- "A looming battle over those subsidies typifies Mr. Ahmadinejad's coming dilemma. In the fall, as part of its WTO obligations, the government plans to limit the amount of subsidized gasoline consumers can buy. Above that level, consumers will have to pay higher prices. That will raise the cost of living for Mr. Ahmadinejad's constituents by pushing up prices of nearly everything else in Iran's gas-guzzling economy. The government is already talking about dipping into the oil fund to continue financing the subsidies" (Bill Spindle, "Burning Oil -- Behind Rise of Iran's President: A Populist Economic Agenda; Ahmadinejad Wins Power Promising Lavish Outlays; Inflation Is a Major Worry; Crunch Time at Biscuit Factory," Wall Street Journal, Eastern ed., 22 June 2006, A.1).
- Iran could ration motorists to less than five liters of gasoline per day from September but will keep prices heavily subsidized to ward off inflation, Iran's Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh said.
Vaziri-Hamaneh said earlier Iran would have to ration gasoline from September 23 after parliament slashed the budget for importing the fuel. He said gas-guzzling Iran would end petrol imports but traders said they doubted Tehran could do so.
Despite holding the world's second biggest oil reserves, Iran lacks refinery capacity and imports more than 40 per cent of the 70 million litres of gasoline it burns each day.
Most gasoline imports come from western Europe, with trading house Vitol the leading supplier, market sources said. India has also featured as a key exporter, at times supplying up to 25,000 bpd.
International traders watch major gasoline importer Iran closely for any sign of fluctuations in demand, but doubt the Islamic Republic will have the political courage to aggravate motorists by halting its 15 monthly tanker shipments.
'Each car will receive a ration of less than five liters if rationing happens,' state television quoted Vaziri-Hamaneh as saying. 'Only taxis and public transport will receive more than the ration.'
The government, in which Vaziri-Hamaneh is the most powerful minister, is due to issue its final verdict on gasoline rationing this week.
Some economists had called for Iran to raise the price of gasoline to market levels or introduce a dual-pricing system under which motorists could pay unsubsidized rates for anything they bought beyond the ration. The minister dismissed this.
'Announcing a sudden rise in the gasoline price will cause an inflation shock which society cannot take now,' he said, adding the real price of gasoline was 55 cents per liter, not the nine cents it fetches at pumps.
Conservative Iranian politicians have dismissed fears that rationing could spark social unrest, stressing how Iranians accepted a coupon system during the 1980-1988 war against Iraq.
But political analysts have expressed doubts that Iranians will be so stoical today. Most traded goods move by road and hikes in fuel prices and transportation have traditionally sparked sharp spikes in the cost of basic good.
Iran's cheap gasoline culture chokes big cities with heavy pollution. Economists identify Iran's ubiquitous subsidies as one of the principal reasons for uncompetitive industry.
Many officials have also argued that Tehran's dependence on imported gasoline threatens national security. It is a sensitive target for any sanctions imposed over atomic work.
Iran has ambitious plans to upgrade refineries over the next five years and lift daily gasoline output to 120 million liters. But investment has been sluggish. (Reuters, "Iran Daily Petrol Ration under 5 Liters," 25 June 2006)
Monday, June 26, 2006
Iran, WTO, and Gasoline
A "looming battle" over what to do with Iran's dependence on gasoline imports (a strategic liability and a development problem that must be solved) and subsidies for gasoline consumption (necessary for the Iranian working class in the short term, but undoubtedly wasteful economically and environmentally in the long term) is a tough one for the President of Iran to handle. Iran's oil minister Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh, who wasn't Ahmadinejad's choice, is a leftover from the Khatami era (a deputy oil minister at that time), and he, as well as his parliamentary allies, isn't really down with the President's economic agenda and may also be using this problem in a faction fight against the President and his allies.
Ahmadinejad in Rural Iran
From Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-born Israeli analyst, one gains another glimpse of Ahmadinejad as Persian Chavez:
Through his constant trips to the provinces (13 so far), Mr. Ahmadinejad has made non-Tehranis feel as if they also belong to Iran.
More important, Mr. Ahmadinejad is putting his money where his mouth is. In his budget approved in December, expenditures in rural areas increased by as much as 180 percent in his first year as president.
The rural population in Iran likes and appreciates him for his generosity because in the years before Mr. Ahmadinejad, those outside Tehran were treated as if they were distant relatives when it came to government investment and expenditure. This appreciation of the president exists even though far more of the rural population made sacrifices for the sake of the 1979 Islamic revolution than were made by residents of Tehran.
So these days, when "their" man is in town, rural Iranians turn up in the hundreds of thousands to greet him. Many of the people want to share their problems with him. This became apparent recently when, during a trip to Golestan Province in the northeast, 135,000 letters addressed to Mr. Ahmadinejad were handed to his delegation and to him personally by people in the crowd. (Meir Javedanfar, "At Home, Iranian Leader Admired," Baltimore Sun, 25 June 2006)
Friday, June 23, 2006
WSJ: "Mr. Ahmadinejad Is Emerging as an Iranian Version of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez"
The Wall Street Journal agrees with me on one thing: "Mr. Ahmadinejad is emerging as an Iranian version of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez" (Bill Spindle, "Burning Oil -- Behind Rise of Iran's President: A Populist Economic Agenda; Ahmadinejad Wins Power Promising Lavish Outlays; Inflation Is a Major Worry; Crunch Time at Biscuit Factory," Wall Street Journal, Eastern ed., 22 June 2006, A.1) . . . except, of course, the WSJ, as well as Iranian neoliberals, doesn't like the fiscal and monetary policies of the Ahmadinejad administration:
In recent weeks, he has proposed a $4 billion national school-renovation program and has raised not only salaries for workers in Iran's vast, government-controlled industrial sector but also the minimum wage for everyone else. He doubled government grants for newlyweds and forced banks to lower interest rates by several percentage points.
Mr. Ahmadinejad is emerging as an Iranian version of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez: a pugnacious politician, buoyed by oil money, whose anti-elite message and defiance of the West is causing his popularity to soar. Mr. Ahmadinejad isn't nearly as powerful as Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But his policies, which interrupt Iran's tentative stabs at economic liberalization, have helped him wield more influence than many thought possible for an Iranian president.
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In the late 1990s, under a series of reform-minded governments, Iran tried to emerge from the economic and political isolation that followed the Islamic revolution and eight years of war with Iraq. In 2001, the government adopted a 20-year plan to boost imports and exports by lowering trade barriers. The ultimate goal was to join the World Trade Organization.
One key to that plan was diversifying an economy heavily dependent on oil revenues. That means implementing a long list of free-market recommendations, including freeing up labor markets and phasing out subsidies.
Mr. Ahmadinejad's policies are rapidly reversing that tentative economic liberalization. In addition to his spending plans, his government has spurned foreign investment and recently raised tariffs on mobile-phone handsets by 60%. Another plan: doling out shares -- he calls them "Justice Shares" -- of government-controlled companies to the poor.
In Ghavart, a conservative, working-class town of 9,000 near the Jey industrial center, Mr. Ahmadinejad's pay raises and subsidies have provided relief -- for some. Hamid Kachoui, a grocer, says he's noticed customers buying extra chicken or meat recently.
"It's much better. People don't have to scrape by," said Mr. Kachoui, 18 years old, standing by a storefront stall packed with rice, bread and other staples. Many food basics are heavily subsidized by Iran's government, using oil money to bridge the gap with international market prices.
Mr. Kachoui credits the improvement to Mr. Ahmadinejad, whom he says nearly everyone in the village supported in last year's election. "With President Ahmadinejad, things will get much better," he says.
Down the road in Jey's industrial center, private biscuit maker Esfahan Farkhondeh Co. has been thrown into a crisis. Last year, the 14-year-old company produced 6,500 tons of biscuits, the kind served with tea and coffee at almost every social gathering in Iran. A few months ago, new laws pushed up the minimum salary for most of the industrial bakery's workers by nearly 50%. The others got 22% raises, according to Mohammed Reza Vaez Shoushtari, an owner and manager.
Meanwhile, the government lowered subsidies on sugar and flour bought by industrial bakers, a nod to Iran's designs on joining the WTO. "Biscuits are not a necessity for people," says Mr. Shoushtari, suggesting a reason why his industry was singled out. The government left subsidies for retail consumers unchanged.
The decision pushed up the price of the two main ingredients in the company's biscuits. The company's bank tightened loan requirements after government-mandated interest-rate cuts and now won't extend additional money to keep the company operating.
Pinched, the biscuit concern informed buyers it would raise prices by 15%. They immediately cancelled about 80% of their orders, Mr. Shoushtari says. He figured most were delaying purchases to see if the government will reverse its decision on the subsidies. Without the ability to fire workers, he plans to wait, hoping the business climate stabilizes.
"When the president changes, the country always becomes a bit chaotic," he says.
For the year that ended March, 2006, Iran is projected to have earned about $49 billion selling oil and natural gas, more than double its take of four years ago, primarily because of rising prices. Much of the president's spending is coming from Iran's Oil Stabilization Fund, which is supposed to pay for long-term infrastructure projects or to buoy the country if oil revenues falter. Iran has dipped into the fund almost every year to fill holes in the government budget. Last year, it spent $7.7 billion from the fund, much of it for government subsidies on basic products, from wheat to gasoline.
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Few things appealed more to Iranian voters, especially the working poor, than Mr. Ahmadinejad's promise to "put the oil revenue on the dinner table of every Iranian." Since being elected, he's made frequent trips to Iranian provinces -- political barnstorming previously unheard of in Iran's aloof theocracy. He encourages supporters to write with their requests and has promised funds for thousands of local projects.
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Indeed, Mr. Ahmadinejad's standing among the poor and working class has allowed him to challenge domestic foes, including many in the clerical establishment, throwing Iran's political establishment off balance in ways few expected. With 17-hour workdays and a reputation for rectitude, Mr. Ahmadinejad has refashioned a post with few formal powers. The parliament, more representative of Iran's conservative establishment, has tried to parry Mr. Ahmadinejad's activism, rejecting three of his candidates for oil minister as well as nominees for other important economic portfolios.
But he's stunned Tehran's political elite by winning many battles. He has replaced several senior clergymen in the Ministry of Culture with non-clerical allies, apparently with the blessing of the Ayatollah Khamenei, a senior cleric himself. While less important than the Supreme Leader, Iran's president holds considerable influence over economic and social policies through his ability to nominate the heads of government ministries. He also appoints the head of the central bank.
To outsiders trying to penetrate Iran's opaque political system, it's still unclear whether the president remains under the control of the clerical establishment or whether this is a genuine bid for power.
"Everybody's too busy just trying to catch up with him," says Nasser Hadian, a political science professor at Tehran University and childhood schoolmate of Mr. Ahmadinejad. Although he disagrees with many of the president's policies, he grudgingly admires the way he has shaken up Iran's political culture. "He's challenging the entire spectrum of society, from the super-secular to the super-religious." (Spindle, 22 June 2006)
Tuesday, June 20, 2006
Persian Chavez
How's my Persian Chavez doing lately? The Guardian says he's popular like our man in Venezuela:
The neoliberal "reformists" are correct, however, that the President of Iran has yet to get control of the oil industry (headed by a leftover from the Khatami years) and the Central Bank (staffed by US-trained economists) in Iran -- even the Parliament, let alone the Guardian and Expediency councils, is not quite on his side on structural economic changes beyond fiscal policy:
The popularity of Iran's controversial leader, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is surging almost a year after he unexpectedly won closely contested presidential elections, Iranian officials and western diplomats said on Tuesday.Naturally, I'm very pleased to hear this. Now, like Chavez, Ahmadinejad has to think about what to do with the term limits thingy.
