The Mahdi Army Survives Undisarmed

A new truce between the "Iraqi government" and the Mahdi Army. Citing AFP and Al-Hayat, Juan Cole sums up the key points of the agreement between them:

The al-Maliki government and the Sadrists pulled back from the brink in Sadr City on Saturday. PM Nuri al-Maliki had demanded that the Mahdi Army militia that serves as the Sadrist paramilitary give up its arms and dissolve itself. The compromise simply states that the Iraqi security forces would be allowed in to Sadr City to search for suspected medium and heavy weapons. The implication is that the Mahdi Army may continue to exist and may keep its light weapons (e.g. AK-47s), though it has to pledge not to walk with them in public.

The siege of Sadr City is to be lifted and the major roads in and out of it are to be unblocked, according to the agreement.

Al-Hayat reports in Arabic that the agreement stipulates that the government should have a court order to come into Sadr City. Arrests of rogue commanders had to to be based on warrants and not just 'indiscriminate.' There is nothing in the agreement about the Mahdi Army disarming altogether, as Nuri Al-Maliki initially demanded. ("Maliki-Sadr Agreement on Sadr City; Al-Maliki Heads to Mosul," Informed Comment, 11 May 2008)

The truce is said to have been brokered by Tehran -- again.

While Washington has two enemies -- not just Sunni insurgents but also Shi'i Sadrists -- whom it can neither conquer nor coopt, Tehran has no determined enemy among the Iraqi Shia and has influence over all major factions of them. Ironically, it's Washington's desire to create "an anti-Iranian Iraq," as well as a front of Arab client states against the so-called Shia crescent stretching from Iran to large swathes of Iraq, Lebanon, and even the Gulf states,¹ that has augmented Tehran's influence:

It was the U.S. attempt to create an anti-Iranian Iraq that was to play into Iranian hands and produce the very situation that Washington was trying to avoid.

The more Washington threatened air strikes on Iran because of its nuclear program, the more the Iranians sought to make sure that it had the potential to strike back at American forces in Iraq. Before he was executed, Sadr I believed that he had been let down by Iran; Sadr II had bad relations with Tehran; and at first Muqtada denounced his Shia opponents in SCIRI and the Marji'iyyah as being Iranian stooges. But American pressure meant that the Sadrists had to look to Iran for help, and in a military confrontation the Mehdi Army saw Iran as an essential source of weapons and military expertise. (Patrick Cockburn, "Riding the Tiger: Muqtada al-Sadr and the American Dilemma in Iraq," Muqtada: Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq, Scribner, 2008)

Thus Tehran alone can help bring stability to at least the areas of Iraq predominantly inhabited by the Shia; and, together with Damascus, which has a certain level of influence over some factions of Sunni insurgents, it may eventually -- in sha' allah -- be able to help broker a government of national unity of sorts in Iraq² if and when Washington ends its occupation of the ruined nation. That's the point that Western leftists should emphasize to counter Washington's propaganda against Iran and Syria. It's the empire, not Iran and Syria, that is the force that perpetuates chaos in Iraq and ends up spreading it everywhere it goes.

1 Washington has, however, failed to move the hearts and minds of Arabs against Iran in particular or the Shia in general. The most admired world leaders among Arabs are Hassan Nasrallah, Bashar Al-Assad, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (in that order), according to Shibley Telhami's "2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll."

2 In any such post-occupation government of national unity in Iraq, Sadrists will play a central role. The Iranian people, a majority of whom prefer Sadr to Maliki, correctly understand it:

A plurality [of Iranians] sees the government in Iraq as legitimate -- down from a modest majority in 2006. Asked whether "the current government is . . . the legitimate representative of the Iraqi people," 45 percent said that it is, while 33 percent said that it is not. This is down from December 2006, when 54 percent thought it was legitimate (31% thought it was not).

Similarly, 45 percent have a favorable view of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki while 22 percent have an unfavorable view. This too has drifted down slightly from 2006, when 48 percent had a favorable view.

More popular is Shi'a opposition figure Muqtada al-Sadr, who was viewed favorably by 56 percent and unfavorably by just 12 percent. Similarly, in 2006 58 percent had a favorable view and 12 percent were unfavorable. (WorldPublicOpinion.org, "Public Opinion in Iran: With Comparisons to American Public Opinion," 7 April 2008, p. 29)

Khosrow Roozbeh

On 11 May 1958, Khosrow Roozbeh, the leader of the intelligence branch of the Military Organization of the Tudeh Party, was executed by a firing squad of the Shah, who had established dictatorship through the CIA-backed 28 Mordad coup d'état against the Mossadegh government in 1953.

