

La inversión ideológica de los Nuevos Ateos

La inversión ideológica de los Nuevos Ateos

Por Yoshie Furuhashi
Traducción de Julio Fernández Baraibar

Richard Dawkins, uno de los llamados Nuevos Ateos, es mencionado en el Guardian con la siguiente cita:

"Cuando uno piensa qué éxito fantástico ha tenido el lobby judío, pese a que, de hecho, son menos numerosos -- los judíos religiosos, por lo menos -- que los ateos y [así y todo] monopolizan, en más o en menos, la política exterior norteamericana mucho más de lo que mucha gente ve. De manera que si los ateos pudieran alcanzar una pequeña fracción de esa influencia, el mundo sería un mejor lugar". (Ewen MacAskill, "Atheists Arise: Dawkins Spreads the A-word among America's Unbelievers," 1 October 2007)

El comentario de Dawkins sobre los judíos y los ateos ilustra la cuestión de los Nuevos Ateos

Uno: aparte de no ser teístas, los ateos entre sí tienen muy poco en común. Los ateos pueden ser del ala izquierda, del ala derecha o del ala de pollo. Además, en muchas sociedades, incluyendo los EE.UU., los ateos tienden a menudo a ser hallados en los rangos sociales más altos y no en la mitad más pobre de la sociedad. Esto significa que el ateísmo, a pesar de la expresión de deseos de Dawkins, es un cimiento particularmente pobre para una política clasista de izquierda.

Dos: una vez que uno empieza a ver las cosas principalmente a través de una perspectiva que divide el mundo entre la religión y la irreligión y elogia políticamente la última en contra de la primera, uno comienza a imaginar, por ejemplo, que el Lobby de Israel o el lobby judío es un lobby religioso. La columna subjetiva del sionismo, sin embargo, no es la religion, excepto para los sionistas cristianos, y, objetivamente, no es el sionismo el que mueve al imperio multinacional dirigido por los EE.UU. sino que es el imperio que usa al sionismo -- así como explota otros tipos de políticas identitarias, así sean basadas en la raza, el género, sexualidad, la etnicidad, la ocupación o lo que sea -- y lo descartará si le deja de ser útil. En otras palabras, la ideología de los Nuevos Ateos, así como la religión que critican, invierte el mundo real. Una ilusión profana no es un buen sustituto de una ilusión sagrada.

Dissident Mystique and Leadership Phobia

As in any country, there are leaders, and there are leaders, and there are dissidents, and there are dissidents, in Iran. Some leaders and dissidents advance national, class, and social interests of Iran's working people; other leaders and dissidents set them back, some to the point of destroying their nation. It is the former we should support, and it is the latter we ought to criticize.

However, most leftists in the West tend to be guided by a mythical contest between the BAD Leadership and the GOOD Dissidents that exists only in their imagination when it comes to picturing politics in Iran in particular and the global South in general. That is a misleading guide. It's time for us to cast away both dissident mystique and leadership phobia.

Hamid Dabashi, to his credit, sometimes helps us question the aforementioned mythical contest (which is why liberals such as Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson disparage this aspect of Dabashi's work).

. . . [B]y far the most atrocious aspect of Bollinger's statement is that because of the slanted relation of power it flaunts it ipso facto shifts the center of gravity of contemporary Iranian political predicament away from Iran and Iranians themselves and places it in the self-righteous domain of a white man and his civilizing mission. It is precisely the same colonial attitude that is perpetrated in the statement written by Akbar Ganji and circulated for signatures among exclusively non-Iranian signatories. Not a single Iranian was allowed, even if he or she insisted, to sign that statement. Akbar Ganji's deeply colonized mind, denying Iranians themselves the right and responsibility to have a say in their national destiny, tallies perfectly well with Bollinger's deeply racist mind to presume that he is telling Iranians something they do not know. Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of Lee Bollinger's statement is the appearance of the name of Akbar Ganji in it, for in that single reference Lee Bollinger and Akbar Ganji appear as the two-sides of the same colonial coin that denies nations agency and assigns to white men the authority and audacity to civilize the world. Is it even conceivable for Gandhi to launch his movement to liberate India and systematically deny Indians a say in the affairs of their homeland, or for Mandela to write a statement on behalf of civil liberties in South Africa and disallow South Africans to sign it? This is precisely what Akbar Ganji has done, and that is precisely the reason why he is so easily incorporated into Bollinger's racist assumption that he has to bear the heavy burden of liberating Iran and civilizing the world. To avoid that trap, it is long overdue that people like Akbar Ganji look at movements led by Gandhi and Mandela as example of their struggle, rather than come to the United States, go on a Shi'i pilgrimage of collecting white talismans of names he considers worthy of defending the cause of liberty in his homeland. (Hamid Dabashi, "Of Banality and Burden," Al-Ahram Weekly 866, 11-17 October 2007)

Dissidents who become "native informers" for the empire, like Ganji for instance, cannot and should not be supported.

New Atheists' Ideological Inversion

Richard Dawkins, one of the so-caled New Atheists, is quoted as saying in the Guardian:

"When you think about how fantastically successful the Jewish lobby has been, though, in fact, they are less numerous I am told -- religious Jews anyway -- than atheists and [yet they] more or less monopolise American foreign policy as far as many people can see. So if atheists could achieve a small fraction of that influence, the world would be a better place." (Ewen MacAskill, "Atheists Arise: Dawkins Spreads the A-word among America's Unbelievers," 1 October 2007)

Dawkins' remark on Jews and atheists illustrates the problem of the New Atheists.

One, aside from not being theists, atheists have little else in common with one another. Atheists can be left-wing, right-wing, or chicken-wing. Moreover, in many societies, including the USA, atheists tend to be more often found among the ranks of the better off than among the poorer half of society. That means that atheism, despite Dawkins' wishful thinking, is a particularly poor foundation for left-wing class politics.

Two, once you begin to see things mainly through the perspective that divides the world between the religious and the irreligious and pits the latter politically against the former, you begin to imagine, for instance, that the Israel lobby = the Jewish lobby = a religious lobby. The subjective pillar of Zionism, however, is not religion except for Christian Zionists, and, objectively, it is not Zionism that moves the US-led multinational empire but the empire that makes use of Zionism -- just as it exploits any other kind of identity politics, whether it is based on race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, occupation, or whatever -- and will discard it if it ceases to be useful to it. In other words, the New Atheists' ideology, just like religion that they criticize, inverts the real world. A profane illusion is no substitute for a sacred one.

Update

Read it in Spanish, translation courtesy of Julio Fernández Baraibar: "La inversión ideológica de los Nuevos Ateos," Critical Montages, 15 October 2007.

Privatization Iranian Style

Iran's Press TV announces the privatization of state enterprises in the oil industry, claiming that "oil privatization in Iran can serve as a model for other regional countries" ("Iran, a Model for Oil Privatization," 7 October 2007). Is it true? If it were a model privatization according to the Washington Consensus, the business press should be jumping up and down and hailing Iran's power elite as if they were the AKP of Turkey, the West's favorite Islamist party, but they aren't. Why is that?

Note that the upstream sector, i.e. the exploration and production sector, is excluded from the privatization plan: "Iran's Oil Ministry Excludes 25 Companies from Privatization" (Tehran Times, 8 October 2007). In other words, Iran's government will be privatizing only the enterprises that are normally not in the state's hands to begin with in other countries.

For international comparison of national oil companies and their upstream fiscal regimes, see Figure 1 on page 9 of Miranda L. Wainberg and Michelle Michot Foss, "Commercial Framework for National Oil Companies" (Working Paper, Center for Energy Economics, University of Texas at Austin, March 2007).

Click on the figure for a larger view.

To top it off, this is what "privatization" in Iran looks like: "the fact the purchasers are themselves state entities casts doubt on whether this can be termed a real privatization."¹ It's better to describe this as transition "from a state-held monopoly to a state-sanctioned oligopoly" as Daniel Brumberg and Ariel I. Ahram put it.²

This mode of "privatization" has complex effects:

• in the long term, it is likely to create a caste of people who may eventually threaten the politico-economic foundation of the Islamic Republic;


• in the short term, it gives power to the Bonyads (religious foundations) and the Pasdaran (the Revolutionary Guards) whose leaders, workers, and beneficiaries are among the sectors of the Iranian population who are the most ideologically invested in the Islamic Revolution and its brand of populism;


• in the medium term, it may help Iran's government alleviate the following problem:
  

  While the firm is obliged to give over 25 percent of its profits from crude and (when prices are high) a deposit to the oil stabilization fund, NIOC keeps for itself revenues derived from petrochemicals, gas, domestic sales of gasoline, and can make use of gas for reinjection to revive older fields. This type of arrangement provides NIOC with ample incentive to continue to work on diversifying Iran's petroleum industry, as any improvement in non-oil capability will benefit NIOC directly. However, it also has the potential for long-term conflict between state interests in maximizing the revenue from oil, and NIOC preference to focus on gas and petrochemicals as more lucrative ventures. (Brumberg and Ahram, pp. 30-31)

1 This is Privatization Iranian Style:

The Tehran stock exchange has broken its record for the highest ever transaction on the nascent bourse with the sale of shares worth over $1 billion dollars in a state copper company, media reported yesterday.