Attributing his success to his populist style and fortnightly meet-the-people tours of the country, the sources said, as matters stand, Mr Ahmadinejad was the clear favourite to win a second term in 2009. The perception that the president was standing up to the US over the nuclear issue was also boosting his standing.
"He's more popular now than a year ago. He's on the rise," said Nasser Hadian-Jazy, a professor of political science at Tehran University. "I guess he has a 70% approval rating right now. He portrays himself as a simple man doing an honest job. He's comfortable communicating with ordinary people." (Ewen MacAskill and Simon Tisdall, "Ahmadinejad 'Has 70% Approval Rating,'" The Guardian, 20 June 2006)
The neoliberal "reformists" are correct, however, that the President of Iran has yet to get control of the oil industry (headed by a leftover from the Khatami years) and the Central Bank (staffed by US-trained economists) in Iran -- even the Parliament, let alone the Guardian and Expediency councils, is not quite on his side on structural economic changes beyond fiscal policy:
Mohammad Atrianfar, founder of the leading reformist newspaper Shargh and an ally of Hashemi Rafsanjani, the president's rival, said Mr Ahmadinejad would not have it all his own way. "The reform movement is alive, despite last year's defeat," he said, although he added it would take some time to regroup. Meanwhile, the government was mishandling economic policy, and that could be its undoing.I added this bit from IRNA to Rostam Pourzal's latest that I published in MRZine:
"The present economy, due to the rate of oil prices, is in a good situation. But the management of the state sector is very bad. I can compare him to a wicked child who has inherited a large amount of money and goes on a spending spree. He has taken horrid and rushed decisions."
Mr Atrianfar said that windfall oil revenue was being squandered through state handouts to impoverished provinces and commodity subsidies. But there was insufficient investment in long-term projects and infrastructure, foreign investment was falling, and the country was suffering capital flight and a brain drain. (MacAskill and Tisdall, 20 June 2006)
"President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad . . . criticized the ongoing privatization scheme, which has turned into a means for the 'looting of national wealth.'I hope that, soon, he will be so popular that the Majlis, the Guardian Council, etc. will be compelled to go along and he will be able to pass a law that would allow laborers to get factories free of charge and run them.
'I've heard that a factory, worth rls 300 billion (USD 32.715 million), is offered at rls 1.050 billion (USD 114,504) . . . . Had the law allowed, we would have given the production unit to laborers free of charge so that it would both remain active and earn profit for the government,' said Ahmadinejad in a speech to the locals.
He said his government does support private investment and business, while believing that the policy should not encourage bankruptcy of workshops, low production, lay-offs and plunder of national wealth.
He insisted, 'The Iranian nation does not accept the sort of privatization at all'" ("Ahmadinejad Protests Plundering National Wealth," IRNA, 9 June 2006).
Saturday, June 17, 2006
Iran at the World Cup
I watched the World Cup match of Iran and Mexico -- two peoples with whom Washington is at odds! -- with my Iranian friends (mainly men).
Not knowing anything about Iranian football, before the match began, I told my friends to point out to me cute guys on the Iranian squad, so I would know where to focus. My friends said that Mehdi Mahdavi-Kia is good-looking, though I thought that Vahid Hashemian and Ebrahim Mirzapour (who turned out to be one of the players responsible for Iran's defeat!) are more appealing. But none of the Iranians is as pretty as Rafael Marquez. Naturally, my sympathies were torn. After the President of Iran issued a decree allowing women to attend sports events at stadiums, Iran's ruling clerics immediately vetoed it: "[W]hen Ahmedinejad made his announcement it forced the clerics to take a position and they said women couldn't look at the naked legs and arms of the male players" (Jafar Panahi, qtd. in Frances Harrison, "Iran's Female Fans Yet to Win Equality," BBC News, 6 June 2006). Yes, indeed, only MEN can appreciate the naked legs and arms of other MEN! What the clerics truly fear, however, might be that female fans might find guys on the other team cuter than guys on their team.
Iran held its ground in the first half; but, in the second half, the Iranian team was on the defensive from the beginning, and the team's morale seemed to collapse after Mexico scored its second goal, and then the team allowed Mexico to score an easy third goal. According to my Iranian friends, that's typical of Iranian football: losing confidence altogether after losing a little. Today, Iran is playing against Portugal. Iran, once again, held its own in the first half: 0-0. But now at 86 minutes it's Portugal 2 - Iran 0. Is there a pattern here? I hope that's not a bad political omen!
The way the Iranians are playing, I suppose the high point of Iranian footballers will remain its 1998 World Cup victory over the American team in the near future, though it must be mentioned that Iran has not recovered from Ali Karimi's injury.
We watched the Iran-Mexico match on ABC, at a viewing party (big screens under a tent outside the Columbus Crew Stadium) provided by the Columbus Crew. It should be noted that, whenever Mexico scored, the camera showed ordinary Mexican men and women jumping up and down and cheering for their team in Mexico City, but it refused to show comparable scenes from Tehran or even the Iranian diaspora when the Iranian team did score its one and only goal that day. That sort of prejudice motivated by American geopolitics, however, did not manifest itself at all among local football fans. Mainly Iranians showed up at the viewing party, but there were also some Mexicans and Somalis (two of the largest immigrant communities in Columbus, Ohio) and Anglos, aside from me and a guy from Bangladesh. During the halftime break, some of them were playing football together, having a good time. "Divide and conquer" doesn't always work!
Whither Team Melli? Abbas Kiarostami, a renowned Iranian film maker, said: "I hope that we'll beat Angola at least". I wished, though, that Iran had been able to get to the Round of 16 -- as Kiarostami noted, the Iranians "need something to cheer about".
Not knowing anything about Iranian football, before the match began, I told my friends to point out to me cute guys on the Iranian squad, so I would know where to focus. My friends said that Mehdi Mahdavi-Kia is good-looking, though I thought that Vahid Hashemian and Ebrahim Mirzapour (who turned out to be one of the players responsible for Iran's defeat!) are more appealing. But none of the Iranians is as pretty as Rafael Marquez. Naturally, my sympathies were torn. After the President of Iran issued a decree allowing women to attend sports events at stadiums, Iran's ruling clerics immediately vetoed it: "[W]hen Ahmedinejad made his announcement it forced the clerics to take a position and they said women couldn't look at the naked legs and arms of the male players" (Jafar Panahi, qtd. in Frances Harrison, "Iran's Female Fans Yet to Win Equality," BBC News, 6 June 2006). Yes, indeed, only MEN can appreciate the naked legs and arms of other MEN! What the clerics truly fear, however, might be that female fans might find guys on the other team cuter than guys on their team.
Iran held its ground in the first half; but, in the second half, the Iranian team was on the defensive from the beginning, and the team's morale seemed to collapse after Mexico scored its second goal, and then the team allowed Mexico to score an easy third goal. According to my Iranian friends, that's typical of Iranian football: losing confidence altogether after losing a little. Today, Iran is playing against Portugal. Iran, once again, held its own in the first half: 0-0. But now at 86 minutes it's Portugal 2 - Iran 0. Is there a pattern here? I hope that's not a bad political omen!
The way the Iranians are playing, I suppose the high point of Iranian footballers will remain its 1998 World Cup victory over the American team in the near future, though it must be mentioned that Iran has not recovered from Ali Karimi's injury.
We watched the Iran-Mexico match on ABC, at a viewing party (big screens under a tent outside the Columbus Crew Stadium) provided by the Columbus Crew. It should be noted that, whenever Mexico scored, the camera showed ordinary Mexican men and women jumping up and down and cheering for their team in Mexico City, but it refused to show comparable scenes from Tehran or even the Iranian diaspora when the Iranian team did score its one and only goal that day. That sort of prejudice motivated by American geopolitics, however, did not manifest itself at all among local football fans. Mainly Iranians showed up at the viewing party, but there were also some Mexicans and Somalis (two of the largest immigrant communities in Columbus, Ohio) and Anglos, aside from me and a guy from Bangladesh. During the halftime break, some of them were playing football together, having a good time. "Divide and conquer" doesn't always work!
Whither Team Melli? Abbas Kiarostami, a renowned Iranian film maker, said: "I hope that we'll beat Angola at least". I wished, though, that Iran had been able to get to the Round of 16 -- as Kiarostami noted, the Iranians "need something to cheer about".
Saturday, June 10, 2006
Fanaa and Kashmir; Aamir Khan, Narmada, and the BJP
Watch Fanaa if it comes to a theater near you, out of solidarity with Aamir Khan if nothing else.
- Anti-Narmada dam agitators, sitting on Dharna and hunger strike at the Jantar Mantar Road in New Delhi for past 20 days demanding that the height of the dam not be raised, got a shot in the arm when leading film actor Aamir Khan paid them a visit on Friday.
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Aamir listened to the grievances of the agitators with patience but did not utter a word. Clad in black T-shirt and jeans, the film actor also visited the 1984 Bhopal gas victims who have been demonstrating for release of relief fund.
"Last week when I was in Delhi, I passed by Jantar Mantar and was told about the two campaigns. I decided to come back and learn more about their problems," he later told reporters.
Khan said he was pained upon learning of the sufferings of the dam displacees. "I do not know about the technicalities involved in raising the height of the dam. What I do know is that farmers have been displaced from their land and they have lost their livelihood. Till the people who have already been displaced by the dam are not rehabilitated, the height of the dam should not be raised." (Onkar Singh, "Aamir Lends Support to Narmada Campaign," Rediff, 14 April 2006) - Aamir Khan addressed a press conference outside his home in Khar, north Mumbai, saying he will not apologise about his comments on the Narmada issue.
"I am saying exactly what the Supreme Court has said. I only asked for rehabilitation of poor farmers. I never spoke against the construction of the dam. I will not apologise for my comments on the issue," he says. (Rediff Entertainment Bureau, "Aamir on Narmada: I Won't Apologise," Rediff 25 May 2006) - Describing the virtual ban on screening Fanaa in Gujarat as an indication of "extreme intolerance" displayed by the ruling party and its organisations in Gujarat to any dissent, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) demanded that the Modi Government uphold the law of the land.
In a statement, the party Polit Bureau said the reported assurance by Chief Minister Narendra Modi of police protection to cinemas showing the film was an eye-wash as it was under his leadership that front organisations of the Sangh combine were threatening cinema owners against showing the film.
The ire of the protesters was against the solidarity expressed by actor Aamir Khan with the demand for rehabilitation of thousands of tribals and peasant families displaced by the Narmada project. ("CPI(M) Flays Ban on Fanaa in Gujarat," The Hindu, 26 May 2006) - The controversial Aamir Khan film Fanaa was released in Gujarat on Tuesday in the presence of a strong police contingent in a single cinema owned by a high-profile Congress family. (Manas Dasgupta, "Fanaa Released in Gujarat amid Security," The Hindu, 7 June 2006)
Friday, June 09, 2006
Tehran Splits the Israel Lobby
It now looks possible that my Persian Prince can come out ahead on the conflict over Iran's right to nuclear research.
But it is significant that Ahmadinejad's guarded response came a day later than other Iranian officials' more conciliatory responses, suggesting a division within Tehran's power elite. It is no easy matter for Ahmadinejad to win not only vis-a-vis Washington and Tel Aviv but also vis-a-vis his domestic rivals.
Nevertheless, today, Ahmadinejad delivered an even clearer response:
However things turn out for Ahmadinejad, it is an extraordinarily interesting time to watch the Washington-Tel Aviv relation:
I wish the Palestinian people had the sort of visionary leadership who could exploit a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity like this.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Thursday that Iran was ready to discuss "mutual concerns" over his country's nuclear program, but he refused to first suspend uranium enrichment.That Washington couldn't even win in Somalia is a good omen.