خسرو روزبه -- قهرمان ملی ایران

Refusing to be blindfolded, Roozbeh shouted to the firing squad: "Long Live the Tudeh Party of Iran! Long Live Communism! Fire!"

آفساید

«آفساید» (جعفر پناهی ۲۰۰۶) فیلمی دربارهٔ زنان و فوتبال ایران است. پناهی، یکی از کارگردانان فمینیست ایرانی، تبعیض‌های قانونی و اجتماعی بین زنان و مردان را نشان می‌دهد. مثلا زنان ایرانی اجازهٔ ورود به ورزشگاه و تماشای فوتبال را ندرند. ولی زنان ایران قربانیان بیچاره نیستند. چنانکه تماشاگر «آفساید» می‌بیند، زنان ایران، باهوش و باتدبیر، می‌دانند چطور بر موانع چیره شوند. برای دیدن فوتبال، زنان با لباسی مبدّل دزدانه وارد می‌شدند. با این کار خیلی از زنان طرفدار فوتبال بر قانونی بیمعنی پیروز می‌شوند.

اما همهٔ زنان موفق نمیشوند و داستان «آفساید» به دنبال شش دختری می‌رود که دستگیر می‌شوند. با داستان آن شش دختر، پناهی چند نقطه را تایید می‌کند.

۱. قانون مربوط به زنان متناقض است. زنان ایران می‌توانند با مردان در سینما فیلم تماشا کنند یا سوار مترو و تاکسی شوند، ولی آنها از ورود به ورزشگاه و تماشای بازی فوتبال منع می‌شوند. اما زنان خارجی، مانند زنان ژاپنی و بحرینی، که طرفدار حریف تیم ملی ایران هستند، و روزنامه‌نگاران زن خارجی اجازهٔ ورود به ورزشگاه دارند. قانون غیر منطقی نه فقط غیر منصفانه است بلکه خود مایهٔ خنده است.

۲. برخی از زنان فمینیست فکر می‌کنند که همهٔ مردان بر زنان بی‌داد می‌کنند و برخی از غربیان باور می‌کنند که سیاست تبعیض فقط مانع پیشرفت زنان است. اما واقعیت پیچیده‌ تر از آن است. در «آفساید»، خیلی از مردان که با آن شش دختر روبرو می‌شوند -- حتی سربازانی که نگهبان ورزشگاه هستند -- با آنها همدردی میکنند. از طرف دیگر، مانع آزادی و برابری فقط قانون تبعیض نیست. یکی از شخصيتهای «آفساید» پیرمردی است که دختر او-- یک از آن شش دختر -- دستگیر می‌شود. این مرد محافظه كار است و می‌خواهد دخترش را تنبیه کند. برای انیکه زنان آزادی و برابری بدست بیاورند، سنت مردم باید عوض شود.

آن شش دختر دانشجوی تهرانی هستند. ولی سربازانی که آنها را دستگیر می‌کنند پسران کشاورز، ساده و روستایی، هستند. توسعه اقتصادی ایران زندگی زنان تحصیل کرده را بهتر از پیش کرده است. ولی زنان و خواهران آن سربازان و زنان که فقیر هستند و نمیتوانند به دانشگاه بروند؟ درباره آنها، آین فیلم هیچی نمیگوید.

یوشی فوروهشی

The Opposition Takes Beirut

The Opposition Takes Beirut
by Nadine Acoury

A few hours after yesterday's press conference of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, opposition fighters occupied the offices of the pro-government Future Movement of Hariri in Beirut, and battles focused on the Koraytem palace (Saad Hariri residence), which was hit by rockets, the Sérail (seat of the Siniora government), and the home of Walid Jumblatt (pro-government Druze party leader).

Hariri's media -- Future TV, the Al-Mustakbal daily, and Radio Orient -- have ceased all activity.