Twenty percent of shares in National Iranian Copper Industries were sold in less than seven minutes on Wednesday for 10 trillion rials ($1.1 billion).

The purchaser was a consortium made up mainly of state companies, including the pension funds of the steel industry and state broadcasting, the reports said.

While the shares have been sold as part of the government's ongoing privatization program, the fact the purchasers are themselves state entities casts doubt on whether this can be termed a real privatization.

Another 20 percent of the company would go on sale in the next week, media reports said.

The deal easily tops the previous high set earlier this year when the Iranian government sold almost $110 million worth of shares in a leading steel company.

Privatization program:

The state currently has a grip on over three-quarters of Iran's economy and supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei last year issued a decree envisaging a major program of privatization.

Drawn up by the Expediency Council, Iran's top political arbitration body headed by former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the plan aims to ease state control over the economy.

The program set out by Khamenei to privatize 80 percent of public and state institutions notably excludes firms in the oil and energy sector as well as industries involved in work connected to defense and security.

But President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been criticized by observers for dragging his feet on privatization and seeking to hand out a large proportion of the shares in privatized companies as "justice" shares to the poor.

The Tehran stock exchange slumped following the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005 but has recovered in the last six months and in the last days topped the 10,000 points barrier. (Agence France-Presse, "Iran Bourse Breaks Record with Billion Dollar Trade," Turkish Daily News, 14 September 2007)

2 See "The National Iranian Oil Company in Iranian Politics," The Changing Role of National Oil Companies (NOCs) in International Energy Markets, Baker Institute Energy Forum, March 2007, p. 5. Go ahead and read the whole article, and you'll learn much about the faction fight between populists and neoliberals in Iran. The long and short of it is that Iran's populist President has been unable to defeat the oil mafia, and he won't be able to do so unless and until Iran's working people get ready to fight a good fight at the level they did at the time of Iran's Islamic Revolution, challenging nothing less than the authority of the Leader, the cornerstone of the political structure of the Islamic Republic. It is obvious that now is not the right time for that, what with Iran being the number one target of the empire.

"We Do It for Ourselves"

Did we learn anything from the destruction of Iraq? An anti-war movement doesn't prevent war, nor does it stop it once it begins. The only way to prevent the invasion of Iraq would have been to stop sanctions and get America to normalize its relation with Iraq during the Clinton administration. Let's not repeat the same failure and help destroy another nation in the Middle East.

Or else we will be only echoing Lee Bollinger from the Left on the eve of another catastrophe: "[T]o be clear on another matter -- this event has nothing whatsoever to do with" the Iranian people, "but only with our rights to . . . speak. We do it for ourselves" (24 September 2007).

Seduction of Islam

Western discourse about Islam today resembles Western discourse about homosexuality^* before Stonewall: if you find "them" attractive, you either are or will soon become "one of them." This discourse imagines the relationship between the Westerner and Islam as if it were a sexual proposition: "One could liken Islam to a proposal of marriage made by a highly eligible if somewhat authoritarian man. In both cases, there is naturally a great temptation to accept the proposal, even if one's mind shyly raises some objections" (Stefan Weidner, "The Mystery of Conversion -- Why Islam Can Also Prove So Seductive to Westerners," Trans. Chris Cave, Goethe-Institut, September 2007). What is fascinating, the West is feminized in this usually Islamophobic, occasionally Islamophilic discourse (this Goethe-Institut article combines both qualities).

What should a historical materialist do about this anxious turn in Orientalism? Take it and turn it against itself. Appropriation is the name of the micro-political game here, in service to the macro-political Great Game to expropriate the empire. A historical materialist literary conceit for that may be, "I am the Western Civilization that ought to have existed but never did, being in love with, and proposing temporary marriage (a quintessentially Shi'i custom) to, the Islamic Republic that is not yet but shall be."

* Quentin Crisp said in a documentary about Hollywood representation of homosexuality: "Mainstream people dislike homosexuality because they can't help concentrating on what homosexual men do to one another. And when you contemplate what people do, you think of yourself doing it. . . . That's the famous joke: I don't like peas, and I'm glad I don't like them, because if I liked them, I would eat them, and I would hate them" (The Celluloid Closet, Dir. Robert Epstein and Jeffrey Friedman [based upon the work of film historian Vito Russo, The Celluloid Closet: Homosexuality in the Movies], 1995).

"Suck Cock to Beat the Draft"

During the Vietnam War, the Gay Liberation Front raised slogans such as "Suck Cock to Beat the Draft." Nowadays, such a liberationist perspective is a marginalized one in the GLBTQ communities, and the dominant demand regarding the armed forces is an equal right to serve. A perfectly legitimate demand in terms of liberalism, one crucial for attainment of full citizenship, but one that is hard to reconcile with anti-imperialist politics, let alone socialist politics, for the USA is an empire, especially since it is currently at war.

Passive Revolution

I suspect that the age of Jacobin social revolutions -- beginning with the French Revolution and ending with Iran's Islamic Revolution -- is over.

Gramsci posed a question: ". . . does there exist an absolute identity between war of position and passive revolution? Or at least does there exist, or can there be conceived, an entire historical period in which the two concepts must be considered identical -- until the point at which the war of position once again becomes a war of maneuver?"(Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 108).

That historical period is now. Today, what is on the political agenda is indeed a war of position, and it is in this context where I consider the concepts of hegemony and passive revolution as useful ones for working toward social change, especially in such countries as Iran and Venezuela.

What is passive revolution? Gramsci put it this way: "what was involved was not a social group which 'led' other groups, but a State which, even though it had limitations as a power, 'led' the group which should have been 'leading' and was able to put at the latter's disposal an army and a politico-diplomatic strength" (Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 105).

In Venezuela, a petit-bourgeois populist leader has political supremacy; in Iran, a petit-bourgeois populist leader is at war of position with other petit-bourgeois leaders who are neoliberal. Workers, peasants, and others ought to push them for more change in their interest.

On a day when I am uncharacteristically optimistic, I think it not impossible to use "political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie," or at least go into that direction, despite great odds against it.

National and Social Struggles

Julio Huato, a left-wing economist, comments on the difficult question of how to reconcile national and social struggles, especially when the nation becomes a target of the empire's regime change campaign:

I'd argue that, under some conditions (e.g. Iran's conditions now), the fight against sexism (or against religious obscurantism) needs to be subordinated to higher priorities. The ranking of priorities in the struggle is not dictated by the left (inside or outside), but by the dynamics of each particular society. (Julio Huato, "New Spirit of Capitalism," 9 October 2007)

If we look back in history, we can indeed see how the empire has sought to exploit divisions in its target nations, including the gender division, and sometimes succeeded in doing so. The roles that Poder Feminino and other women's organizations, such as wives of striking copper miners in 1971 and those of striking transportation workers in 1973, some knowingly, others unknowingly, played in destabilizing the Allende administration are the best known example. In the case of Chile, the most powerful component of anti-government women were religious conservative upper-middle-class women; in the case of Iran, secular liberal upper-middle-class women are among those whom the empire wants to use through its "democracy assistance" component of the regime change campaign.

The best response that Iran's government can make to the empire's "democracy assistance" is to reform Iran preemptively, strengthening women's rights, expanding sexual freedom, and so on, but both the government and society it governs are made up of people who have a wide range of opinions about these questions, and some sectors of the population are even more conservative than the government itself, so no change can come about overnight.

In the meantime, therefore, we ought to concentrate on getting Washington to take regime change off the table, so people of Iran can concentrate on reforming the state and society without worrying about social conflicts being exploited by the empire to create a climate of ungovernability and impose its imperial solution.

Sexism vs. Patriarchy

Many use the terms "sexism" and "patriarchy" interchangeably. Against this imprecise usage, I'd propose the following definitions:

Patriarchy subordinates not only women but also younger men to the patriarch of an extended family, in a society where the relation of hierarchical dependency and obligation is the norm.