His comments came a day after world powers backed off a demand that Iran commit to a prolonged moratorium on uranium enrichment, asking only for a suspension during talks on its nuclear program. Ahmadinejad did not say whether he accepted the proposal, part of a package of incentives in exchange for Iran suspending enrichment. (Ali Akbar Areini, "Ahmadinejad: Iran to Talk, U.S. Gave In," Associated Press, 8 June 2006)
But it is significant that Ahmadinejad's guarded response came a day later than other Iranian officials' more conciliatory responses, suggesting a division within Tehran's power elite. It is no easy matter for Ahmadinejad to win not only vis-a-vis Washington and Tel Aviv but also vis-a-vis his domestic rivals.
Nevertheless, today, Ahmadinejad delivered an even clearer response:
Iran will not negotiate its inalienable rights, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said here [Qazvin] Thursday night.A sign that he's winning the domestic debate on how to respond to Washington's overture?
President Ahmadinejad, who arrived in the northwestern province of Qazvin Thursday morning along with members of his cabinet, made the remark while addressing families of martyrs and war veterans of the province.
"We intend to hold talks (with states) on international issues. (Certain countries) spread propaganda that if they officially recognize Iran's right to have access to nuclear fuel cycle, it will be tantamount to giving a major concession to our nation.
"They should not think that if they hold talks with Iran, it means they have given a concession to the country.
"They should know that it is the Iranian nation which accepts to negotiate with them on international issues. This is the Iranian nation who is giving procession to them," he said.
He added, "They make decisions against Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. We intend to hold talks with them on roots of corruption, discrimination and cruelties.
"In that case, peace will be established in the world and nations throughout the world will enjoy welfare.
"The Iranian nation insists on its inalienable rights and will never give them up."
The president stated, "Our nation raises flag of invitation to justice and humanity. My letter to (the US President George W. Bush) has been written about increasing problems in the world." Head of Supreme National Security Council further added the Iranian nation is powerful and a real superpower. ("Iran Will Not Negotiate Its Inalienable Right: President," 9 June 2006, IRNA)
However things turn out for Ahmadinejad, it is an extraordinarily interesting time to watch the Washington-Tel Aviv relation:
The Bush administration's offer to open direct talks with Iran and reward Tehran if it stops enriching uranium is exposing a policy rift between neoconservatives on one hand, and the Israeli government and Jewish organizations on the other.A division appears to be developing in the Israel Lobby. How fascinating.
Neoconservative analysts are blasting the administration, saying that holding talks with the Islamic regime would serve only to embolden it and undermine the anti-fundamentalist opposition in Iran. They argue that America's ultimate goal should be to change Tehran's theocratic regime.
"The administration can't have it both ways. They can't embrace the regime and still talk about liberty for the Iranian people," said Iran analyst Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative Washington think tank widely associated with the push for regime change in Iraq. A former Pentagon official, Rubin added that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice "can spout whatever platitudes she wants to spout, but at this point, when it comes to liberty and freedom, she has no credibility."
Israeli officials and several influential Jewish groups, meanwhile, have refrained from criticizing the new American approach — which some experts are depicting as the most dramatic foreign policy shift of the Bush presidency — saying that they support more pragmatic ways to block Iran's apparent dash toward a nuclear weapon. For Israel and Jewish groups — despite Iranian calls for Israel's destruction — the fundamental goal is not regime change, but to block Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The split appears to fly in the face of recent high-profile efforts to paint the pro-Israel lobby as a seamless network dominated by Jewish organizations and neoconservatives coordinating their activities with the Israeli government. Most notably, such a view was advanced by two highly respected academics — John Mearsheimer, a top international relations theorist based at the University of Chicago, and Stephen Walt, former academic dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government — in a research paper released in March. The Walt-Mearsheimer paper has triggered an escalating debate on the influence of Israel and Jewish organizations that has spilled over onto the opinion pages of major publications, including The New York Times and The Washington Post.
Recently, with such scrutiny mounting, Israeli leaders asked American Jewish organizations to lower their profile on the Iran issue, the Forward has learned.
In one notable example, a delegation of leaders from the American Jewish Congress met with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert shortly before returning to the United States. When asked how he thinks Jewish groups should pursue the Iran issue, Olmert reportedly implied that he would prefer a low profile, according to one source familiar with the proceedings.
"We don't want it to be about Israel," Olmert is said to have replied, explaining that although Iran's president focuses his belligerent rhetoric on Israel, both Jerusalem and Washington have an interest in convincing the international community that a nuclear armed Iran would be a menace to the region and to the entire world.
President Bush updated Olmert shortly before Rice announced the new American policy at a May 31 press conference, Israeli and American sources said. Rice announced that Washington would be willing to join its European allies in direct talks with Iran if Tehran "fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities." Rice made clear that America would not attempt to hinder an Iranian civilian nuclear program.
Immediately following Rice's comments, her Israeli counterpart, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, issued a statement, saying, "Israel appreciates the steps and measures by the United States in continuing to lead the international coalition and in taking all necessary steps to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear capability."
One Israeli official told the Forward that Jerusalem is satisfied with the apparent international recognition that "this is the critical time to clarify whether Iran is really pursuing a peaceful nuclear program or a belligerent one." The official dismissed the argument made by some opponents of Rice's move that all the overture by the United States would do is allow Iran to buy time while pursuing nuclear weapons and fending off international sanctions. America's move, the Israeli official said, only would hasten and embolden the international community as it approaches a likely showdown with Iran in the United Nations.
Israel's support for Rice and Olmert's request for Jewish groups to take a lower profile are being well received by many Jewish groups. Already, some Jewish groups had been asking the White House to stop suggesting that American efforts to block Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons are motivated primarily by a desire to protect Israel.
Jewish organizations have no interest in becoming "the lobby for war with Iran," one communal official said.
In the past, when the administration chose to pursue diplomatic options instead of an immediate push for international sanctions, it drew public criticism from some Jewish organizations. This time around, while some Jewish groups are uncomfortable with the administration's shift on direct talks with Iran, only the right-of-center Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs openly criticized the move.
Last year, when the Bush administration agreed to give Russia a chance to negotiate a plan that would allow Iran to enrich uranium under international supervision, the main pro-Israel lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, issued a rare public rebuke of the White House. But this week, in response to the recent American announcement, Aipac issued a measured statement to the Forward, saying that if the administration blocks Iran's production of enriched uranium by offering talks, that would be a "positive development." The statement, however, cautioned against losing sight of Iran's habit of deceiving America and its allies.
Aipac sources said this week that they don't expect the administration's policy shift to hinder their efforts to pass the Iran Freedom Support Act, a bill aimed at tightening U.S. sanctions on Iran, which has overwhelmingly passed the House of Representatives but must still be voted on in the Senate. This week Aipac sent a fund-raising letter to thousands of its supporters saying "we need your help to stop Iran." A spokesman for Aipac said that the letter is part of the organization's routine fund-raising efforts and not connected to the administration's new strategy.
Some officials with Jewish groups share the concern expressed by many neoconservative critics of the new American approach, that any negotiations simply would buy Iran time to advance its nuclear weapons program.
"For the Iranians, diplomacy is a form of delay, so it is dangerous," said David Twersky, director of international affairs for the American Jewish Congress. However, he added, "it will also be dangerous to act precipitously, prematurely. The United States cannot go by itself and say, we are imposing sanctions."
Most Jewish groups accept the administration's argument that the overture would make it easier for Washington to put together the international coalition necessary for effective sanctions against Iran.
"Looking down the abyss at the choices, which, in their starkest terms, are either accepting Iran as a nuclear power or attacking militarily, I think people are looking to see whether or not a third way can be found to achieve the same purpose," said Jess Hordes, the Anti-Defamation League's Washington affairs director.
This sentiment was being echoed among some friends of Israel on Capitol Hill. "In the abstract, who wants to talk to the Iranian regime and who wants to give it legitimacy and to prolong the game they are playing?" said Rep. Eliot Engel, a Democratic member of the House International Relations Committee. "But that's the price we might have to pay in order to get the world community to take a tougher stand on Iran down the line." (Ori Nir, "Bush Overture To Iran Splits Israel, Neocons: Olmert Asks Groups To Keep Low Profile," Forward, 9 June 2006)
I wish the Palestinian people had the sort of visionary leadership who could exploit a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity like this.
Wednesday, June 07, 2006
Will Washington Make Peace with Tehran, Stiffing Tel Aviv?
Have the multinational ruling classes who fear energy costs going out of control finally spoken? Washington's offer to Tehran has significantly improved.
The confidential diplomatic package backed by Washington and formally presented to Iran on Tuesday leaves open the possibility that Tehran will be able to enrich uranium on its own soil, U.S. and European officials said.Tehran may be able to extract even more concessions, if Washington continues to fail to manufacture multinational ruling-class consensus. That will be a significant challenge to Tel Aviv, as Trita Parsi explained earlier this year:
That concession, along with a promise of U.S. assistance for an Iranian civilian nuclear energy program, is conditioned on Tehran suspending its current nuclear work until the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency determines with confidence that the program is peaceful. U.S. officials said Iran would also need to satisfy the U.N. Security Council that it is not seeking a nuclear weapon, a benchmark that White House officials believe could take years, if not decades, to achieve.
But the Bush administration and its European allies have withdrawn their demand that Iran abandon any hope of enriching uranium for nuclear power, according to several European and U.S. officials with knowledge of the offer. The new position, which has not been acknowledged publicly by the White House, differs significantly from the Bush administration's stated determination to prevent Iran from mastering technology that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. (Karl Vick and Dafna Linzer, "Proposal Would Let Iran Enrich Uranium: Tehran Must Meet U.N. Guidelines," Washington Post, 7 June 2006, A01)
Instead, the real danger a nuclear-capable Iran brings with it for Israel is twofold. First, an Iran that does not have nuclear weapons--but that can build them--will significantly damage Israel's ability to deter militant Palestinian and Lebanese organizations. It will damage the image of Israel as the sole nuclear-armed state in the region and undercut the myth of its invincibility. Gone would be the days when Israel's military supremacy would enable it to dictate the parameters of peace and pursue unilateral peace plans. "We cannot afford a nuclear bomb in the hands of our enemies, period. They don't have to use it; the fact that they have it is enough," Member of Knesset Ephraim Sneh explained to me.Will Washington make peace with Tehran, stiffing Tel Aviv? That's an interesting test case that allows us to evaluate if Washington still regards Tel Aviv as a strategic asset that must be protected at all costs or if influential members of the US power elite have come to believe it necessary to subordinate Tel Aviv's -- and its US supporters' (Carol Giacomo, "Pro-Israel Group Pushes Tough U.S. Policy on Iran," Reuters, 7 June 2006) -- interests to the multinational ruling classes'.
This could force Israel to accept territorial compromises with its neighbors in order to deprive Iran of points of hostility that it could use against the Jewish state. Israel simply would not be able to afford a nuclear rivalry with Iran and continued territorial disputes with the Arabs at the same time. "I don't want the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to be held under the shadow of an Iranian nuclear bomb," Sneh continued.
Second, the deterrence and power Iran would gain by mastering the fuel cycle could compel Washington to cut a deal with Tehran in which Iran would be recognized as a regional power and gain strategic significance in the Middle East at the expense of Israel. This has been a major Israeli fear since the end of the Cold War, when Israel's strategic utility to Washington lost considerable justification due to the absence of a Soviet threat. Under these circumstances, US-Iran negotiations could damage Israel's strategic standing, since common interests shared by Iran and the US would overshadow Israel's concerns with Tehran and leave Israel alone in facing its Iranian rival. The Great Satan will eventually make up with the ayatollahs and forget about the Jewish state, Israeli officials fear.