Appeals to Support the Leaders of "the Majority"

The pro-government circles are traumatized by the rapid defeat. Confirming their debacle on the ground, Jumblatt and Hariri (who have always boasted of "holding the heart of Beirut," leaving the "Shiite suburb" -- of the poor, workers, especially day laborers and low-income workers, artisans, and Palestinian refugee camps -- to Hezbollah) asked Nabih Berri (leader of Amal, another Shi'i party, and president of the National Assembly) to ensure their safety and that of their followers in Beirut.

The Army Content to Clean Up after the Opposition

Note the position of the Lebanese Army who did not oppose the advance of the opposition and settled for entering the occupied offices to evacuate the staff.

Michel Aoun

General Michel Aoun, leader of the (pro-opposition Christian) Rally for Lebanon, quickly expressed his continuing support for the resistance.

The "Red Lines" of the Opposition

In his speech of yesterday afternoon, Hassan Nasrallah was very clear: the country has entered a "new era" since the "decisions taken by the government of Walid Jumblatt" (in a clear allusion to the ultra pro-US Druze leader's takeover of the Lebanese executive power) concerning the resistance and its weapons, especially the telecommunications network of the resistance, and the dismissal of the head of the internal security of the international airport Wafik Shoukeir.

Nasrallah said the government should rescind its two decisions before resuming the national dialogue:

1. decision to dismantle the telecommunications network of the resistance (which has existed for 20 years) because the network is an essential weapon of the resistance and its dismantling would allow the Zionist enemy to penetrate the heart of the resistance and assassinate its leaders and militants (as it does in Palestine)


2. decision to dismiss the head of the internal security of the international airport (an official long known for his impeccablly patriotic and anti-Zionist administration) and to replace him by a puppet who would help the airport fall into the hands of pro-government militias allied with the United States and Israel and who would allow spies and weapons to be smuggled into Lebanon.

The Rest of the Country

Outside Beirut, in the mountains of the north and the south, the fighters of the government "majority" re-opened the national and international (Beirut-Damascus) routes that they had blocked yesterday.

Favorable International Context

As Israel sinks into a standstill due to the impending resignation of Olmert and his replacement, and the United States struggles to convince even its allies to follow its colonial war in the last year of the Bush presidency, the Lebanese resistance scores a major, decisive victory: do not touch the weapons of the resistance, resolve the political problem through national dialogue, and take the real majority of the country into account.

Social Demands

The general strike and demonstration of the General Confederation of Workers had been planned for months for the sixth of May, on the basis of demands such as:

• raise the minimum wage (untouched since 1996 despite a price increase of over 140%)


• increase wages of both private- and public-sector workers


• extend social security to all workers (it currently covers less than 40% of workers).

The workers' demands were taken hostage by the government, which launched the provocation of the dismantling of the telecommunications network of the resistance and the dismissal of the head of the internal security of the airport five days before the strike, with a clear, unmistakable goal: liquidate the social demands of a majority of people of Lebanon who are suffering growing impoverishment, on the pretext that the strike blames the "majority" in the government and plays into the hands of the opposition.

French Sites and Blog
<www.rplfrance.org/>
<www.aloufok.net/article.php3?id_article=4661>
<libanresistance.blogspot.com/>

Arabic News Sites
<www.al-akhbar.com/>
<www.assafir.com/>

---

The original article in French was published on the Web site of ISM France on 9 May 2008. Translation by Yoshie Furuhashi.

La Résistance contrôle une grande partie de Beyrouth

The Lebanese government attacked workers and Hizballah at the same time, triggering a general strike supported by the Party of God. Hizballah and its allies have decisively won this battle, and even the Saudis are said to be advising pro-Western Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to step down: "La Résistance contrôle une grande partie de Beyrouth," Al-Oufok, 9 May 2008; Nada Bakri and Graham Bowley, "Shiite Militias Seize Beirut Neighborhoods," New York Times, 10 May 2008; and "Hezbollah 'Seizes West Beirut'," Al Jazeera, 9 May 2008.

Evo Appeals for Dialogue and the Opposition Challenges Him to Win His Mandate at a Recall Referendum

Evo Appeals for Dialogue and the Opposition Challenges Him to Win His Mandate at a Recall Referendum
by Bolpress

Abruptly, and at record speed, the Senate passed a law to hold a recall referendum.

President Evo Morales invited the opposition governors of the "Media Luna" (the half-moon-shaped region composed of the Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija departments) to resume dialogue on Monday afternoon with an agenda for open discussion and offered guarantees for autonomy within limits of law. The opposition forces responded to the president's appeal by passing, at record speed, a law to hold a recall referendum on the mandates of the president, the vice president, and governors.