Sexism, in contrast to patriarchy, justifies subordination of women to men -- often rationalizing it as biologically or culturally grounded exception to the rule of independent individuals with equal rights -- but not younger men to older men, and it is found in a society where kinship has contracted greatly.

Clarified thus, these terms should help us grasp the North-South sexual gap. In the global South, patriarchy predominates; in the global North, sexism prevails.

Chiísmo, científico y utópico

Chiísmo, científico y utópico

Por Yoshie Furuhashi
Traducción Julio Fernández Baraibar

¿Cuál es hoy el principal peligro para los intelectuales de la diáspora iraní?   Su deseo de "mirar hacia Occidente"¹.  Su tentación de llamar a "la potencia americana", en nombre de "un supuestamente agradecido público iraní, dirigido por la clase media occidentalizada" a través de una guerra ideológica que hace que Irán sea vista como la República del Miedo.

. . . (Kanan) Makiya argumentaba que, una vez liberado, ellos (los iraquíes) se quitarían de encima las gastadas ortodoxias de la política árabe y, para su desesperación, mirarían hacia Occidente.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

"Estaba condenado", me dijo (Ali) Allawi.  "Lo que estaba condenado era el intento de modernizar Iraq en una especie de renovación civilizatoria, usando el poder americano en alianza con un supuestamente agradecido público iraquí, dirigido por una clase media occidentalizada.  Se hizo evidente que este presupuesto era falso.  Y que está compuesto por una serie de decisiones desastrosas" (Dexter Filkins, "Regrets Only?" New York Times Magazine, 7 October 2007).

Kanan Makiya debería ser una lección para los izquierdistas de la diáspora intelectual.  Ellos no pueden amar a Irán del modo como yo lo hago porque ellos están cargados con el peso de las pérdidas personales y las derrotas históricas, pero si el imperio multinacional dirigido por los EE.UU. tiene éxito en la destrucción de Irán², ya sea por medio de una guerra económica, "una asistencia democrática", una fuerza militar, o (como es lo más probable) la última posibilidad, después de una década de ejercicio de las dos primeras, ellos van a perder más de lo que yo perderé, de la misma manera que Kanan Makiya debió perder en Iraq más de los que yo perdí.

1 Las siguientes palabras de Jalal Al-e Ahmad suenan como una verdad cuando uno mira la cultura de, más o menos, el primer 20 por ciento de las naciones del Sur, dependiendo esta proporción del nivel de su desarrollo capitalista:

Seguir a Occidente -- los estados occidentales y sus empresas petroleras- es la suprema manifestación de "occidentosis" en nuestra época.  Así es cómo la industria occidental nos saquea, cómo nos dirige, cómo maneja nuestro destino.  Una vez que tú has dado el control político y económico de tu país a las empresas extranjeras, ellos saben qué venderte o, por lo menos, qué no venderte.  Porque como ellos buscan obviamente venderte sus productos en perpetuidad, es mejor que tú permanezcas para siempre en necesidad de ellos y Dios salve tus reservas petroleras.  Ellos se llevarán el petróleo y te darán cualquier cosa que quieras a cambio -- desde sopas a nueces, o incluso granos.  Este comercio forzoso se extiende incluso a cuestiones culturales, a letras, a discursos.  Hojea nuestra media docena de las llamadas publicaciones literarias pesadas.  ¿Qué noticias ves de nuestra parte del mundo?  ¿De Oriente, en términos más lejanos?  ¿De India, Japón, China?  Todo lo que ves son noticias del premio Nobel, del nuevo Papa, de Francoise Sagan, del Festival de Cannes, de la última obra de Broadway, de la última película de Hollywood.  Y esto sin mencionar los semanarios ilustrados, que son mucho más evidentes.  ¿Si a esto no se lo llama "occidentosis", cómo podemos llamarlo? (Occidentosis: Una plaga que viene del Oeste, Mizan Press, 1984, p. 62-3)

El hábito "espontáneamente" cultivado por muchos intelectuales de los países que miran hacia Occidente, o más bien el mítico Occidente, sirve a las clases dominantes del imperio multinacional dirigido por EE.UU., incorporando la clase alta y los estratos medios al liberalismo, al americanismo, a la ideología de "Libertad, Igualdad, Propiedad y Bentham".  Ver el artículo de Shirin S. Deylami, "In the Face of the Machine: Westoxification, Cultural Collision, and the Making of Perso-Islamic Ideology" (Frente a la Máquina de Occidentosis, Choque Cultural y la Producción de una Ideología Perso-Islámica) (Octubre, 2006) para una crítica a dos erróneas interpretaciones de la ideología de Ahmad (y otras parecidas) como "una invocación al pasado" y " un desdén por la moderna globalización" en todas sus formas actuales y potenciales.  Esta mala interpretación, sostiene Deylami, pierde el punto principal de la crítica de la Occidentosis: "el apuntar a una específica forma de hegemonía económica, política y cultural" (página 1).

2 Irán, de no haber sido por la maldición del petróleo y la fe en el Duodécimo Imán, debería haber sido un Japón del Asia Occidental; por el contrario, si Japón no hubiera llegado a ser una potencia imperial por derecho propio, Kita Ikki debería haber sido un Jalal Al-e Ahmad del Japón.  Como las cosas han sucedido de la manera en que sucedieron, nuestros senderos fueron en direcciones completamente opuestas.  Los intelectuales de la diáspora iraní no se dan cuenta que los hombres y mujeres de la clase trabajadora de su país, tercamente religiosos, que los rechazan y en su lugar siguen a Khomeini, están haciendo una elección más fina que mis compatriotas.  Pero si ellos no miran hacia Occidente y, en su lugar, miran hacia Oriente, apreciarán lo que tienen.  Los iraníes tienen una república propia, aunque sea religiosa; los japoneses tienen un "estado cliente", aunque sea secular, conducido por burócratas japoneses y gangsters al servicio del emperador americano.  Además, la república que ha expulsado a sus intelectuales cosmopolitas, podría, si es permitido vivir, eventualmente recibirlos de vuelta, quizás bajo las banderas de un chiísmo que es a la vez científico y utópico.

Notas del Traductor:
Kita Ikki (1883-1937) fue un intelectual, escritor y filósofo político japonés, en actividad durante el principio del Japón del período Showa (Período de la Paz Ilustrada, correspondiente al reino del emperador Showa [Hirohito]).  Durante sus años de estudiante de la Universidad Waseda en Tokio, fue atraído por las ideas socialistas, reuniéndose con muchas de las figuras influyentes del primer movimiento socialista en Japón.  También fue atraído por la Revolución China de 1911 y se hizo miembro de la Togmeng Hui (Liga Unida) dirigida por Song Jiaoren.  Estuvo en China y presenció la caída de la dinastía Qing.

A su retorne a Japón en 11919, se desilusionó de la Revolución China y del socialismo.  Se unió al Okawa Shumei y otras formas de Yuzonsha, una organización ultranacionalista, y dedicó su tiempo a escribir y al activismo político.  Gradualmente se convirtió en el principal teórico y filósofo del movimiento derechista previo a la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

Participó en el golpe de estado del 26 de febrero de 1937 y, fracasado éste, fue fusilado.

Jalal Al-e-Ahmad (1923-1969) fue un prominente escritor y crítico social y político iraní. Nació en una familia religiosa en Teherán y su padre era un clérigo islámico. Realizó estudios universitarios y se especializó en literatura persa, en la universidad de Teherán.  En 1950 se casó con Simin Daneshvar, una muy conocida novelista iraní.  Jalal y Simin no tuvieron hijos, tema que ha sido reflejado en las obras de Jalal.  Murió en Asalem, una zona rural del norte de Irán, en una cabaña construida con sus propias manos. Fue enterrado en la mezquita de Firouzabadi, en Ray, Irán.

Shi'ism, Scientific and Utopian

What is the greatest danger to intellectuals in the Iranian diaspora today? Their desire to "look to the West."¹ Their temptation to appeal to "American power," in the name of "a supposedly grateful Iranian public, led by a Westernized middle class," through ideological warfare that makes Iran out to be a Republic of Fear.

. . . [Kanan] Makiya argued, that, once freed, they [Iraqis] would throw off the tired orthodoxies of Arab politics and, in their despair, look to the West.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

"It was doomed," [Ali] Allawi told me. "What was doomed was the attempt to refashion Iraq in a sort of civilizational makeover, using American power in an alliance with a supposedly grateful Iraqi public, led by a Westernized middle class. The assumption turned out to be false. And it was compounded by a series of disastrous decisions." (Dexter Filkins, "Regrets Only?" New York Times Magazine, 7 October 2007)

Kanan Makiya ought to be an object lesson for leftists among the diaspora intellectuals. They cannot love Iran in a way that I can, for they are saddled with the burden of personal losses and historical defeats, but if the US-led multinational empire succeeds in destroying Iran,² whether through economic warfare, "democracy assistance," military force, or (as is most likely) the last after a decade of the first two, they will miss it more than I will, just as Kanan Makiya must miss Iraq more than I do.