A US-Iran breakthrough would alter the order of the Middle East in favor of Israel's strategic rival, Iran. Over the past 15 years, Israeli-Iranian tensions have peaked at every opportunity to reconfigure the Middle East's geopolitical map. The end of the Cold War and the launch of the peace process made Iran a front-line state against Israel, a position it had actively avoided during the first decade of the revolution. The tremors that shook the Middle East system after the 9/11 attacks, in turn, put Israel again in a position in which it risked becoming a burden rather than an asset to the US, while Iran's help in Afghanistan was sorely needed.
The recent plethora of leaks and hints of Israel's readiness to take out the Iranian nuclear facilities should be seen in light of Israel's fear of a US-Iran deal. The Israeli leaks have not coincided with major advances in Iran's nuclear program, but rather with hints of an American preparedness to strike a compromise with Tehran that would grant it the dreaded know-how and limit Israel's strategic maneuverability.
Since Israel itself is incapable of neutralizing Iran's program through air strikes, the veiled threats coming out of Tel Aviv are aimed at pressuring Washington not to moderate its stance, by warning it about the real consequences of an Israeli assault on Iran: a major escalation of the violence in the region that ultimately would fall into America's lap. Whether it liked it or not, Washington would get sucked into the ensuing mess. And whether Washington gave a green light to the assault or not, it would escape neither the blame nor the responsibility to restore order.
Using this as leverage against the US, Israel is playing hardball to prevent Washington from cutting a deal with Tehran that could benefit America, but deprive Israel of its military and strategic supremacy. (Trita Parsi, "A Challenge to Israel's Strategic Primacy," Bitterlemons-International.org, Edition 1 Volume 4, 5 January 2006)
Friday, May 26, 2006
Iran, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, and Kenneth R. Timmerman
A fraudulent story that Tehran is setting up a dress code for minorities has circulated among right-wing newspapers, beginning with Canada's National Post, "which was bought by CanWest Global Communications from Conrad Black, a close associate of [Richard] Perle's, is controlled by David and Leonard Asper, who have accused the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation of being anti-Israel" (Jim Lobe, "Iran Target of Apparent Disinformation Ploy," Inter Press Service, 22 May 2006). The story originated from a neo-con Iranian Amir Taheri: "Taheri is a member of Benador Associates, a public relations firm that lists a large number of leading neo-conservatives, including American Enterprise Institute (AEI) associates Richard Perle, David Frum, Michael Ledeen, Michael Rubin, and Joshua Muravchik, among its clients. Major boosters of the war with Iraq, Benador clients, who also include former Central Intelligence Agency chief James Woolsey and former Israeli minister Natan Sharansky, have also called for the Bush administration to take a hard line against Iran" (Lobe, 22 May 2006).
The bogus story got wide circulation in part because the Simon Wiesenthal Center lent its cultural capital to it: "'This is reminiscent of the Holocaust,' [Chris] Wattie quoted Rabbi Marvin Heir, the dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, as telling him. 'Iran is moving closer and closer to the ideology of the Nazis'" (Lobe, 22 May 2006):
Well, the home page of the Simon Wiesenthal Center Web site proudly features the story of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's 24 May 2006 speech applauding the US Congress for "the strong bipartisan conviction that a nuclear-armed Iran is an intolerable threat to the peace and security of the world," hailing "the Iran Freedom and Support Act," and arguing that "[i]f we don’t take Iran’s bellicose rhetoric seriously now, we will be forced to take its nuclear aggression seriously later," the speech which received no fewer than 16 standing ovations from the US Congress. That just about says it all, but there's more.
Kenneth R. Timmerman -- the Executive Director of the Foundation for Democracy in Iran (FDI), an organization at the forefront of the campaign for regime change in Iran -- was commissioned by the Simon Wiesenthal Center to write propaganda against Iran, Libya, and Syria: "A ground-making study on the unconventional weapons programs of Iran, Libya, and Syria, commissioned by the Simon Wiesenthal Center in 1992, won applause from Democrats and Republicans alike," as he boasts on his own Web site. So, it's been a long-standing campaign for both Timmerman and the Simon Wiesenthal Center.
Iran -- the only nation in West Asia and North Africa modern enough to be a credible contender for regional leadership and yet, unlike Egypt and Jordan, is not quite sold on America and Israel -- sure is a far larger prize than Iraq for Washington and Tel Aviv, which no doubt long for the second coming of the Shah . . . and for all who make a living by supporting both.
The bogus story got wide circulation in part because the Simon Wiesenthal Center lent its cultural capital to it: "'This is reminiscent of the Holocaust,' [Chris] Wattie quoted Rabbi Marvin Heir, the dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, as telling him. 'Iran is moving closer and closer to the ideology of the Nazis'" (Lobe, 22 May 2006):
The e-mail to Rabbi Abraham Cooper, associate dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, was urgent and pointed. The topic: explosive allegations that Iran, already seen as part of an "axis of evil" for its leaders' threats to Israel, denial of the Holocaust, and alleged drive for nuclear weapons, was replaying an infamous anti-Semitic theme from Nazi Germany.Some who are not familiar with the ideological orientation of the Simon Wiesenthal Center may wonder why it offered confirmation of a story that it couldn't possibly confirm.
"As per our conversation, I'm looking at running this," wrote the newspaper editor of the article he'd just received, "but I have not been able to confirm its veracity. Particularly, I want to make sure that part saying Jews will have to wear a yellow stripe and Christians a red stripe is, in fact, true."
Rabbi Cooper's reply, e-mailed back last Thursday, one hour and 14 minutes later, was unequivocal and succinct:
"Dear John," he wrote, "The story is absolutely true." (Larry Cohler-Esses, "'Yellow' Journalism!!: Anatomy of a Hoax: False Story Alleging Special Yellow Insignia for Iranian Jews Spurred by Wiesenthal Center's Flawed Confirmation," The Jewish Week, 25 May 2006)
Well, the home page of the Simon Wiesenthal Center Web site proudly features the story of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's 24 May 2006 speech applauding the US Congress for "the strong bipartisan conviction that a nuclear-armed Iran is an intolerable threat to the peace and security of the world," hailing "the Iran Freedom and Support Act," and arguing that "[i]f we don’t take Iran’s bellicose rhetoric seriously now, we will be forced to take its nuclear aggression seriously later," the speech which received no fewer than 16 standing ovations from the US Congress. That just about says it all, but there's more.
Kenneth R. Timmerman -- the Executive Director of the Foundation for Democracy in Iran (FDI), an organization at the forefront of the campaign for regime change in Iran -- was commissioned by the Simon Wiesenthal Center to write propaganda against Iran, Libya, and Syria: "A ground-making study on the unconventional weapons programs of Iran, Libya, and Syria, commissioned by the Simon Wiesenthal Center in 1992, won applause from Democrats and Republicans alike," as he boasts on his own Web site. So, it's been a long-standing campaign for both Timmerman and the Simon Wiesenthal Center.
Iran -- the only nation in West Asia and North Africa modern enough to be a credible contender for regional leadership and yet, unlike Egypt and Jordan, is not quite sold on America and Israel -- sure is a far larger prize than Iraq for Washington and Tel Aviv, which no doubt long for the second coming of the Shah . . . and for all who make a living by supporting both.
Thursday, May 25, 2006
The Shah: America's Nuclear Poster Boy
Ross Pourzal says:
Back in the good old days,Now look at the poster boy.
the regal Shah served as the poster boy
for US power companies selling nuclear reactors
TO A SKEPTICAL AMERICAN PUBLIC!
Ahmadinejad on Fashion
Alireza Doostdar, a Ph.D. candidate in anthropology and Middle Eastern studies at Harvard, says at Juan Cole's Informed Comment:
A note on fashion in Iran:
I actually like the 70s look that Ahmadinejad has not let go: an open-collar white shirt, no tie, a grey or brown suit or a tan wind-breaker, and kaffieh. That becomes him. I'd call that style "Islamic modern," essentially a style imported from the West remade and given a new revolutionary meaning in the Iranian context.
("Islamic modern" is generally a term that can be applied to the whole existence of the nation of Iran.)
I also like the look adopted by many sophisticated urban Iranian women. The way they wear their scarves and sunglasses makes them look as if they just stepped out of old films from the golden years of Hollywood.
I'd suggest to the President of Iran that he look into the hats worn by women in the 20s. Many of them keep hair out face, and very chic, very adaptable to the "Islamic modern" style.
'Thank you for debunking the lies about Iran requiring religious minorities to be “color-coded.” I just wanted to make a small comment about the actual national dress law being debated in parliament, which is supposed to regulate fashion. True, the law is in large part motivated by the “un-Islamic” slipping of headscarves and tightening of manteaus on the streets, but there is also a large element of cultural nationalism at work here, which might be comparable to Gandhi’s national dress plans. The law calls for slapping tariffs on imports of clothing from abroad to give indigenous producers competitive advantage, and banning imports of “second-hand clothes” from neighboring countries. It also calls for supporting Iranian designers and producers who come up with innovative “modern” forms of dress based on Islamic and Iranian materials and motifs. They want to encourage designers to go out and study ethnic dress styles for example to come up with more “authentic” modern styles for urban people (by which they mean, I believe, primarily women).Excellent. Our man in Iran has the right idea for fashion as well: import substitution. And he's winning the right friends -- or at least fellow travelers -- even in the Iranian diaspora communities in the West, which is a difficult but essential task.
All this could be critiqued on many levels, but it is important I think to place it on a nationalistic plane rather than merely on one of religious zealotry. I see many parallels between this move and the U.S. Senate’s decision to make English the official language of the U.S. They’re both based on strong ideas of some sort of “national” culture--which they believe is being diluted by outside influences (in the US case, Mexican immigrants; in the Iranian, Western fashions of dress).
The other thing I wanted to point out was that Ahmadinejad himself, often to the chagrin of people in his own party and other right-wing groups, has been an outspoken critic of moves to regulate hijab, including the recent police moves to station policewomen in Tehran to instruct women with “bad” hijab to fix their scarves. Both before and after his election, he has said repeatedly that he thinks it is misguided to point at women whenever the issue of “corruption” comes up, and additionally that hijab is no where nearly as important an issue in this country as economic corruption and social injustice (I have both video and text references if you’re interested). I am very critical of Ahmadinejad on many issues, but his stance on hijab and regulating dress is not one of them.' ("Doostdar on Iranian Dress Code," 21 May 2006)
A note on fashion in Iran:
I actually like the 70s look that Ahmadinejad has not let go: an open-collar white shirt, no tie, a grey or brown suit or a tan wind-breaker, and kaffieh. That becomes him. I'd call that style "Islamic modern," essentially a style imported from the West remade and given a new revolutionary meaning in the Iranian context.
("Islamic modern" is generally a term that can be applied to the whole existence of the nation of Iran.)
I also like the look adopted by many sophisticated urban Iranian women. The way they wear their scarves and sunglasses makes them look as if they just stepped out of old films from the golden years of Hollywood.
I'd suggest to the President of Iran that he look into the hats worn by women in the 20s. Many of them keep hair out face, and very chic, very adaptable to the "Islamic modern" style.
A Libyan Solution for Iran?
Reuters reports that John Bolton suggested that the ruling class and clerical gerontocrats of Iran could choose from two alternatives: regime change or a Libyan solution:
serious offer -- Rafsanjani would be overjoyed, Khamenei would take that offer, too, and the President of Iran would not be in a position to reject it.
But is the offer serious? For, if that's all that Washington wanted, it could have made the same offer in the Khatami years.