Trying to pave a path to a pact, President Morales said he was willing to accept any kind of international mediators and observers. Vice President Álvaro García Linera, hopeful that the opposition governors would respond positively to the appeal, suggested this morning that they reach a consensus on a "package of decisions" to exit the political crisis, including a recall referendum.

But the opposition in the Senate responded to the executive branch's invitation by approving at record speed a law to plan a referendum on whether to recall the highest national and departmental authorities that was introduced by the president himself and that has already been approved by the Chamber of Deputies .

The opposition lawmakers, who have a majority in the Senate, passed the recall plan by a large majority, rapidly approved all terms of each of its articles, established its rules, and sent it to the executive branch for enactment. They argue that the time has come for the people to decide whose position is right in the current political crisis -- the government or the opposition.

If the president does not sign or veto the law within 10 days, the vice president and the Congress could give the green light to the referendum. If Morales does not sign the law, he would leave an impression of great political weakness.

MAS Senator Félix Rojas said that the congressional caucus who supports the executive branch is in agreement with the law for a recall referendum but does not consider it sensible or appropriate to support it at a moment when efforts are being made to bring the government and the opposition to an agreement. Now the country is calling for resumption of dialogue, but if this referendum plan is authorized, it will harm the chance of any political rapprochement, he said.

Senator Antonio Peredo (MAS) said that the opposition is seeking to put the president "off balance" vis-à-vis what is happening in the country. "Given the illegal fashion in which the referendums are held in the departments, they want to give the president a hot potato; they are seeking an open confrontation between the central government and the governors," he said.

According to the rules established by the Senate this Wednesday, to recall the president and the vice president, more than 53.7% of voters must vote against them at the referendum. If both authorities lost the mandate, general elections would be held immediately.

The opposition maneuver is intended to block any attempt on the part of the government supporters to adopt laws for constitutional referenda, to ratify the Constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly, and to put an end to controversy and set a ceiling on land ownership (5,000 or 10,000 hectares).

Before the "head start" of the opposition, García Linera announced in the morning that the central government will respect the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, expressed his full support for all democratically elected authorities in Bolivia, and called for dialogue. After meeting with Vice President García Linera, US Ambassador Philip Goldberg suggested that the OAS, friendly countries, the Catholic Church, or another institution chosen by the parties in conflict could mediate the dialogue.

---

The original article in Spanish was published in Bolpress on 8 May 2008. Translation by Yoshie Furuhashi.

Food and Imperialism

The latest stage of imperialism, which has globalized neoliberal capitalism, has made it very difficult for people in the South to rebel against imperialism, for if they do so, imperialism can deny them an increasing variety of essential goods for survival for which they have come to depend on world markets -- especially food, much of whose production and distribution it controls.

• "Of the half of humanity that lives in cities (3 billion), some 1 billion, or one-third of city dwellers, live in slums," mainly working in the informal sector (Fred Magdoff, "The World Food Crisis: Sources and Solutions," Monthly Review, May 2008).


• "Roughly 70% of all developing countries are currently net importers of food. Among the least developed countries, this figure is even higher" (Katarina Wahlberg, "Are We Approaching a Global Food Crisis? Between Soaring Food Prices and Food Aid Shortage," World Economy & Development in Brief, 3 March 2008).


• "6 corporations control 85% of the world trade in grain" (Shawn Hattingh, "Liberalizing Food Trade to Death," MRZine, 6 May 2008, citing John Madeley, Hungry for Trade: How the Poor Pay for Free Trade, London: Zed Books, 2000).

Perhaps it's in part because of the radical development of dependency that the most significant attempts to challenge US hegemony in recent years have come from resource nationalists, for those who control strategic commodities -- oil and gas, mainly oil, which is more fungible than gas -- are less vulnerable to international capitalist boycotts, though they are still subject to the capital strike and flight of domestic capitalists.

Evo's Dilemmas

Evo's Dilemmas
by Néstor Kohan

The Right respects legality only when legality favors it. The history of our America has shown that a thousand times. The confrontation that is convulsing Bolivia today is no exception.