1 The following words of Jalal Al-e Ahmad still ring true when one looks at the culture of the top 20 percent or so of just about all nations in the South, actual proportions depending on levels of their capitalist development:

To follow the West -- the Western states and the oil companies -- is the supreme manifestation of occidentosis [westoxification] in our time. This is how Western industry plunders us, how it rules us, how it holds our destiny. Once you have given economic and political control of your country to foreign concerns, they know what to sell you, or at least what not to sell you. Because they naturally seek to sell you their manufactures in perpetuity, it is best that you remain forever in need of them, and God save the oil reserves. They take away the oil and give you whatever you want in return -- from soup to nuts, even grain. This enforced trade even extends to cultural matters, to letters, to discourse. Go flip through our half-dozen so-called heavy literary publications. What news do you see of our part of the world? Of the east in the broadest terms? Of India, Japan, China? All you see is news of the Nobel Prize, of the new pope, of Françoise Sagan, the Cannes Film Festival, the latest Broadway play, the latest Hollywood film. This is not to mention the illustrated weeklies, which are quite notorious. If we aren't to call this occidentosis, what are we to call it? (Occidentosis: A Plague from the West, Mizan Press, 1984, p. 62-3)

The habit "spontaneously" cultivated by many intellectuals of all nations who look to the West, or rather the mythical West, serves the ruling classes of the US-led multinational empire, incorporating the upper classes and strata of their nations into liberalism, Americanism, the ideology of "Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham." See Shirin S. Deylami, "In the Face of the Machine: Westoxification, Cultural Collision, and the Making of Perso-Islamic Ideology" (October 2006) for a criticism of two common misinterpretations of Ahmad's ideology (and others like it) as "a call to the Past" and "a disdain for modern globalization" in all its actual and potential forms. These misinterpretations, Deylami argues, miss the point of the criticism of "Westoxification": "a particular targeting of one form of economic, political, and cultural hegemony" (p. 1).

2 Iran, but for the curse of oil and the faith in the Twelfth Imam, might have been a Japan of West Asia; conversely, if Japan had not become an imperial power in its own right, Kita Ikki might have been a Jalal Al-e Ahmad of Japan. As things happened, our paths went into completely opposite directions. Intellectuals in the Iranian diaspora do not realize that stubbornly religious working-class men and women of their nation, who rejected them and followed Khomeini instead, still made a finer choice than my compatriots. But if they don't look West and look East instead, they will appreciate what they have. The Iranians have a republic, albeit religious, of their own; the Japanese have a client state, albeit secular, run by Japanese bureaucrats and gangsters for the American emperor. Moreover, the republic that had expelled its cosmopolitan intellectuals may, if it is permitted to live, eventually welcome them back, perhaps under the banner of a Shi'ism that is at once scientific and utopian.

Update

Julio Fernández Baraibar, my friend in Buenos Aires, translated this article into Spanish: "Chiísmo, científico y utópico," Critical Montages, 7 October 2007.

Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham

De jure discrimination of all kinds can be abolished for working-age adults under capitalism. Abolition of de jure discrimination brings the spirit of capitalism closer to the pure spirit of "Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham." The closer the spirit of capitalism gets to "Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham," the more class power the bourgeoisie enjoys. The working class lose class struggle by winning culture wars . . . on capitalist terms.

(The only de jure discriminations that cannot be abolished under capitalism probably are discrimination between individuals capable of consent and individuals incapable of it; that between convicts and "law-abiding citizens"; and that -- as long as it is based on the system of nation-states -- between citizens and non-citizens.)

Once de jure discrimination gets abolished, what happens?

1. Those old criticisms of sexism, racism, heterosexism, etc. that were aimed at attainment of equal rights become neutralized at best and become agents of capital and empire at worst.

2. Elimination of de jure discrimination does away with the material basis that united upper and lower classes and strata of each oppressed community. Now, upper classes and strata of women, Blacks, queers, etc. can move up and away from their lower-class and -strata counterparts. At the same time, women, Blacks, queers, etc. of lower classes and strata get confronted with intensification of their class exploitation that is articulated with their gender, race, sexual, and other oppressions, intensification often expressed through criminalization, most obviously in the case of Blacks, for racial oppression is more intimately intertwined with class oppression than gender, sexual, and other oppressions (because the "Black race" is a category that emerged from New World slavery and Jim Crow, thus overrepresented in the lower strata of the working class, whereas women, queers, etc. are not over- or underrepresented in any class or strata). Elimination of de jure discrimination destroys civil rights movements through their success, so women, Blacks, queers, etc. of lower classes and strata now face a more powerful capitalism, better legitimated in multicultural fashion, without the material and ideological resources for resistance that their erstwhile organic intellectual leaders supplied.

What explains working-class opposition to struggles to abolish de jure discrimination? De jure discrimination confers economic rent on those who are not discriminated against. Its abolition intensifies competition -- hence opposition to it. It's no secret that the seemingly more gender-egalitarian spirit of capitalism today has been achieved, in the case of the United States, by bringing men down as much as bringing women up.

Therefore, leftists do ourselves no favor, for instance, by forgetting the fact that families, for the working class, have been units of survival in the face of, and sometimes resistance to, capital as well as sites of gender, sexual, and other oppressions. Atomization that destroys families destroys them as units of resistance as well as sites of oppressions. The same applies to all other units of survival which sometimes become units of resistance while being sites of oppressions at the same time: trade unions, religious organizations, political parties on the Left, formerly and actually existing socialist states, etc.

For the working class, the question is how we can win culture wars in such a way that we can make use of the advantages that victories in culture wars bring -- de jure elimination of obstacles to class unity -- while coping with disadvantages that arise from destructions of old units of working-class survival and resistance. Only by doing so can we propose an alternative to both plain and simple reaction to the atomizing power of capitalism on one hand and the new spirit of capitalism that exploits it at working-class expense on the other hand.

So far, leftists have been unable to answer this question in practice if not in theory.

Japan as Heuristic

I do not claim that the Monthly Review school of Marxism was or is right about all things Marxian, but one of the things that it does better than many others is criticism of the nineteenth-century notion that "all nations would inevitably pass" the same "linear set of stages" of development,¹ which happens to be the most important thing to get right.

If that is true of development of relations of production and productive forces, moreover, it is even truer of political and cultural development. This point is easy to grasp if you always keep Japan -- which today is secular without having ever struggled for secularism and yet very superstitious all the same, sexually kinky in hilariously mundane ways without being politically progressive or culturally liberal in the least, etc. -- in mind as a point of reference, a useful heuristic. (You might enjoy living there if you are not a leftist.)

"The country that is more developed industrially" does not show, "to the less developed, the image of its own future." Peoples have and will travel different paths to different ends under capitalism. Socialism won't change that either. If the people of Japan ever do socialism, which, alas, is highly unlikely, they won't do it in the same ways that others have.

1 See, for instance, João Aguiar, "Capital and Empire: An Interview with John Bellamy Foster," MRZine, 23 March 2007:

Q. In the Preface to the first German edition of Capital (1867), Marx says: "The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future." Can we infer from it that Marx thought the capitalist world-system would become more or less uniform and homogenous, without the major polarization between core and periphery that exists today? Was Marx thinking that what happened in the transition to capitalism in England would happen all over the world, following the exact same steps of economic development?

It is worth remembering the context of this statement in Marx's preface. He was telling his German readers that although the analysis was based directly on Britain, the most advanced capitalist country, it applied to Germany as well. Here he quoted from the Roman poet Horace's Satires (Book I, Satire 1), where Horace, in his critique of the pursuit of riches, says to those who think this critique does not apply to them: "Change the name, and the tale is told of you." Germany, Marx insisted, would follow the same basic developmental course as Britain, reflecting an "iron necessity" of capitalist development.

This passage has frequently been quoted to indicate that Marx thought of capitalism as following one linear set of stages, through which all nations would inevitably pass. Marx, however, did not himself adhere to such a rigid interpretation and pointed in his later writings to uneven and distorted development and alternative paths. The best known of these alternative paths was the Asian mode of production, which, whatever its demerits as a conception, pointed to Marx's departure from any simple linear pattern. From the late 1860s on, he increasingly took into account relations of dependency in the cases of Ireland and India, in particular, learning from resistance movements in those countries. At the end of his life he argued that the next revolution would first take place in Russia, which was still a semi-peripheral power.