Take a look at this BusinessWeek article: "Iran: The Mideast's Model Economy?" (Stanley Reed, with Babak Pirouz, 24 May 2004). The BusinessWeek writer all but kissed the hands of the clerical rulers of Iran.
Tehran was liberalizing Iran's economy:
Besides, if Washington had made a serious offer back then, it could have conceivably prevented the rise of Ahmadinejad -- notwithstanding the simmering discontent of workers and slum dwellers that the BusinessWeek article completely ignored -- for that would have given neoliberal "reformists" a tangible result to boast of and lifted the morale of educated urban professionals and small producers who love America and want to study in it and do business with it.
I suspect that the reason it didn't make that offer when it made perfect sense to make it was Washington wanted a full neo-con prize: the total restructuring of Iran at Washington's, not the clerical gerontocrats', pace, and an overtly (not covertly) pro-Tel-Aviv government.
Has Washington given up on the full neo-con prize, in view of the rise of resource populism in Iran?
Not bloody likely, according to the Hindustan Times:
John Bolton, the US ambassador to the United Nations, said on Monday that Iran's leaders could stay in power and improve their ties with Washington if they ended their pursuit of nuclear arms.Yes, the Libyan solution would be possible if Washington made a
He later insisted, however, that he had not meant to threaten Tehran with regime change if its leaders failed to do so.
Bolton, addressing a meeting of B'nai B'rith International, a Jewish humanitarian organization, cited Washington's movelast week to normalize relations with Libya after that country gave up its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and said Iran's leaders faced a similar "clear choice". ("Iran Regime Can Stay If Does a Libya: Bolton," The Times of India, 23 May 2006)
serious offer -- Rafsanjani would be overjoyed, Khamenei would take that offer, too, and the President of Iran would not be in a position to reject it.
But is the offer serious? For, if that's all that Washington wanted, it could have made the same offer in the Khatami years.
Take a look at this BusinessWeek article: "Iran: The Mideast's Model Economy?" (Stanley Reed, with Babak Pirouz, 24 May 2004). The BusinessWeek writer all but kissed the hands of the clerical rulers of Iran.
Tehran was liberalizing Iran's economy:
The country has racked up growth in the 5% range for four years running, thanks to high oil revenues, abundant rainfall, and a gradual easing of the choking economic restrictions ushered in by the 1979 revolution. Not long ago, Iran was a bona fide basket case struggling to pay its debts. Now its external accounts are under control, with the trade balance in surplus and substantial hard currency reserves of $35 billion. The government is also raising money internally by privatizing shipping, auto, and other assets. (Reed, 24 May 2004)And it was seeking to assist Washinton in Afghanistan and Iraq:
Despite the nuclear tensions, the optimists point out that the U.S. and Iran share plenty of regional interests. Iran despised both the Taliban in Afghanistan and Iraq's strongman, Saddam Hussein, and applauded the toppling of both. Since then, the Iranian government has encouraged local businesses to supply both countries with goods that range from fuel to cement. While some Iranian factions may be contributing to the turmoil in Iraq, the mainstream wants calm to return to its neighbor in order to hasten the departure of U.S. troops. The Iranians reckon that once the Americans go, a Shiite-led government friendly to the Islamic Republic will come to power. In an interview with BusinessWeek, Iranian Vice-President Mohamed Ali Abtahi poured scorn on the rebel Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr's troublemaking "is providing the Americans with a reason to stay" in Iraq, the vice-president said (Reed, 24 May 2004)Really, what's not to like?
Besides, if Washington had made a serious offer back then, it could have conceivably prevented the rise of Ahmadinejad -- notwithstanding the simmering discontent of workers and slum dwellers that the BusinessWeek article completely ignored -- for that would have given neoliberal "reformists" a tangible result to boast of and lifted the morale of educated urban professionals and small producers who love America and want to study in it and do business with it.
I suspect that the reason it didn't make that offer when it made perfect sense to make it was Washington wanted a full neo-con prize: the total restructuring of Iran at Washington's, not the clerical gerontocrats', pace, and an overtly (not covertly) pro-Tel-Aviv government.
Has Washington given up on the full neo-con prize, in view of the rise of resource populism in Iran?
Not bloody likely, according to the Hindustan Times:
US President George W Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert have agreed on a timetable for American intervention to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capability.
Bush told Olmert that the plans for US intervention are congruent with the timetable put up by the later during their discussion, a media report said on Thursday.
He assured the Israeli premier that Washington would not allow Iran to acquire nuclear capability, Ynetnews reported.
According to Israeli intelligence assessment, Iran will acquire the necessary nuclear technology to build a nuclear weapon within a year, Olmert said during the talks.
The prime minister also expressed concern over diplomatic foot-dragging at the United Nations, where the United States has faced Russian and Chinese opposition to push for tough sanctions against Iran.
Despite the US assurance, officials in Washington have cast doubt over its ability to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear technology, the news portal said.
"I am very, very, very satisfied," Olmert told Israeli reporters after talks with Bush.
The US will ask the Security Council to impose economic and military sanctions on Iran if it refuses to halt uranium enrichment activities, it said.
If Russia uses its veto to block a US-backed resolution for imposing sanctions on Iran, Washington will circumvent the Security Council by luring allied countries to impose an economic and military embargo on Tehran, it said. (Press Trust of India, "Bush, Olmert Agree on Iran Deadline," 25 May 2006)
Wednesday, May 24, 2006
Katherine Jashinski
"Army National Guard Specialist Katherine Jashinski received a bad conduct discharge today and was sentenced to 120 days confinement after pleading guilty to the charge of 'refusal to obey a legal order'" ("First Female Conscientious Objector Sentenced for Refusing Deployment to Afghanistan," 24 May 2006), says a press release from the SOA Watch. Salute her courage.
What Jewish Leftists Can Do for Iranians
"A story authored by a prominent U.S. neo-conservative regarding new legislation in Iran allegedly requiring Jews and other religious minorities to wear distinctive colour badges circulated around the world this weekend before it was exposed as false," writes Jim Lobe of Inter Press Service ("Iran Target of Apparent Disinformation Ploy," 22 May 2006). The neo-con in question is Amir Taheri, so keep this name in mind, in case he will be up to more mischief. And he probably will, with connections like these: "Taheri is a member of Benador Associates, a public relations firm that lists a large number of leading neo-conservatives, including American Enterprise Institute (AEI) associates Richard Perle, David Frum, Michael Ledeen, Michael Rubin, and Joshua Muravchik, among its clients. Major boosters of the war with Iraq, Benador clients, who also include former Central Intelligence Agency chief James Woolsey and former Israeli minister Natan Sharansky, have also called for the Bush administration to take a hard line against Iran" ("Iran Target of Apparent Disinformation Ploy," 22 May 2006).
Thankfully, the lone Jewish MP in Iran's parliament, Maurice Motamed, immediately issued a strong condemnation of Taheri's lie: "One Jewish representative in the Iranian parliament, Maurice Motamed, insisted that colour requirements for ethnic minorities had 'never been proposed or discussed in parliament', let alone approved. 'Such news,' he told the Associated Press, 'is an insult to religious minorities here'" ("Iran Target of Apparent Disinformation Ploy," 22 May 2006).
There are several things that Jewish leftists in the United States can do to counter psy-op like this:
Thankfully, the lone Jewish MP in Iran's parliament, Maurice Motamed, immediately issued a strong condemnation of Taheri's lie: "One Jewish representative in the Iranian parliament, Maurice Motamed, insisted that colour requirements for ethnic minorities had 'never been proposed or discussed in parliament', let alone approved. 'Such news,' he told the Associated Press, 'is an insult to religious minorities here'" ("Iran Target of Apparent Disinformation Ploy," 22 May 2006).
There are several things that Jewish leftists in the United States can do to counter psy-op like this:
- Speak up/write about Iran as a Jewish activist/intellectual, and encourage others to do so.
- Contact the Jewish community in Iran, and invite them to send reps to the US on a speaking tour (I realize getting visas for them would be a hassle, but probably doable).
- Get lefty Jewish organizations to send their reps to Iran to talk to people in the Jewish community there and report back to the US.
No SCO Membership for Iran?
RIA Novosti commentator Dmitry Kosyrev writes in an opinion piece: "For obvious reasons, everyone was interested whether Iran would be accepted as a member this summer. The answer in Shanghai was a clear no. Neither Iran with its complicated relations with the U.S. and the IAEA, nor European Belarus, nor Pakistan with its attempts to find new friends in the wake of the ongoing Indian-American rapprochement, none of them will join the SCO now" ("Why Iran, Belarus Will Not Join Shanghai Cooperation Organization This Summer," RIA Novosti, 17 May 2006). If true, bad news for Iran.
Reforming Iran's Oil Industry
Ghaida Ghantous and Barbara Lewis of Reuters report that Tehran may be reconsidering the buy-back system ("Foreign Cash Still Flows to Iran's Oilfields," 23 April 2006):
But, before getting there, the most urgently needed reform of Iran's oil industry is transparency.
Parviz Mina, a former member of the Board of Directors and Managing Director of International Affairs of the National Iranian Oil Company, pointed out last August in an interview conducted by Reza Bayegan that "Iranian members of parliament are complaining bitterly about being kept entirely in the dark about the terms of these contracts" ("New Oil Disorder," Iranian.com, 8 August 2005). When the books are closed to the public, no reform is possible, and that's what needs to change first and foremost.
Then, a reformer has to go after the structure that creates corruption, as Mina elaborates:
Hugo Chavez got lucky with his opposition's failed lockout, for surviving it allowed him to purge all who stood in his way inside PDVSA. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tried to do the same with cabinet appointments, but that's not the sort of purge he can pull off till emergency circumstances of the sort that confronted the Chavez government arise.
Update
Yoshie Furuhashi, "Privatization Iranian Style," Critical Montages, 14 October 2007.
The so-called buy-back investment model, where foreign firms are repaid with proceeds from oil output, has drawn criticism. Western oil executives say risks far outweigh rewards, while some Iranian politicians remain distrustful of foreign capital.No doubt that whether or not the current contracts with foreign oil companies, as well as the buy-back system in general, are really in the Iranian people's interest must be looked into.
Tehran has said it was reviewing its buy back contracts to make investment in its fields more alluring.
"We have received all the views and we're doing it and I think we're very close to a conclusion," Vaziri said without elaborating.
But, before getting there, the most urgently needed reform of Iran's oil industry is transparency.
Parviz Mina, a former member of the Board of Directors and Managing Director of International Affairs of the National Iranian Oil Company, pointed out last August in an interview conducted by Reza Bayegan that "Iranian members of parliament are complaining bitterly about being kept entirely in the dark about the terms of these contracts" ("New Oil Disorder," Iranian.com, 8 August 2005). When the books are closed to the public, no reform is possible, and that's what needs to change first and foremost.
Then, a reformer has to go after the structure that creates corruption, as Mina elaborates:
[After the revolution of 1979, t]he Minister of Oil appointed seven deputies in charge of supervising the activities of various managers in the National Oil Company. In reality all the major decisions were made by these deputies who, by the way had no expertise. Their only credential was commitment to the Islamic regime and a connection to one of the country's centers of power. Accordingly, all the prerogative and authority was gradually taken away from the NIOC and given to the Ministry of Oil.Such a structural reform is an extraordinarily difficult task, but unless that gets done, trying to negotiate with foreign companies more lucrative contracts than the current ones will likely prove futile, since surplus rents will get consumed by the mullah–bazaari nexus, not by the Iranian people.
Ahmadinejad has said that he wants to put a stop to duplication and introduce measures that ensure transparency. This would prove as difficult as putting the genie back into the bottle. Bijan Zanganeh, from the time he has been appointed as Islamic Republic's oil minister has created close to one hundred affiliated and subsidiary companies. All the projects are divided between these companies.