The Santa Cruz autonomy referendum is just the tip of the iceberg. To limit the debate to a question of legal pettifoggery would be a very serious error. It is an open secret that the bourgeoisie of the "Media Luna" (the half-moon-shaped region composed of the Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija departments), white and racist, lumpen and dependent, are planning to overthrow Evo Morales. That's not all. They are advised and directed by US Ambassador Philip Goldberg (who worked in Kosovo between 1994 and 1996. . .).

The CIA is implementing a predictable plan in Bolivia. Combine a Kosovo-style secessionism, psychological warfare, and incitement to internal counterrevolution as it did yesterday in the Chile of Salvador Allende and is doing today in the Venezuela of Chávez. Goldberg is following a textbook scheme. Use foundations like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and other agencies to transfer money to "independent" NGOs and rightist groups, just like in Venezuela. Since 2005, the USAID has given $120 million a year to the supposedly "democratic" opposition.

The central plaza of Santa Cruz is full of young Mormons -- blue-eyed blonds in white shirts -- who barely speak Spanish and warn against "the devil." . . . To suggest that Evo Morales in this context sit down and dialogue meekly with this warrior bourgeoisie funded by the United States is not only unrealistic and hardly pragmatic. It is simply suicidal.

As Morales himself acknowledged in an interview that he gave in La Paz in March 2008 (see <amauta.lahaine.org>), the MAS has arrived at the government, but it has no power. That is precisely the problem. If we wish to transform Bolivian society from the bottom up, we cannot avoid the problem of power at risk of losing everything.

The current dilemma of Evo and the MAS is whether it is possible to restrain the Right by making concessions or preferable to confront it and advance the process. The answer is complex because the Bolivian government is not homogeneous. It is pulled between two poles: the option of its moderate advisers (where some officials of the old political class turned progressives today and some academic fellow travelers of the process are ensconced) and the option of its most radical activists and social bases. The latter propose to radically push the process of reforms to the point of breaking the implicit pact that ties the hands of the government and will slowly weaken it. If this option ends up prevailing, Evo must not only intensify the confrontation with the "Media Luna." He should also impose price controls to curb inflation (the slogan that, as we have been able to hear firsthand, his own bases have cried out to him in some demonstrations) and accelerate the process to regain the full -- not just partial -- control of natural resources.

There is little time left to choose between these two alternatives. History is cruel and does not forgive indecisions. The people left behind, humiliated and exploited, are waiting. Bolivia is in its decisive hour. The outcome will affect the entire region, from Venezuela to Argentina.

---

Néstor Kohan is a teacher at the Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) and coordinator of the Colectivo Amauta-Cátedra Che Guevara. The original essay in Spanish was published in Bolpress on 5 May 2008. Translation by Yoshie Furuhashi.

Language Reform and National Identity

During the period spanning the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, many a nation reformed its written language, (the timing and nature of the reform depending on each nation's history), to make it come closer to spoken language, so common people could understand it better.¹ The reform was also inspired by a Romantic ideology which went like this: the renaissance of the nation is to come from the vitality of its roots preserved in common people's manly speech, veiled by the literary language of the effeminate elite who, dependent on foreign influences, have let the nation decline. It was a step in the development of the national-popular consciousness, as well as in the process of standardization that comes with capitalism, thus a step in the formation of modernity as we know it.

At the same time, such reforms often weakened both synchronic bonds with neighboring languages and diachronic ones with the most recent past. The Turkish language reform, for instance, made the modern Turkish language possess much fewer Arabic and Persian words and rules than its immediate literary predecessor, Ottoman Turkish, did, becoming an "odd man out" following a "West European" script in the region whose cultures are deeply inscribed in Arabic, an ironic fact considering that Turkish is a more "Eastern" language (the westernmost member of the Altaic language family) than Arabic (a Semitic language belonging to the Afro-Asiatic family) or Persian (which has kept its modified Arabic script but is an Indo-European language²).

But the purge couldn't be complete.

Here's an example: the "National Library" is

Millî Kütüphane
in Turkish

دار الكتب الوطنية
Dar al-Kutub al-wataniya
in Arabic

كتابخانه ملي
Ketabkhane-ye Melli
in Persian.