Still, the notion "the tale is told of you" clearly dominated most Marxist thinking until the 1950s. By that time it was clear (since the underdeveloped world's share of total industrial output had declined steadily from more than 60 percent in 1830 to something like 7 percent in 1950) that the notion that all countries would develop along the line of the original capitalist powers was false. Fifty years ago in 1957, Paul Baran wrote The Political Economy of Growth which introduced a new Marxist approach to imperialism and development, inspiring the radical dependency and world system traditions. Baran observed that while Marx's notion that the less developed countries would follow the path of the more developed countries had been right for Western Europe and the European settler colonies in North America and Australia, the manner of the imperialist penetration of Latin America, Asia, and Africa had created a different reality: an imperialist system in which the peoples and territories of the periphery were in a seemingly perpetual condition of dependency. Indeed, these conditions could be expected to persist, Baran argued, apart from some break with the imperialist status quo, either on the lines of the Japanese state-led, authoritarian Meiji restoration/revolution (an option now closed to most of the periphery), or socialist revolution (of varying types).

Progressive Imperialism

How do men like Kanan Makiya, a former Trotskyist, come to support the US-led multinational empire? I imagine that they begin with a perfectly reasonable observation (see 1 below) and then in some cases slowly, in other cases rapidly, proceed to one untenable conclusion after another (2-4).

1. Some Third-World states sometimes illegitimately use the rhetoric of anti-imperialism to squash legitimate internal criticism and hold back work on urgent social and cultural issues such as women's rights and freedom of sexuality.


2. All Third-World states always illegitimately use the rhetoric of anti-imperialism to squash legitimate internal criticism and hold back work on urgent social and cultural issues such as women's rights and freedom of sexuality. It is always wrong to prioritize anti-imperialism.


3. As a matter of fact, those who decry imperialism are the worst imperialists themselves.


4. Democracies in the West, especially the USA and Europe, can and should help liberate people from their oppressive and imperialist tyrants in the Third World. If that, too, is imperialism, it's at least a better imperialism, progressive imperialism, much like the French Revolution's export of the revolutionary Enlightenment, or the Vietnamese Communists' overthrow of the genocidal Pol Pot.

Unfortunately, when leftists become former leftists, bidding farewell to anti-imperialism, their erstwhile immersion in the Marxist tradition helps them think in this fashion, for Marxism without anti-imperialism becomes a variant of liberal progressivism and internationalism.

¿Pueden los izquierdistas de la diáspora iraní acordar con Irán?

¿Pueden los izquierdistas de la diáspora iraní acordar con Irán?

Por Yoshie Furuhashi
Traducción Julio Fernández Baraibar

Los izquierdistas de la diáspora iraní enfrentan hoy una cuestión: ¿pueden analizar objetivamente por qué no estuvieron en una posición de liderar la Revolución Iraní, llorar adecuadamente su derrota y sus compañeros caídos y llegar a un acuerdo con la República Islámica -- que los derrotó pero que también ha sufrido grandes cambios desde aquellos tempranos años --, tal como hoy existe?

Esto es difícil para ellos, pero deben hacerlo si aman a sus compatriotas y desean ayudarlos para que regresen a la patria, quienes serán capaces de reformar aún más su país si no es destruido por el imperio multinacional dirigido por los EE.UU.

Si arreglan con Irán, podrán luego ayudar a mostrar a los ciudadanos del imperio que lo que las siempre contrarrevolucionarias elites del poder del imperio buscó destruir son los adelantes sociales y económicos hechos durante la Revolución Islámica (la nacionalización del petróleo, sobre todo, que en el gobierno de Mossadegh -- derrocado por la Operación Ajax de la CIA -- no pudo cumplimentar; la reducción de la pobreza y de la desigualdad económica; las mejoras en la salud y la educación públicas y en la infraestructura; el avance de la mujer en la educación, el empleo y la participación política; el desarrollo cultural dialéctico y muchos otros) y no los aspectos represivos de la Revolución. Este es el más importante mensaje que pueden comunicar a toda la gente -- el pueblo trabajador de los EE.UU., Europa y Japón -- que puede presionar al imperio para permitir vivir al pueblo iraní.

Nota al pie de la autora:
Mi maestro de persa, que era un izquierdista a la vieja usanza antes de 1989 y ahora es crítico literario, demasiado postmoderno para los marxistas y con demasiado efecto de sentido para los postmodernos (según él mismo me ha dicho), dice que dos de sus amigos iraníes, uno liberal¹ y otro un neomarxista (que también fue un izquierdista a la vieja usanza en el pasado), y él casi llegan a los golpes el otro día, por causa de esta cuestión.

Como Ud. ya habrá adivinado, entre los tres, es el hombre neomarxista quien halla más difícil hacer lo que se necesite hacer por la causa del regreso de los iranies a casa. A esta altura, él se niega a volver, aún cuando ahora puede hacerlo, de modo que se niega a sí mismo la posibilidad de recopilar toda clase de información acerca de lo que más le preocupa (las condiciones de los trabajadores en Irán), sobre la base de que un marxista, especialmente un marxista iraní, si hace investigación en Irán legitimaría al gobierno islámico iraní, por que ello mostraría que hay espacio para la coexistencia de diferentes escuelas de pensamiento bajo este gobierno. De manera que cuando su señora visita Irán para ver a su familia y amigos, lo deja sólo en los EE.UU.

El exilio autoimpuesto por el neomarxista no es el mayor problema, sin embargo. Algunos de los antiguos amigos de mi profesor de persa han ido a trabajar para el imperio, y están ahora empleados por Gozaar,² Radio Farda, etc. Me pregunto si habrán pensado sobre el papel que Kanan Makiya³ (que de acuerdo a Edward Said, era un trotskista en los 60 y 70) jugó en la destrucción de Iraq. Fin de la nota.

Notas al pie de JFB:
1 En el sentido norteamericano. JFB
2 Una publicación sostenida y financiada por Freedom House, una organización de los sectores más belicistas y conservadores de los dos partidos norteamericanos. Entre sus directivos figuran, entre otros, el ex director de la CIA James Woolsey, el ex funcionario de la administración de Reagan, Kenneth Adelman, la ex embajadora en las Naciones Unidas Jeanne Kirkpatrick. JFB
3 Según el New York Times "Hasta la invasion norteamericana en marzo de 2003, Mr. Makiya, un iraquí-norteamericano nacido en Bagdad wen 1949, fue la más destacada voz intellectual pidiendo a Occidente y a las naciones árabes el derrocamiento de Saddam Hussein. Era un estrecho amigo de Ahmad Chalabi, el más querido por el Pentágono, y llamó la atención de los neoconservadores. El vicepresidente Dick Cheney lo elogió en "Meet on Press" y Mr. Makiya fue uno de los tres iraquíes americanos que se reunuieron con el presidente Bush en el invierno de 2003". JFB

Venezuelans Evaluate Socialism and Capitalism

Gallup corroborates what we have known all along given Hugo Chavez's popularity: most Venezuelans love socialism, because it serves them better than capitalism.

On many issues affecting day-to-day life, Venezuelans are nearly twice as likely to associate socialism with positive outcomes, as they are to associate them with capitalism. When Gallup asked respondents whether "more freedom to think the way one wants" better describes socialism or capitalism, 43% say socialism, compared with 26% who say capitalism. Venezuelans share similar views about under which system there is more peace and social calm (44% for socialism vs. 23% for capitalism), and under which system there is less crime (42% for socialism vs. 22% for capitalism).

A similar pattern emerges on issues related to governance. Forty-three percent of Venezuelans say the country has more sovereignty under socialism, while 24% say this is true of capitalism. The same holds true on the issue of corruption, with 42% saying corruption gets fought under socialism, while 21% say this happens with capitalism. Forty-four percent perceive more justice for people under socialism, compared with 21% who perceive this about capitalism.

Forty-nine percent of respondents say socialism offers education opportunities for all, compared with 21% who say the same about capitalism. Venezuelans also perceive that there is better quality of education with socialism (45%) than with capitalism (25%). Nonetheless, when Chavez initially talked about education reform during his first term, several thousand parents and teachers demonstrated against a decree to allow education officials to fire teachers and administrators who disagree with any changes.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Forty percent say more wealth gets produced under socialism, compared with 28% who say the same about capitalism. Forty-six percent say wealth is better distributed under socialism and 22% say under capitalism. Venezuelans are nearly evenly divided about which system affords more people with opportunities to make money; 35% say socialism and 34% say capitalism. Roughly 4 in 10 Venezuelans (41%) tell Gallup there is more inflation and a high cost of living under capitalism, compared with 27% who say the same is true about socialism. (Patricia Guadalupe, "Venezuelans Tend to View Socialism More Positively Than Capitalism," Gallup, 5 October 2007)

What is noteworthy is that Venezuelans believe not only that socialism meets their social and economic needs better than capitalism but also that socialism gives them "more freedom to think the way one wants" than capitalism, contrary to what liberalism has us believe. Socialism of the 21st Century has achieved solid hegemony in Venezuela in the Gramscian way.