As an example previously all the exploration, drilling and production efforts were concentrated under one director in the NIOC, now there are ten to twelve companies each making decisions and having a finger in the pie. Before the revolution we had in total 54,000 employees working for the Iranian oil industry, 34,000 were rank and file and 20,000 professional staff. Today this number has reached the colossal figure of over 180,000. What is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad planning to do with this monstrosity? ("New Oil Disorder," Iranian.com, 8 August 2005)
Hugo Chavez got lucky with his opposition's failed lockout, for surviving it allowed him to purge all who stood in his way inside PDVSA. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tried to do the same with cabinet appointments, but that's not the sort of purge he can pull off till emergency circumstances of the sort that confronted the Chavez government arise.
Update
Yoshie Furuhashi, "Privatization Iranian Style," Critical Montages, 14 October 2007.
Abortion in Iran and Venezuela
US leftists generally fail to see similarities between Iran and Venezuela, but there are many. After all, both are oil producer nations and price hawks, both have relatively well educated populations, both have managed to industrialize, and their per capita incomes are in the same league: Venezuela's GDP Per Capita = $5,800; and Iran's GDP Per Capita = $7,700. Both wish to lead masses of the other nations in their respective regions under their respective leaderships. No doubt Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have thought about these similarities, beyond the fact that they are both under pressures from Washington, though incomparably more so in the case of Iran than that of Venezuela. That is why I hope that Ahmadinejad will see Venezuela -- especially its commitment to participant democracy, in which everyone is a protagonist -- as a model for Iran and take lessons from Chavez on political survival, especially his cultivation of supporters in the military as well as barrios.
But one of the similarities between Iran and Venezuela, alas, is conservatism: women in both societies lack the right to abortion, except the right to abortion performed to save the mother's life (women in El Salvador do not enjoy even this limited right, as even most MPs of the ostensibly secular FMLN eventually voted for total criminalization [Jack Hitt, "Pro-Life Nation," New York Times, 9 April 2006]).
In 2005, the Iranian parliament -- dominated by "conservatives" many of whom backed Ahmadinejad in the election in the same year -- "voted to liberalise the country's abortion laws" (Frances Harrison, "Iran Liberalises Laws on Abortion," BBC, 12 April 2005). It was the same clerical gerontocrats who blocked Ahmadinejad's oil ministry reform, decree to allow women to attend sports events at stadiums, etc. that vetoed the liberalized abortion law. Unless the basic structure of the Islamic Republic is undone, either through a passive revolution or other means, a fundamental change is not possible. Iran desperately needs a populist political force capable of pursuing its own social and economic agenda and sweeping away all -- including the mullah–bazaari nexus -- who stand in the way. Such a force, given the fact that a majority of Iranians -- including most of neoliberal "reformists" -- are religious in one way or another, won't and can't be secular at this point in history.
A couple of weeks ago, "Pope Benedict XVI told Venezuela President Hugo Chavez in a meeting at the Vatican . . . that he doesn't want him to weaken the abortion ban the South American nation currently has in place. The meeting came on the same day that news broke about a court's decision in Colombia to allow abortions in certain rare cases" (Steven Ertelt, "Pope Tells Venezuela President Hugo Chavez Don't Weaken Abortion Ban," LifeNews, 12 May 2006). It is frustrating to see that Colombia is ahead of Venezuela on the right to abortion. I understand that there is a chance to put the issue on a referendum in 2007, but Chavez probably won't move on this till he succeeds in removing the term limits.
But one of the similarities between Iran and Venezuela, alas, is conservatism: women in both societies lack the right to abortion, except the right to abortion performed to save the mother's life (women in El Salvador do not enjoy even this limited right, as even most MPs of the ostensibly secular FMLN eventually voted for total criminalization [Jack Hitt, "Pro-Life Nation," New York Times, 9 April 2006]).
In 2005, the Iranian parliament -- dominated by "conservatives" many of whom backed Ahmadinejad in the election in the same year -- "voted to liberalise the country's abortion laws" (Frances Harrison, "Iran Liberalises Laws on Abortion," BBC, 12 April 2005). It was the same clerical gerontocrats who blocked Ahmadinejad's oil ministry reform, decree to allow women to attend sports events at stadiums, etc. that vetoed the liberalized abortion law. Unless the basic structure of the Islamic Republic is undone, either through a passive revolution or other means, a fundamental change is not possible. Iran desperately needs a populist political force capable of pursuing its own social and economic agenda and sweeping away all -- including the mullah–bazaari nexus -- who stand in the way. Such a force, given the fact that a majority of Iranians -- including most of neoliberal "reformists" -- are religious in one way or another, won't and can't be secular at this point in history.
A couple of weeks ago, "Pope Benedict XVI told Venezuela President Hugo Chavez in a meeting at the Vatican . . . that he doesn't want him to weaken the abortion ban the South American nation currently has in place. The meeting came on the same day that news broke about a court's decision in Colombia to allow abortions in certain rare cases" (Steven Ertelt, "Pope Tells Venezuela President Hugo Chavez Don't Weaken Abortion Ban," LifeNews, 12 May 2006). It is frustrating to see that Colombia is ahead of Venezuela on the right to abortion. I understand that there is a chance to put the issue on a referendum in 2007, but Chavez probably won't move on this till he succeeds in removing the term limits.
Tuesday, May 23, 2006
Venezuela: A Model for Iran
Venezuela ought to be a model for Iran, both in its domestic and foreign policy. After all, both are oil producer nations and price hawks ("Venezuela's Minister of Energy and Petroleum Rafael Ramirez said on Monday that Venezuela supports the idea of an oil production cut at the next meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)" ["Venezuela Supports OPEC Production Cut: Minister," Xinhua, 23 May 2006]), both have relatively well educated populations, both have managed to industrialize, and their per capita incomes are in the same league: Venezuela's GDP Per Capita: $5,800; and Iran's GDP Per Capita: $7,700. Both wish to lead masses of the other nations in their respective regions under their respective leaderships. No doubt Chavez and Ahmadinejad have thought about these similarities, beyond the fact that they are both under pressures from Washington, though incomparably more so in the case of Iran than that of Venezuela.
Tariq Ali noted: "The mullah–bazaari nexus behind Rafsanjani has already thwarted Ahmadinejad's efforts to clean up the Oil Ministry, and remains entrenched in the Expediency Council" ("Mid-point in the Middle East?" New Left Review 38, March-April 2006). Ahmadinejad doesn't have to lose on this and other fights against the ruling class and clerical gerontocrats, if he could cultivate the sort of mass following in Iran, including its military and militias, in the fashion that Chavez has. I'm sure both men have thought about that, too.
The Chavez and Ahmadinejad administrations also have the same shortcoming: fondness for grandstanding. Washington just slapped a ban on weapons sales to Venezuela, and what does Caracas say? It might sell F-16s to Iran. That's more a gesture than anything else: after all, Iran doesn't need hard-to-maintain F-16s; but such a statement allows the Chavez government to assert its defiance of Washington to the max and plays well in the international gallery in Latin America and the Middle East. This shortcoming probably won't go away -- it's ingrained in the temperament of both leaders.
Tariq Ali noted: "The mullah–bazaari nexus behind Rafsanjani has already thwarted Ahmadinejad's efforts to clean up the Oil Ministry, and remains entrenched in the Expediency Council" ("Mid-point in the Middle East?" New Left Review 38, March-April 2006). Ahmadinejad doesn't have to lose on this and other fights against the ruling class and clerical gerontocrats, if he could cultivate the sort of mass following in Iran, including its military and militias, in the fashion that Chavez has. I'm sure both men have thought about that, too.
The Chavez and Ahmadinejad administrations also have the same shortcoming: fondness for grandstanding. Washington just slapped a ban on weapons sales to Venezuela, and what does Caracas say? It might sell F-16s to Iran. That's more a gesture than anything else: after all, Iran doesn't need hard-to-maintain F-16s; but such a statement allows the Chavez government to assert its defiance of Washington to the max and plays well in the international gallery in Latin America and the Middle East. This shortcoming probably won't go away -- it's ingrained in the temperament of both leaders.
Sunday, May 21, 2006
Street-fighting Days
Street-fighting days, alas, are long behind the Axis of Feeble: leftists in the USA, the UK, Australia, Canada, and Japan:
Recent polls tell us, for instance, that 60% of Americans disapprove of President Bush's overall job performance; 74% disapprove of his handling of rising gasoline prices; 62% disapprove of his handling of the Iraq war; 63% think the president's role in the intelligence leak scandal was either illegal or unethical. Further, 45% of Americans think Bush should be censured or officially reprimanded for authorizing secret domestic surveillance by the National Security Agency, and an astonishing 33% of Americans think Bush should be impeached. (As a point of reference, public support for impeaching President Clinton averaged only 26% in the summer and fall of 1998.)The French, alone among peoples of filthy rich countries, still remember how to rock the government in the streets. They admirably put it in practice in fierce defense of their way of life: contre la précarité généralisée. That's a great start. No people who cannot defend themselves can hope to defend others. And yet, it is telling that, after the victory over the CPE, streets of France went quiet, even as the National Assembly passed a bill for selective immigration: for skilled and educated workers from the South, against non-skilled and ill educated workers from the South:
In many foreign countries, such a high level of popular discontent would translate rapidly into mass protests. (Rosa Brooks, "One More Job for Immigrants," Los Angeles Times, 14 April 2006)
France's lower house of parliament easily passed a divisive immigration law put forward by Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy on Wednesday which has been heavily criticised by the opposition, the church and immigrant groups.
The law aims to attract skilled workers while keeping less skilled ones out. Critics say it will stigmatise foreigners, discriminate against the poor and undermine France's traditional role as a haven for the persecuted.
The deputies in the National Assembly, where the ruling UMP party has an easy majority, adopted the law by 367 votes to 164. The Senate will start debating it on June 6. (Emile Picy, "French Deputies back Divisive Immigration Bill," Reuters, 18 May 2006)
Always behind the Revolutionary Solidarity Schedule
Near the beginning of the Bolivarian Revolution, opinions about Hugo Chavez were quite divided among US leftists. Not now. Chuck Munson of Infoshop must be the last Chavez skeptic.
That is ironic, because Chavez doesn't need US leftists' support now: his national and Latin American support is rock-solid, and Washington is too busy with the Middle East -- what with campaigns for dual regime changes in Iran and Palestine -- to make a major move against Venezuela at this moment.
Most US leftists seem to be always a couple of years behind the revolutionary solidarity schedule: they embraced Chavez too late to give him support when he could have used it (2002, the year of the anti-Chavez coup and lockout); they committed themselves to US withdrawal too late to prevent the death of modern Iraq. I fear that, by the time when they manage to pay attention to Iran and its leader, they will have already missed the train again.
That is ironic, because Chavez doesn't need US leftists' support now: his national and Latin American support is rock-solid, and Washington is too busy with the Middle East -- what with campaigns for dual regime changes in Iran and Palestine -- to make a major move against Venezuela at this moment.
Most US leftists seem to be always a couple of years behind the revolutionary solidarity schedule: they embraced Chavez too late to give him support when he could have used it (2002, the year of the anti-Chavez coup and lockout); they committed themselves to US withdrawal too late to prevent the death of modern Iraq. I fear that, by the time when they manage to pay attention to Iran and its leader, they will have already missed the train again.
Chronicling the Death of a Nation
Riverbend, who keeps the Baghdad Burning blog, is a great chronicler. This must be the first time in history the death of a nation has been so richly electronically documented, in real time.