That means that the Turks have kept "kütüp" (books, the plural of "kitap") from the Arabic plural of "kitab" (book), "kutub"; "millî" from the Persian adjective "melli" (national) which derived from the Arabic "millah" (confessional community); and "hane" from the Persian "khane" (house). ("Dar" in Arabic is "house," which is one of its several meanings in Persian; and "watan" in Arabic and "vatan" in Persian and Turkish are "homeland, motherland, patria.") The only thing Turkish in the Turkish name of the National Library of Turkey is where the adjective is placed: before, not after, the noun it modifies, unlike Arabic and Persian. Amazing that the Kemalists let this happen!

1 The historical process that eventually led to such reforms had began with the Reformation, the rejection of Latin in favor of vernacular languages. Muslims, by and large, have rejected this option to this day, preferring to study Arabic. Therefore Islam, uniquely among the Abrahamic religions, provides a powerful ideological resource that can be employed against nationalism. By the same token, secular nationalists of such nations as Iran and Turkey tend to conflate their hostility toward Islam with their dislike of Arabic: e.g., "Our Turkish is not what it used to be. It has become a heavy language filled with superfluous Arabic words and Koranic expressions. . . . A general aura of Islam is invading the language" (emphasis added, Mehmet Ali Birand, "The Gradual Islamization of Our Daily Lives," Turkish Daily News, 13 March 2008).

2 It's also ironic that the people speaking this most "Western" language in the region and following a Jacobin political script have somehow ended up with an "Islamic Republic."

Evo: Half of Cruceños Do Not Want Separatists' Autonomy

Evo: Half of Cruceños Do Not Want Separatists' Autonomy
by Bolpress

This is no autonomist victory nor is it a "democratic fiesta" -- it's a violent, failed opinion poll whose rate of abstention is three times the usual rate, says the President.

The illegal and unconstitutional referendum resoundingly failed to adopt the statute of autonomy for Santa Cruz, said President Evo Morales, as the poll showed that at least half of Cruceño citizens do not support the model of autonomy pushed by some clans.

Leading politicians and businessmen from the Santa Cruz department swear that more than 80 percent of voters approved their statute.  "Today we say to the world that we are already autonomous, viva Santa Cruz," declared the chairman of the Santa Cruz Civic Committee Branco Marinkovic in a triumphant speech at the 24th of September Plaza in the capital of Santa Cruz, as soon as the initial results of the referendum were made public.

Morales saluted the people of Santa Cruz for organizing themselves and resisting the separatist statute of oligarchies on Sunday, the fourth of May, and said that he was impressed by the wisdom and consciousness of people.

In his opinion, the Santa Cruz poll failed because it was not a "democratic fiesta" that autonomists were hoping for but a violent process plagued by irregularities, allegations of fraud, and aggressions of young Cruceño shock troops reinforced by citizens from the interior of the country.

According to the President, the autonomists cannot declare themselves winners who received more than 80 percent of the votes without considering the high rate of citizen abstention which was three times the levels of abstention in recent elections.

The average abstention rate at the national level ranges between 20 and 22 percent.  In the Constituent Assembly election, abstention in Santa Cruz amounted to 19 percent.  The media estimate that 39 percent of registered voters abstained from voting this Sunday.

The data presented by some media, many of which sympathize with and support the illegal referendum, should worry those who gambled on it, said Morales, because the percentage of abstention plus those of no votes and null votes conclusively shows that at least 50 percent of Cruceños do not support the capitalists' autonomy.

"To tell the truth, I am sure that far more than 50 percent said no to autonomy. . . , that more data will be found behind the media. . .  .  Leaders and authorities ought to tell the truth," emphasized the head of state.

Morales regretted that the referendum had further divided Santa Cruz and set families living in that department at odds with one another.

He appreciated the wisdom and consciousness of people and social movements who today, despite assault and humiliation, rebelled against minority groups who tried forcibly to ratify a model of autonomy that fractures the country.

Morales was referring not only to acts of social repudiation in the city and provinces of Santa Cruz, but especially to multitudinous mobilizations in El Alto, Cochabamba, and La Paz this Sunday "against the Cruceño landowners' statute."  In Cochabamba, they called for the resignation of Governor Manfred Reyes Villa, and in El Alto they threw stones at the television station of Governor José Luis Paredes.  Both Reyes Villa and Paredes are allies of Cruceño autonomists.

The President said that the people were not mobilized by economic resources or perks and assured that his government did not finance any of these mobilizations.  "Hence my admiration for these spontaneous demonstrations in defense of legality and equality among Bolivians."