Can Leftists in the Iranian Diaspora Come to Terms with Iran?

A question faces leftists in the Iranian diaspora today: can they objectively analyze why they were not in a position to lead the Iranian Revolution, properly mourn their defeat and fallen comrades, and come to terms with the Islamic Republic, which defeated them but which has also changed greatly since its early years, as it actually exists now?

That is difficult for them,¹ but they have to do this if they love and wish to serve their countrymen and -women back home, who are capable of reforming their country further if it does not get destroyed by the US-led multinational empire.

If they come to terms with Iran, they can then help show the citizens of the empire that what the (always counter-revolutionary) power elites of the empire seek to destroy is social and economic gains made under the Islamic Revolution (nationalization of oil above all, which the Mossadegh administration, overthrown by the CIA's Operation Ajax, could not accomplish; reductions in poverty and economic inequality; improvements in health, education, infrastructure, etc.; advancement of women in education, employment, political participation, etc.; dialectical cultural development; and many others), not the revolution's repressive aspects. That is the most important message they can communicate to the only people -- working people in the USA, Europe, and Japan -- who can pressure the empire to let the Iranian people live.

1 My Persian teacher, who was an old-fashioned leftist before 1989 and is now a literary critic who is too post-modern for Marxists and makes too much sense for post-modernists (according to himself), says that two of his Iranian friends, one a liberal and the other a neo-Marxist (who was also an old-fashioned leftist in the past), and he almost came to blows the other day, over this very question.

As you may have guessed, among the three, it is the neo-Marxist man who finds it most difficult to do what needs to be done for the sake of Iranians back home. To this day, he refuses to go back home, even though he now can, so he denies himself chances to collect many kinds of data about what preoccupies him the most (the conditions of workers in Iran), on the grounds that a Marxist, especially an Iranian Marxist, doing research in Iran would legitimate Iran's Islamic government, for that would show that there is room for co-existence of different schools of thought under that government. So, his wife, when she visits Iran and sees their families and friends, leaves him home alone in the USA.

The neo-Marxist man's self-imposed exile is not the biggest problem, however. Some of my Persian teacher's former friends have gone to work for the empire, now employed by Gozaar, Radio Farda, and so on. I wonder if they have thought about the role that Kanan Makiya (who, according to Edward Said, was a Trotskyist in the 60s and 70s) played in the destruction of Iraq.

Update

Julio Fernández Baraibar, an Argentinian friend of mine, has translated this piece into Spanish: "¿Pueden los izquierdistas de la diáspora iraní acordar con Irán?" Critical Montages, 5 October 2007.

Desiring Arabs

Joseph Massad's new book, Desiring Arabs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), is now out in bookstores. The book, a chapter of which is based on his article "Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World" in Public Culture (Spring 2002, pp. 361-385), has received plaudits from the Financial Times (John R. Bradley, "Arabian Rights," 25 August 2007) as well as the Angry Arab News Service (20 June 2007) and Lenin's Tomb. The book examines how "different sexual mores and practices," which often included celebration of same-sex love and lust (e.g., Abu Nuwas's poetry), in the Arab world became suppressed and marginalized by modern Arab intellectuals, secular or religious, who imported Western sexual norms. In other words, they internalized Orientalism into their discourse.¹

Many observers from the West -- soldiers, scientists, missionaries, businessmen, colonial and neo-colonial civil servants, etc. -- who wrote about sexuality in the rest of the world in the past -- especially from the late nineteenth century to the mid twentieth century -- were generally disgusted by what they saw, especially absence of the bourgeois heterosexist norm and prevalence of other forms of sexual practice such as sodomy and polygamy. Take, for instance, Persian Life and Customs, with Scenes and Incidents of Residence and Travel in the Land of the Lion and the Sun by the Rev. Samuel Graham Wilson, "fifteen years a missionary in Persia" (2nd Ed., Edinghburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson, and Ferrier, 1896 -- my example, not Massad's):

With respect to its morals Persia takes a low rank. In social life, polygamy, concubinage, temporary marriage, and free divorce manifest their demoralizing effects. Sensuality is strongly developed. Impure thought and conversation prevail. Their stories and poetry abound in obscenity, and many of their picture books are unfit to look at. The sensual doctrine of a heaven where every man will have seventy houris suits the popular taste. Though much freedom is given by law to the passions, yet unnatural vices prevail. Sodomy is common among the vicious class and the wealthy; even Armenian and Nestorian youth following the lead of some of their bishops are guilty of it. (p. 229)

They thought of such sexual differences, real or imagined, as a matter of civilizational hierarchy -- the West ranked higher than the rest in their opinion -- which became part of the themes of the Civilizing Mission of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Ironically, many nationalists, both secular and religious, have unconsciously adopted this Orientalist judgment and sought to "modernize" their nations by disowning or denigrating their own pre-modern sexual discourse.

Today, many observers from the West -- roughly the same categories of people, to whom human rights NGO officers are added -- are again disgusted -- but this time by dearth of out GLBTQ communities (notwithstanding the fact that they weren't regarded as "normal," let alone desirable, in the West itself only a couple of decades ago), often assuming that discourse of sexual orientations either (1) already is, or (2) will inevitably be, or (3) ought to be the norm in the Middle East (the first of which is the most misleading assumption, for it has many Westerners mistake all same-sex practices that exist now in the Middle East for "closet homosexual" cases). The standards of judgment have changed, but the power relation between those who judge and those who are judged -- the West judging the rest -- and how the judgment promotes imperialism remain the same. Moreover, the cumulative impact of such activism based on transnational identity politics is not to expand sexual freedom in its target countries but to heterosexualize them, closing down previously open spaces for same-sex pleasure, much as the discourse of sexual orientations did when it first emerged in the West. That, too, is a problem that Massad dissects.

Massad, in short, challenges the assumptions of both Western human rights NGOs and their secular and religious nationalist adversaries.

Massad's work is already being put to good use by Aswat², the Palestinian lesbian organization:

During the reported period 40 workshops were held and attended by approximately 300 participants. In addition, the workshop facilitators have disseminated further reading information papers about Aswat and further reading materials on lesbianism, formation of sexual orientation, effects of closet and queer approaches to sexuality in Arabic, English an Hebrew such as: "Re-Orienting Desire -- The Gay International and the Arab World" by Joseph Massad, and "Compulsory Heterosexuality" by Adrienne Rich. (Aswat, "Advocacy, Outreach and Education Project")

The reason why Massad's work is useful to Aswat is not only its historical accuracy but also its sharp rejoinder to imperialist exploitation of the sexual gap between the global North and the global South, of which Palestinians, often invidiously compared with Israelis and found sexually wanting, may be the most prominent victims.³

A minor problem of Massad's approach is that it, being based on discourse analysis of the type first developed by Michel Foucault, is subject to a criticism of culturalism,⁴ having relatively little to say about the role that the emergence and development of the capitalist mode of production, with its tendency to proletarianize, urbanize, atomize, and commodify people, in the emergence and development of discourse of sexuality under capitalist modernity. That, however, is a problem that can be readily remedied by historical materialists, to whom, as well as queer anti-imperialists in the Middle East, I highly recommend this book. Read together with the work of such scholars as Dror Ze'evi and Afsaneh Najmabadi, it should equip us with basic software for hot sex wars on the cultural front in the 21st century.

1 Massad's work complements that of other scholars such as Afsaneh Najmabadi and Dror Ze'evi: Afsaneh Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005) and Dror Ze'evi, Producing Desire: Changing Sexual Discourse in the Ottoman Middle East, 1500-1900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).
2 Brian Whitaker, who not only Islamist-baits Massad, claiming that his book "reflects essentially the same idea" as that of "the Islamic Action Front," but also pretends to champion Aswat against him ("Distorting Desire," Gay City News, 13 September 2007), is completely off the mark. Yes, Virginia, there are such creatures as anti-imperialist queers.
3 But the project of queering Zionist propaganda has not gotten very far. Gay porn mogul Michael Lucas, whose claim to fame is having come up with "his own life-size dildo," is upset by queer America's insufficiently pro-Israel and anti-Muslim attitude: Michael Lucas, "How Can Gays Be Anti-Israel?" (New York Blade, 4 May 2007).
4 See, for instance, Arno Schmitt, "Gay Rights versus Human Rights: A Response to Joseph Massad" (Public Culture 15.3, Fall 2003, pp. 587-591, made available online at Schmitt's Web site).