Reading her diary is not unlike watching a baby die before our eyes due to lack of medical supplies in an Iraqi hospital, near the end of a documentary titled "Iraq's Missing Billions":
How long will Riverbend remain in Iraq? She has education, so she has means to live as an exile elsewhere. It is brave and patriotic of her to persist in Baghdad. I wonder if she, too, will be eventually forced to abandon Iraq or die with it.
Reading her diary is not unlike watching a baby die before our eyes due to lack of medical supplies in an Iraqi hospital, near the end of a documentary titled "Iraq's Missing Billions":
ALI COMMT: he problem is the doctors caring for Zehara have virtually nothing to “make the best of”. They have no ventilators, no adrenaline, not even a cheap but essential medicine like vitamin K. Even the cannula being used on Zehara had to be bought on the black market by her father.And now he’s gone into town again – this time looking for vitamin K.Only the grandmother is here.Then Zehara starts to deteriorate – she is gasping for breath. Her father has still not returned. But it is too late.An Iraqi friend of mine recently got hold of this documentary on video, and she did a showing. Only a handful showed up. I was one of the few, and so was an Iranian friend of mine. That's when I made up my mind about what should be Western leftists' priority. It's too late to save modern Iraq. The dead cannot be resurrected. But modern Iran is still alive. It's time for triage.
00:34:18
THE DOCTOR: Where is the mother of this child? This child has passed away.
ALI VO: And then the father comes back .
FATHER: I just went to get this for her, they told me to bring it. It’s vitamin K as they don’t have it here
ALI VO: If this hospital had had the correct equipment and the right drugs, Zehara should have survived.
FATHER: She saw nothing in her life. . . . We all return to Allah.
FATHER: No, no, poor child. This box is too small. Go and get another one.
UNCLE: From where?
FATHER: From the pharmacy.
ALI VO: The next day, Abbas, Zehara’s brother, died too. This is not the new Iraq we were promised when the coalition invaded our country.
THE END
How long will Riverbend remain in Iraq? She has education, so she has means to live as an exile elsewhere. It is brave and patriotic of her to persist in Baghdad. I wonder if she, too, will be eventually forced to abandon Iraq or die with it.
Return of Resource Populism
We are living an early stage of an epochal change: return of resource populism (the idea of using the proceeds of natural resources for the needs of people and national economy, rather than for the profits of multinational corporations and their investors), after the exhaustion of neoliberal hegemony. It is significant that the leaders of the nations that have made a clear turn to resource populism -- Hugo Chavez (b. 28 July 1954), Evo Morales (b. 26 October 1959), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (b. 28 October 1956), and Vladimir Putin (b. 7 October 1952) -- are about the same age. They are also all from relatively humble class backgrounds. They all were young men during the 1970s, so they must all vividly remember what the control of strategic natural resources -- mainly fossil fuels -- can do. In addition, Chavez and Ahmadinejad have clear ambitions to remake not only their respective nations but regions as well.
Of the four, Ahmadinejad is the only one who actually participated in a victorious political revolution in the 1970s. Some call his presidency the second Islamic revolution. Rare are men on whom fortune smiles twice: participate in the making of a revolution as a youth and then take the helm of the state later, this time to initiate social revolution at home and abroad.
The missing link is Africa, where a leader comparable to the four standard bearers of resource populism has yet to rise.
Of the four, Ahmadinejad is the only one who actually participated in a victorious political revolution in the 1970s. Some call his presidency the second Islamic revolution. Rare are men on whom fortune smiles twice: participate in the making of a revolution as a youth and then take the helm of the state later, this time to initiate social revolution at home and abroad.
The missing link is Africa, where a leader comparable to the four standard bearers of resource populism has yet to rise.
Saturday, May 20, 2006
Ahmadinejad, the Mardomyar
Here is an excellent profile of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: Iason Athanasiadis, "Ahmadinejad: A Study in Obstinacy" (Asia Times 19 May 2006). It shows he is the right man at the right time for the Muslim world as well as his country, and he's winning the right friends and making the right enemies (namely both neoliberal "reformists" and clerical gerontocrats) at home.
Friday, May 19, 2006
Death of Iraq
The people of Iraq were abandoned by Western leftists two years ago -- streets of America were quiet even as the Abu Ghraib scandal exploded and Sunnis and Shiites held a joint uprising.
Because of our desertion and dereliction, Iraq is now on the way to becoming an Afghanistan, an irreversible course.
I don't believe in God, so I don't think there will be divine retribution. But I do believe in cause and effect -- we'll all pay earthly prices for this. How high the prices will be, I don't know.
Don't let this happen to Iran.
Because of our desertion and dereliction, Iraq is now on the way to becoming an Afghanistan, an irreversible course.
Across central Iraq, there is an exodus of people fleeing for their lives as sectarian assassins and death squads hunt them down. At ground level, Iraq is disintegrating as ethnic cleansing takes hold on a massive scale. (Patrick Cockburn, "Iraq Is Disintegrating as Ethnic Cleansing Takes Hold," The Independent, 20 May 2006)
Deaths run like water through the life of the Bahjat family. Four neighbors. A barber. Three grocers. Two men who ran a currency exchange shop.Modern Iraq is dead, and everyone who can leave is leaving the country.
But when six armed men stormed into their sons' primary school this month, shot a guard dead, and left fliers ordering it to close, Assad Bahjat knew it was time to leave.
"The main thing now is to just get out of Iraq," said Mr. Bahjat, standing in a room heaped with suitcases and bedroom furniture in eastern Baghdad.
In the latest indication of the crushing hardships weighing on the lives of Iraqis, increasing portions of the middle class seem to be doing everything they can to leave the country. In the last 10 months, the state has issued new passports to 1.85 million Iraqis, 7 percent of the population and a quarter of the country's estimated middle class.
The school system offers another clue: Since 2004, the Ministry of Education has issued 39,554 letters permitting parents to take their children's academic records abroad. The number of such letters issued in 2005 was double that in 2004, according to the director of the ministry's examination department. Iraqi officials and international organizations put the number of Iraqis in Jordan at close to a million. Syrian cities also have growing Iraqi populations. (Sabrina Tavernise, "As Death Stalks Iraq, Middle-Class Exodus Begins," May 19, 2006)
I don't believe in God, so I don't think there will be divine retribution. But I do believe in cause and effect -- we'll all pay earthly prices for this. How high the prices will be, I don't know.
Don't let this happen to Iran.
Price of Dual Regime Changes in Iran and Palestine
Hamas has offered an indefinite truce if Israel withdraws to its pre-1967 borders: (Yitzhak Benhorin, "Hamas: Ceasefire for Return to 1967 Border," 30 January 2006).
But Tel Aviv won't do that. It would rather have Hamas collapse due to lack of funds, and so would Washington:
Rather than prompting Tel Aviv to make peace with Hamas in an effort to isolate Iran, Washington is pursuing a strategy of regime changes in both Iran and Palestine. That's the sort of situation that makes liberals wonder if Tel Aviv is still really Washington's strategic asset or has already become its strategic burden, for there can be a blowback: destablization of the pro-Washington Arab regimes -- the Gulf states (Jim Wolf, "US Looks to Arm Iran's Neighbors, General Says," Reuters, 18 May 2006), Jordan (Jamal Halaby, "Jordan Plays Hardball with Hamas," Associated Press, 19 May 2006), and Egypt (Nadia Abou El-Magd/Associated Press, "Egypt Urges Hamas to Recognize Israel, Renounce Violence," USA Today, 2 February 2006) -- that have volunteered to serve in the dual regime change campaign.
If the price of dual regime changes is, for instance, the destruction of Abqaiq, "the world’s biggest oil processing complex," is the price worth it?
But Tel Aviv won't do that. It would rather have Hamas collapse due to lack of funds, and so would Washington:
U.S. officials said the Bush administration could take punitive action against banks that help provide money or services directly to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority because Washington has designated the Islamic militant group a "terrorist" organisation.Or at least provoke a conflict between Hamas and Fatah:
The United States has not threatened to punish banks that transfer funds directly to the office of moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, whose Fatah faction was trounced by Hamas in January elections. ("Arab League Says to Transfer $50 Mln to Hamas Govt," Reuters, 23 AprIL 2006)
Rival Palestinian forces faced off at Gaza's border crossing with Egypt after a Hamas official was caught with 639,000 euros ($A1.08 million) hidden in his clothing, authorities said.It's Tel Aviv's maximalist rejectionism that has compelled Hamas to rely on Tehran more than before.
Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh vowed during Friday prayers not to disband a new Hamas-led security force and said he was prepared to increase its size in defiance of President Mahmoud Abbas and the Bush administration.
About 100 Hamas gunmen raced to the Rafah crossing where Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri was caught with the money. Rafah is guarded by Abbas's presidential guard, raising fears of fresh Palestinian infighting after clashes on Thursday night.
Abbas's elite guard also called in reinforcements.
Hamas said Abu Zuhri was carrying Arab donations for the new government, which is desperately short of funds, and for Palestinians in Israeli jails.
"Is it a crime to bring in money?" Haniyeh said, defending his spokesman. "Are the Palestinian people being forced to starve?"
Abu Zuhri told Reuters: "If bringing support for my people is a crime then I am very proud of this crime."
Abu Zuhri initially refused to leave the border terminal without the money, which was confiscated by Palestinian customs agents. He later left and the gunmen withdrew. The militant group said it expected the money to be quickly returned.
But senior Abbas aide Saeb Erekat said the president had ordered an investigation by the attorney-general.
The Palestinian Authority is facing a financial crisis after international donors suspended aid because of the Hamas-led government's refusal to renounce violence and recognise Israel since coming to power in March. ("Hamas Aide Caught at Border with Cash," Reuters, 20 May 2006)
Rather than prompting Tel Aviv to make peace with Hamas in an effort to isolate Iran, Washington is pursuing a strategy of regime changes in both Iran and Palestine. That's the sort of situation that makes liberals wonder if Tel Aviv is still really Washington's strategic asset or has already become its strategic burden, for there can be a blowback: destablization of the pro-Washington Arab regimes -- the Gulf states (Jim Wolf, "US Looks to Arm Iran's Neighbors, General Says," Reuters, 18 May 2006), Jordan (Jamal Halaby, "Jordan Plays Hardball with Hamas," Associated Press, 19 May 2006), and Egypt (Nadia Abou El-Magd/Associated Press, "Egypt Urges Hamas to Recognize Israel, Renounce Violence," USA Today, 2 February 2006) -- that have volunteered to serve in the dual regime change campaign.
If the price of dual regime changes is, for instance, the destruction of Abqaiq, "the world’s biggest oil processing complex," is the price worth it?
Bolivar in Tehran
Compared to Iraq, Iran is a far larger prize (it's literally larger, too, in size and population). You see, even before the invasion began, Iraq was already reduced to a shadow of its former self by genocidal UN sanctions, incapable of trying to become a contender for regional leadership (which was the specter posed by its invasion of Kuwait, prompting the Gulf War) again. Not so with Iran. Iran is modern, its populace well educated, its revolutionary philosophy -- the heritage of Ali Shariati now personified by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad -- appealing to not just Shiites but other Muslims elsewhere groaning under the oppression of pro-American regimes (note, in particular, that the oil-rich Gulf states have large Shiite populations, with Bahrain having a Shiite majority). You might say that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were to surround Iran, the beginning of a siege for regime change, the regime change Washington wants even more now than before the election of Ahmadinejad.