Morales called upon all opposition governors to work from tomorrow for a genuine autonomy for indigenous peoples, departments, and regions, based on the new Constitution of Bolivia.  He hoped that his appeal "will be heard by the governors to ensure autonomy for communities, not for cliques."

---

The original article in Spanish was published in Bolpress on 4 May 2008.  Translation by Yoshie Furuhashi.

Iran, Islam, Immigration, and Israel

In the recent elections in both Italy and the United Kingdom, the Right, both soft and hard, won a dramatic victory, and all currents of the Left lost: Elisabetta Povoledo, "Immigrant Issue Key in Italy's Elections" (International Herald Tribune, 25 April 2008); Lidia Cirillo, "Right Victorious: Italian Elections -- A First Response" (International Viewpoint, May 2008); and Richard Seymour, "London Meltdown" (Lenin's Tomb, 3 May 2008). A neo-fascist gets a seat on the London Assembly, and Rome now has a neo-fascist mayor, apparently supported by not only fascists but also the "leaders" of the Jewish community: "Sandro Di Castro, president of the Jewish community's Bene Berith association, says the present sense of danger posed to Israel by Islamists and Iran outweighs memories of the more distant and tragic past of the mass deportations from Rome by the Nazis and Mussolini's anti-Jewish race laws" (Guy Dinmore, "Fascists and Jews United for Rome Mayor," Financial Times, 4 May 2008).

The Left of the global North has yet to come up with a principled and yet popular program on the intertwined national and international questions of Iran, Islam, immigration, and Israel, and the lack of it doesn't bode well especially when economic anxiety is on the rise. The Right has a simple tool it applies to the first three: demonize and criminalize them as much as possible. The defense of Israel serves many purposes at the same time: whitewashing the Right, distancing it from anti-Semitism of fascism of the twentieth century; anti-Semite-baiting leftists for criticizing Israel; and re-branding the Right as "the defender of the Western Civilization from a new fascist menace," the Islamic Republic of Iran, or a specter of a new Caliphate re-conquering Al-Andalus and imposing Sharia on Europeans, or both. The Center Left panders to, and sometimes runs to the right of, the Right on all these issues. The Far Left is better than the Center Left on Israel and immigration, but opinions on the Far Left are very much divided when it comes to Iran and Islam.

The British and Italian elections, therefore, may very well be harbingers of worse things to come.

The Indian Left on Energy and Sovereignty

The Left in India has gotten great political mileage out of the question of energy and sovereignty -- the India-US nuclear deal and the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline deal -- making the most of its veto power:

Ahead of the joint meeting on the India-US civil nuclear deal next week, the Left has said that the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline's fate will prove how independent India's foreign policy is under the present dispensation.

"If the pipeline deal goes through, then we will know we have an independent foreign policy," Communist Party of India leader A B Bardhan said.

"If the pipeline deal does not go through, it would mean the American pressure has won," Bardhan declared, while alluding to American opposition to the three-nation gas pipeline. ("After N-deal, Left Puts Government to Iran Pipeline Test," Times of India, 4 May 2008)

The Complexities of Zimbabwe

Chido Makunike's commentary, "The Complexities of Zimbabwe," was published in Pambazuka News (1 May 2008) before the official presidential elections results of 47.9% for Morgan Tsvangirai and 43.2% for Robert Mugabe was announced. But it is still worth reading.

The reason why Mugabe has been able to hang onto power for so long, despite naked repression and economic meltdown, long after the exhaustion of his brand of nationalism, is that the politics of the opposition leadership has genuinely been underwhelming:

To say many and probably most Zimbabweans want Mugabe to step aside is not the same as saying his ideas have been largely rejected by them. For example, most would want his flawed land reform effort to be fixed to work, not for it to be reversed. The MDC was slow to understand this and other nuances of Mugabe's complex legacy, losing it precious time and early support in Zimbabwe and elsewhere. (Makunike, 1 May 2008)

If Mugabe had faced a better opposition, he would have been gone a long time ago.

The emphasis of the argument that leftists should be making in the case of Zimbabwe and others like it is not that there is a nascent left within the opposition despite the Western backing of the MDC (which is the point often made by leftists regarding Zimbabwe) but that the Western backing delays, rather than hastens, the much needed transition and moreover worsens the quality of the outcome of the transition, as well as obstructs the development of democracy in the West itself. That's the crucial nuance found in Makunike's article.