Use Political Supremacy to Wrest, by Degree, All Capital from the Bourgeoisie

Official Marxism of the formerly socialist states depoliticized people, for the USSR and the PRC had much less room for political debates and social conflicts in the public sphere than Iran. Hence the eventual demise of socialism there.

That is the problem that Socialism of the 21st Century in Venezuela seeks to avoid, though that means slower and lesser transformation so far of political economy than in Iran, let alone the USSR and the PRC. Mark Weisbrot and Luis Sandoval write in "The Venezuelan Economy in the Chávez Years": "As can be seen in Table 1, the private sector has grown faster than the public sector over the last 8 years, and therefore the private sector is a bigger share of the economy in 2007 than it was before President Chávez took office" (emphasis added, July 2007, p. 6).

That stands in contrast to the experience of the Iranian Revolution, about which one neoliberal critic wrote disapprovingly: "Semi-official estimates put the private-sector share of the national economy at between 15 to 20 percent. This made the Islamic state a mixed capitalist-socialist economy predominantly under clerical control" (Akbar Karbassian, "Islamic Revolution and the Management of the Iranian Economy," Social Research, Summer 2000).

The question is, can people use "political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie," as Michael A. Lebowitz proposes below?

But, the idea of this socialism cannot displace real capitalism. Nor can dwarfish islands of cooperation change the world by competing successfully against capitalist corporations. You need the power to foster the new productive relations while truncating the reproduction of capitalist productive relations. You need to take the power of the state away from capital, and you need to use that power when capital responds to encroachments -- when capital goes on strike, you must be prepared to move in rather than give in. Winning the “battle of democracy” and using “political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie” remains as critical now as when Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

However, the success of this process is not at all inevitable. There are, as there have always been within the Bolivarian Revolution, powerful tendencies that point in the opposite direction. Not only the strong inclination of government ministers and managers in important state sectors to plan and direct everything from above (a pattern which has successfully crippled independent workers’ movements) and not only the continuing culture of corruption and clientalism which can be the basis for the emergence of a new oligarchy. There is also a very clear tendency which supports the growth of a domestic capitalist class as one leg upon which the Bolivarian Revolution must walk for the foreseeable future.

No Chavists these days, of course, openly argue that socialism for the twenty-first century should depend upon capital. Rather, all insist that the process at this point requires the Bolivarian Revolution to tame private capital through “socialist conditionality”—i.e., by establishing new ground rules as conditions under which private capital can serve the revolution. In its best versions, this may be seen as a process of transition, that process of making “despotic inroads” and wresting, “by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie.” Certainly, measures such as opening the books, imposing workers’ councils with power, demanding accountability to communal councils, and transforming the workday by introducing education for worker management introduce an alien logic into capitalism -- the logic of new socialist productive relations within capitalist firms.

However, the lack of clarity as to the nature of those ground rules means that mixed signals are being sent out. The “realistic” message that Venezuela is likely to have a “mixed economy” for a long time, that there is a place for private capital in the Bolivarian Revolution, and that a sufficient condition for access to state business and state credit is a commitment by capital to the interests of communities and workers has brought with it the formation of organizations such as Conseven, the “Confederation of Socialist Industrialists,” and other private capitalist organizations busily defining private capital as socialist property. “Productive socialism,” it is being said in meetings of “Chavist” capitalists around the country, requires private capitalists as part of the socialist model.

In this case, rather than the “elementary triangle” of socialism (units of social property, organized by workers through social production, for the satisfaction of communal needs), what is strengthened is the capitalist triangle: private ownership of the means of production, exploitation of wage laborers, for the purpose of profits. However lofty the language of social responsibility, the pursuit of profits dominates: commitment to the community becomes, effectively, a tax, and worker participation becomes shares in the company to induce workers to commit themselves to producing profits. As may be seen from the disappointing experience of the EPS (which has followed this pattern), capital accepts these constraints as conditions in order to ensure its right to exploit and generate profits until it is strong enough itself to impose capitalist conditionality.

The Bolivarian Revolution, like all revolutionary processes, produces its own potential gravediggers. To the extent that it fosters the infection of the logic of capital, the Bolivarian Revolution does not walk on two legs but, rather, has one leg walking backward. When we acknowledge that this tendency is flourishing within the process and add it to the continuing pattern of clientalism and corruption, the remaining enclaves of old capitalist power (in banking, import-processing, land-ownership, and the media), and the constant presence and threat of U.S. imperialism, it is obvious that there are formidable barriers to the struggle for socialism in Venezuela.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In a relatively short time, the Bolivarian Revolution has come a long way. It still faces many problems, and its success will only occur as the result of struggle -- not only a struggle against U.S. imperialism, the champion of barbarism around the world, which is threatened by any suggestion that there is an alternative to its rule; and, not only against the domestic oligarchy with its capitalist enclaves in the mass media, banks, processing sectors, and the latifundia. The really difficult struggle, I’ve argued, is within the Bolivarian Revolution itself -- in the divergence between a would-be new Bolivarian oligarchy and the masses of excluded and exploited.

These are struggles that all Latin America faces. As I concluded in Build it Now, “every place these struggles proceed, though, will make it easier for those who have gone before and those yet to come.” Venezuela’s lesson needs to be understood and communicated widely: its focus upon human development and revolutionary practice, its missions in education and health, and its creation of communal councils as the basis for a revolutionary democratic state cannot help but inspire masses elsewhere and create the condition for a revolutionary leadership to emerge. The real lesson of the Bolivarian Revolution, though, is what can happen when there is a dialectic of masses which understand that there is an alternative and a revolutionary leadership prepared to move in rather than give in. (Michael A. Lebowitz, "Venezuela: A Good Example of the Bad Left of Latin America," Monthly Review 59.3, July-August 2007)

I cannot guarantee that the Bolivarian strategy will work for Venezuela (difficulties that this strategy faces are highlighted in the above excerpt from the Lebowitz article -- read the full text to see its promising aspects), or it can be applied in Iran to reverse the trend toward gradual adoption of the neoliberal model after Khomeini's death, but the idea certainly merits serious consideration by all, religious or secular, who struggle against the neoliberal stage of capitalism and imperialism.

Democracy

Democracy is a good in itself, and a country that is not democratic (in the substantial, not procedural, sense), even if its power elite adopt a relatively enlightened development strategy, will eventually fall apart, for the power elite themselves will, sooner or later, begin to think, "Let's see, our counterpart in more economically liberal countries are making their countries richer and earning a great deal more money than we are. Why not make our economy more capitalistic?"

The history of state socialism is a demonstration of this: both in Russia and China, it was the power elite, not poorer workers and farmers, who first abandoned any vestigial commitment to socialism, transforming their countries in the neoliberal capitalist image (more disastrously in Russia than China, for the change there was much more precipitous, from which Russia has only recently begun to recover under Putin, thanks to oil booms, more efficient tax collection, and the undoing of some of the results of ill-considered privatization). By the time when their power elites ditched socialism, the populaces in both countries had already become depoliticized under decades of one-party rule with no organization of their own and little experience in democratic debate, so they failed to effectively counter top-down transformation for the benefit of not only the power elites but also international capital.

Can Iranians and Venezuelans defend the social gains of their respective revolutions from capitalists and their intellectuals, achieve new victories, and defend their nations from the empire?

Iran as Regional Hegemon

The Financial Times reports that "Iran is ready to help the US stabilise Iraq if Washington were to present a timetable for withdrawing its troops from the country, Tehran's top security official [Ali Larijani, head of the Supreme National Security Council] said yesterday" (Roula Khalaf and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, "Iran Ready to Work with US on Iraq," 30 September 2007).

Why doesn't Washington take Iran's offer? Because the offer is to help Washington withdraw from Iraq, leaving a government friendly to Iran there. That is the last thing Washington wants, in fact, which is why it has not and will not take it. What Washington wants, instead, is to ensure that Iraq won't fall into the hands of Iran after it leaves -- hence the reluctance to withdraw any time soon.

What do leftists say about the offer? Urge Washington to take it? Only some do. Again, there is no coherence on the Left. Herein lies the problem. Only if Washington accepts Iran becoming a regional power, potentially capable of achieving hegemony over Iraq after US withdrawal, will it withdraw from Iraq. But some leftists have trouble accepting Iran becoming such a regional hegemon -- that's subimperialism or perhaps even imperialism in their opinion. So, there is no strong counter-discourse to the notion that "we can't let Iran have Iraq."