Western leftists ought to do what we can to help Ahmadinejad survive this siege. That's not just our moral duty to the Iranian masses who voted to cast their lot with him. In the process of survival, internal and external circumstances may eventually compel Ahmadinejad to choose between his political, economic, and social agenda on one hand and the structure of the Islamic Republic on the other hand (which are sure to come into conflict) -- then, we'll see what stuff he is made of. Depending on the circumstances and choices he will make under them, what we will have is the beginning of an epoch-making change in the entire Middle East, comparable to the rise of the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela and gradual formation of a regional bloc in which the left (led by Hugo Chavez) and the right (led by Lula), leaders and masses, contend with each other over democratic control of natural resources in particular and production in general. Given where most of the world's oil lies, change in the Middle East is even more urgently needed than change in Latin America. Who better to initiate that change than a Bolivar in Tehran?
Iran is the key -- both for the ruling class and for us.
Western leftists ought to do what we can to help Ahmadinejad survive this siege. That's not just our moral duty to the Iranian masses who voted to cast their lot with him. In the process of survival, internal and external circumstances may eventually compel Ahmadinejad to choose between his political, economic, and social agenda on one hand and the structure of the Islamic Republic on the other hand (which are sure to come into conflict) -- then, we'll see what stuff he is made of. Depending on the circumstances and choices he will make under them, what we will have is the beginning of an epoch-making change in the entire Middle East, comparable to the rise of the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela and gradual formation of a regional bloc in which the left (led by Hugo Chavez) and the right (led by Lula), leaders and masses, contend with each other over democratic control of natural resources in particular and production in general. Given where most of the world's oil lies, change in the Middle East is even more urgently needed than change in Latin America. Who better to initiate that change than a Bolivar in Tehran?
Iran is the key -- both for the ruling class and for us.
Thursday, May 18, 2006
The Sewing Factory in Gaza, the Administration in Tel-Aviv, and the Owners in New York
Check out an excellent paper by Efraim Davidi: "The Sewing Factory in Gaza, the Administration in Tel-Aviv, and the Owners in New York: Israeli Industrialists' Strategy in the Global Supply Chain" (MRZine 18 May 2006).
Wednesday, May 17, 2006
SCO Invites Iran to Its Summit on June 15
This is extremely good news -- the best news about Iran that I've heard in months:
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Tuesday Iran has been invited as an observer to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's summit due on June 15.
"The invitation has already been sent," he said.
At present, the UN Security Council is studying the International Atomic Energy Agency director-general's report on Iran's nuclear problem.
"The IAEA will meet in session in two weeks' time," Lavrov said. (Itar-Tass, "SCO Invites Iran to Its Summit on June 15 -- Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov," 16 May 2006)
Iran's recent announcement that it intends to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) could complicate Western efforts to curb Tehran's nuclear ambitions. Iran now has observer status at the SCO, but it hopes membership could come as early as June. Although SCO membership is no foregone conclusion -- and does not include mutual defense pledges -- being inside the Shanghai "club" could bring Tehran extra support from its two key members: Russia and China.
PRAGUE, May 15, 2006 (RFE/RL) -- Membership of the SCO could offer Iran shelter from the intense U.S.-led international pressure on Tehran to end uranium enrichment.
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mohammadi was quoted by ITAR-TASS and Xinhua news agencies as saying in April that his country hopes to join the SCO this summer. He said Iran is looking forward to reviewing the nuclear dispute with its SCO "colleagues." Mohammadi said Tehran hopes for those countries' support at the organization's June summit in Shanghai.
"What we are seeing is really a tectonic shift of diplomatic and every other kind of activity into Western and Central Asia."
Russia and China have already given Tehran crucial support in the United Nations debate over its controversial nuclear program. Both have resisted pressure from the United States and its European allies to formulate a UN draft resolution that could open the way for economic sanctions or even military intervention unless Iran stops work on the nuclear fuel cycle. (Breffni O'Rourke, "Iran: Plans to Join Shanghai Group Seen as Bold Geopolitical Stroke," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 May 2006)
Tuesday, May 16, 2006
Focus on Iran and Palestine, Not Iraq
Leftists in the West (the US, the EU, and Japan) should focus on Iran and Palestine, Latin America, and Moscow and Beijing (in that order), rather than Iraq, on the foreign policy front. Face it -- Iraq is a goner. We failed Iraqis, and we won't be in a position to do much for them for many years to come.
Ahmadinejad, albeit religious, is an equivalent of Hugo Chavez. He can be a Bolivar in Tehran, though he isn't yet, till he pulls off a passive revolution against the gerontocracy of clerics.
Explain to the Western public what Ahmadinejad is doing in Iran -- objectively. Do NOT defend the indefensible -- e.g., flirtations with Holocaust revisionism -- that WON'T be credible and WON'T help Ahmadinejad AT ALL. Instead, CLARIFY his economic and social policies and foreign policy and inspire support for them. He is the most important leader to arise in the Near East in decades. He needs our INTELLIGENT (NOT blind and uncritical) support.
Why put Iran rather than Venezuela at the top of our agenda? Because Chavez's domestic and regional support is far more solid than Ahmadinejad's. Economic troubles and political collapse of the ruling-class party duopoly in Venezuela had cleared the political field for Chavez and Bolivarians. Not so in Iran. Ahmadinejad is the president of Iran, but Iran's military, police, and militias officially answer to Khamenei, who is perfectly capable of cutting deals with Washington behind Ahmadinejad's back and perhaps having him killed. Ahmadinejad needs to change that, in a war of positions, but he needs time, much time, to transfer the allegiance of soldiers to him, away from Khamenei. Our job is to buy him time.
Ahmadinejad, albeit religious, is an equivalent of Hugo Chavez. He can be a Bolivar in Tehran, though he isn't yet, till he pulls off a passive revolution against the gerontocracy of clerics.
Explain to the Western public what Ahmadinejad is doing in Iran -- objectively. Do NOT defend the indefensible -- e.g., flirtations with Holocaust revisionism -- that WON'T be credible and WON'T help Ahmadinejad AT ALL. Instead, CLARIFY his economic and social policies and foreign policy and inspire support for them. He is the most important leader to arise in the Near East in decades. He needs our INTELLIGENT (NOT blind and uncritical) support.
Why put Iran rather than Venezuela at the top of our agenda? Because Chavez's domestic and regional support is far more solid than Ahmadinejad's. Economic troubles and political collapse of the ruling-class party duopoly in Venezuela had cleared the political field for Chavez and Bolivarians. Not so in Iran. Ahmadinejad is the president of Iran, but Iran's military, police, and militias officially answer to Khamenei, who is perfectly capable of cutting deals with Washington behind Ahmadinejad's back and perhaps having him killed. Ahmadinejad needs to change that, in a war of positions, but he needs time, much time, to transfer the allegiance of soldiers to him, away from Khamenei. Our job is to buy him time.
Monday, May 15, 2006
Doomed: Letters from Third-World Leaders
William Blum reminds us that "[w]ith his recent letter to President Bush, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has become part of a long tradition of Third-World leaders who, under imminent military or political threat from the United States, communicated with Washington officials in the hope of removing that threat," such as Ho Chi Minh, Cheddi Jagan, Maurice Bishop, Che Guevara, Hugo Chavez, and Saddam Hussein ("Appealing to the United States Is Not Very Appealing," CounterPunch and Dissident Voice, 15 May 2006). In all cases, their communication did nothing to change Washington's plan.
The only consolation is that the Vietnamese eventually succeeded in making Washington withdraw its troops and abandon its proxies and that the threatened governments of Cuba and Venezuela did survive Washington's aggressions.
Will the Ahmadinejad administration and Iran?
If Fallujah is any indication, the Iranian people may have to brace for what will befall them on November 8, the day after Election Day in the United States.
The only consolation is that the Vietnamese eventually succeeded in making Washington withdraw its troops and abandon its proxies and that the threatened governments of Cuba and Venezuela did survive Washington's aggressions.
Will the Ahmadinejad administration and Iran?
If Fallujah is any indication, the Iranian people may have to brace for what will befall them on November 8, the day after Election Day in the United States.
The Nakba: Then and Now
In collaboration with the Institute for Middle East Understanding, MRZine remembers the Nakba. As Sam Bahour says, "The Nakba is not a memorial for the dead. It is a remembrance of the living, of a proud and steadfast people yearning to return home and begin the bitter and difficult process of repatriation."
Sunday, May 14, 2006
Norman G. Finkelstein, "Haunted House"
Here's another piece from another love of mine: Norman G. Finkelstein, "Haunted House" (MRZine, 13 May 2006). If you have met him, you know he is as razor-sharp and intense in person as his writing is. Where does his edge, his intensity, come from? His mother.
Every night as we watched the news on television my mother would avert her eyes and raise her hand to block the screen when scenes from Vietnam flashed across it. After a few moments the question would invariably come: "Is it over yet?" Not at all given to self-dramatization, she simply couldn't endure the scenes of destruction and death. Whereas most of my friends and their parents eventually came to be against the Vietnam War, the moral urgency of opposition sounded at a different decibel in my home. The war wasn't a subject of intellectual or political argument, even vehement argument. My mother's whole being revolted against it. I wouldn't say she was emotional about the war; she was hysterical. Although knowledgeable about the facts, she detested any intellectualizing of it. Even to engage in debate about Vietnam constituted a moral travesty. It manifested a lack of genuine outrage at, and comprehension of, the unfolding horror: no one who had actually experienced war could or would calmly discuss it. For related reasons she disdained my joining the high school forensics team. The art of debate was to argue with equal passion and skill both sides of a given question. To her mind, it nurtured duplicity, the amoral manipulation of words. (Norman G. Finkelstein, "Haunted House," MRZine, 13 May 2006)
Link van de Maand
MRZine is Dutch magazine Grenzeloos's "Link van de Maand" [Link of the Month]. Here's the blurb it gave MRZine:
Het Amerikaanse Monthly Review (MR) is een van de langst bestaande en meest gerespecteerde marxistische tijdschriften. Sinds enige is het MR zine online, een website waaraan lezers zelf een bijdrage kunnen leveren. Het resultaat is een boeiende mengelmoes van korte en langere artikelen over een grote verscheidenheid van onderwerpen, geschreven door auteurs uit de hele wereld.How nice!
[The American Monthly Review (MR) is among the longest-standing and most respected Marxist magazines. MRZine has been online for some time, a Web site to which readers themselves can make contributions. The result has been a captivating mix of short and long articles concerning a wide variety of subjects, by authors from all over the world.]
Jean Genet: "They Are in the Right Because I Love Them"
"Le choix que l'on fait d'une communauté privilégiée, en dehors de la naissance alors que l'appartenance à ce peuple est native, ce choix s'opère par la grâce d'une adhésion non raisonnée, non que la justice n'y ait sa part, mais cette justice et toute la défense de cette communauté se font en vertu d'un attrait sentimental, peut-être même sensible, sensuel; je suis français, mais entièrement, sans jugement, je défends les Palestiniens. Ils ont le droit pour eux puisque je les aime. Mais les aimerais-je si l'injustice n'en faisait pas un peuple vagabond?" -- Jean Genet, "Quatre heures à Chatila"
"You can select a particular community other than that of your birth, whereas you are born into a people; this selection is based on an irrational affinity, which is not to say that justice has no role, but this justice and the entire defense of this community take place because of an emotional -- perhaps intuitive, sensual -- attraction; I am French, but I defend the Palestinians wholeheartedly and automatically. They are in the right because I love them. But would I love them if injustice had not turned them into a wandering people?" -- Jean Genet, "Four Hours in Chatila"
"You can select a particular community other than that of your birth, whereas you are born into a people; this selection is based on an irrational affinity, which is not to say that justice has no role, but this justice and the entire defense of this community take place because of an emotional -- perhaps intuitive, sensual -- attraction; I am French, but I defend the Palestinians wholeheartedly and automatically. They are in the right because I love them. But would I love them if injustice had not turned them into a wandering people?" -- Jean Genet, "Four Hours in Chatila"
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