An Empire of NGOs

On the question of Western "NGO"¹ interventions in nations of the global South and their relations to the US-led multinational empire, there regrettably is no consensus on the broadly defined Left. The lack of consensus even among leftists makes it impossible to raise the consciousness of the Western public about the roles of "NGOs" in the empire's "regime change" campaigns, which negate the essence of democracy in the name of "democracy assistance."

Take a look at a recent series of exchanges over the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict² in the Green Left Weekly:

• "Interview with Eva Golinger: US Continues Destabilisation Push in Venezuela" (GLW 716, 28 June 2007)


• Jack DuVall (President, ICNC), "Gollinger Interview" (Letter to the Editor, GLW 718, 22 July 2007)


• Michael Barker, "Promoting 'Democracy' through Civil Disobedience" (GLW 722, 25 August 2007)


• Stephen Zunes, "Inaccurate and Unfair Attacks on the ICNC" (GLW 723, 31 August 2007)


• Michael Barker, "An Accurate and Fair Critique of the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict" (GLW 725, 22 September 2007)

I doubt that Eva Gollinger or Michael Barker has been able to persuade Stephen Zunes that leftists shouldn't be serving as "chair of the board of academic advisers" of the ICNC (Zunes, 31 August 2007) or otherwise supporting it or any other institution like it. Can anyone?

1 I put the term "Non-Governmental Organizations" between quotation marks, for some of the "NGOs" in question are wholly or largely funded by the United States government and other governments of the multinational empire. The Solidarity Center is a good example: "A well-kept secret about Solidarity Center is that it received 90% (nearly $30 million) of its annual revenue from the U.S. State Department and other government agencies of the Bush administration, but it got less than 2% ($600,000) from the AFL-CIO. These figures are from Solidarity Center’s 2003-2004 Annual Report" (Harry Kelber, "How Sweeney Won Three Sham Re-elections; His Role in ULLICO Scandal and Elsewhere," Labor Educator -- downloadable in PDF at laboreducator.org/sweeneyres3.pdf).

2 For information about the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, see, also, Tom Barry, "The New Politics of Political Aid in Venezuela," Right Web Analysis (Silver City, NM: International Relations Center, July 18, 2007), though all you need to know is probably that it lists Freedom House as one of the "Related Organizations" on the ICNF Web site's "Resources" page. As for its method, get it from the horse's mouth -- check out the "Discussion Guide" that accompanies Bringing Down a Dictator, a film that functions as a how-to manual that teaches you to pull off a "regime change" with the support of the government of the United States and other "democracies." The executive producer of the film is Peter Ackerman, Founding Chair of the ICNC and Chairman of Freedom House, and "Special Thanks" in the film's credit go to the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and the United States Institute of Peace. The guide encourages the film's audience to debate intriguing questions such as the following:

• A number of factors contributed to the overthrow of Milosevic, especially financial assistance and training from the United States. Based on information in the film, discuss the role of each of the following in bringing down the Milosevic regime:

  Aid from the United States and European countries
  The NATO bombing
  Elections
  Street marches and protests
  The strike at the Kolubara Coal Mine (p. 6)

• The United States government gave over $25 million dollars in aid to Otpor and other opposition groups during the movement against Milosevic. Some of these groups declared themselves to be anti-American. What is the purpose of the US funding of anti-American groups overseas? Does accepting US funds weaken a group's anti-American stance? If a group is fighting for justice, does that automatically mean that the group is a good group? Do the methods they use in their fight have any effect on whether the group is "good" or not? Explain your answers to the last three questions. (p. 10)

The film is "available on DVD in both the NTSC and PAL television systems," in "Arabic, Burmese, English, Farsi, French, Indonesian, Mandarin, Russian, and Spanish." Very thorough -- all relevant languages for the most urgent US "regime change" campaigns are covered. Needless to say, the ICNC, as well as other members of the empire of NGOs, is working on Iran:

In choosing Freedom House as the venue for a foreign policy address this week, President George W. Bush has stepped into an intense debate among democracy activists in the US and Iran on how US dollars should be used to carry out the administration's policy of promoting freedom in the Islamic republic.

Few in the Washington audience on Wednesday realised that Freedom House, an independent institution founded more than 60 years ago by Eleanor Roosevelt, the former first lady, is one of several organisations selected by the State Department to receive funding for clandestine activities inside Iran.

Peter Ackerman, chairman of the board of trustees, who introduced Mr Bush, is also the founder of a separate organisation that promotes non-violent civic disobedience as a form of resistance to repressive regimes. His International Center on Non-Violent Conflict has organised discreet "workshops" in the Gulf emirate of Dubai to teach Iranians the lessons learned from east European movements.

A separate organisation, the Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre based in New Haven, Connecticut, has also received US funding and organised a Dubai "workshop" for Iranians last year that was not made public.

Mr Ackerman, who is very wealthy from an earlier career as a financier, says he does not accept government money. Questioned by the FT, Freedom House confirmed it had received funding from the State Department for activities in Iran. It declined to give details but said it was not involved in Mr Ackerman's work in Dubai.

Freedom House also disclosed that it received $100,000 (€83,873, £57,500) from Mr Ackerman last year and a further $100,000 from his organisation.

In a research study, with Mr Ackerman acting as chief adviser, Freedom House sets out its conclusions: "Far more often than is generally understood, the change agent is broad-based, non-violent civic resistance - which employs tactics such as boycotts, mass protests, blockades, strikes and civil disobedience to de-legitimate authoritarian rulers and erode their sources of support, including the loyalty of their armed defenders." (Guy Dinmore, "Bush Enters Iran 'Freedom' Debate," Financial Times, 31 March 2006)

It should be noted that Mr. Jack DuVall himself visited this blog to defend the ICNC, merely because I cited the same Financial Times article in an entry whose focus was Freedom House, not the ICNC: "Queering Freedom House," Critical Montages, 24 September 2007 (be sure to read his comment). It looks like opinions of leftists are a sensitive spot for the organization.

"I Hate All Iranians"

Some on the Left wonder: why doesn't Washington deal with Iran as it dealt with Libya? The answer: Iran is not Libya.

Neither East nor West

The Iranians are the only people in the world who successfully defended themselves when their country was invaded by an enemy equipped with Soviet hardware and backed by all the major Western powers. These are people to be reckoned with!

The Iranians paid dearly for their independence, and they will not give it up and submit themselves to the domination of the US-led multinational empire easily.

Still Very Much Rebellious

Qaddafi didn't come into power through social revolution, like the one that convulsed Iran from bottom up. Instead, he won state power through a bloodless coup d'état. It's easier for Washington to deal with a dictator who rules the passive population, whether to depose him (as in Iraq) or work with him (as in Libya), than with the collectivist leadership who lead the historically revolutionary and still very much politically active population like Iran's.

Let's say Washington offers a deal, and Khamenei, et al. take it. Washington can't rule out that the people of Iran won't, sooner or later, undo it, either restoring the status quo ante or even taking their revolution to a new, higher stage.

Washington's enemy is not Khamenei or Rafsanjani, or even Ahmadinejad -- its enemy is the people of Iran.

Britsh MPs visiting the Pentagon to discuss America's stance on Iran and Iraq were shocked to be told by one of President Bush's senior women officials [Debra Cagan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Coalition Affairs to Defence Secretary Robert Gates]: "I hate all Iranians." (Simon Walters, "I Hate All Iranians, US Aide Tells MPs," Daily Mail, 29 September 2007)

The Idea of the Third World

It is very possible that the "Third World" never existed during the heyday of the ideology of Third-Worldism, for most of the "Third-World" nations in practice tilted to either the "East" or the "West."  Perhaps the only authentically Third-World nation was the Islamic Republic of Iran: neither East nor West, in the sense of neither of the capitalist bloc nor of the socialist bloc¹; and neither Eastern nor Western in its cultural mythology.²

Paradoxical as it may sound, for the first time in history, there may now exist conditions for the birth of the objective correlative for the idea of a "Third World," i.e. independence from hegemony of great powers.

1 Houman A. Sadri, "Trends in the Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Iran," Journal of Third World Studies 15.1 (Spring 1998); and Houman A. Sadri, "An Islamic Perspective on Non-Alignment: Iranian Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice," Journal of Third World Studies 16.2 (Fall 1999).
2 See, for instance, Hamid Dabashi, Iran: A People Interrupted (New York: New Press, 2006) for description of the coexistence of Shi'ism and cosmopolitanism in Iran, rooted in part in reality, in part in Dabashi's dream.