September 1978: Egypt, Iran, and Jimmy Carter

September 1978 was a turning point in the modern history of the Middle East.

5 September 1978: Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat begin the peace process at Camp David, Maryland

7 September 1978: Protests that began in 1977 culminate in a massive demonstration of millions in Tehran -- the Shah responds by laying down martial law

8 September 1978 - Black Friday: Iranian Army troops open fire on protesters in Tehran, killing hundreds and wounding thousands

17 September 1978: Egypt and Israel sign the Camp David Accords

Jimmy Carter, a born-again Southern gentleman farmer of the Democratic Party, dealt a coup de grâce to secular nationalism and pan-Arabism in the Middle East and served as a midwife^* to the Iranian Revolution, which "will owe its importance to the potential that it will have to overturn the existing political situation in the Middle East and thus the global strategic equilibrium. . . . [A]s an 'Islamic' movement, it can set the entire region afire, overturn the most unstable regimes, and disturb the most solid" (Michel Foucault, "A Powder Keg Called Islam," Corriere della sera, February 1979).

* See Yoshie Furuhashi, "Class Power vs. Profit Maximization," LBO-talk, 12 August 2006.

Marxism and Shi'ism as Theology of Discontent

Hamid Dabashi sums up Shi'ism as a theology of discontent: "Shi'ism is a religion of protest. It can only speak truth to power and destabilize it. It can never be 'in power.' As soon as it is 'in power' it contradicts itself. Shi'ism can never politically succeed; its political success is its moral failure. And that paradox is at the very soul of its historical endurance" ("Ta'ziyeh as Theatre of Protest," The Drama Review 49.4, Winter 2005, p. 91).

A Shi'i ritual drama of ta'ziyeh -- which stages the martyrdom of Hussein (a son of Fatima, Muhammad's daughter) and his 72 comrades, who were killed by the forces of Yazid, the second caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, in the battle of Karbala -- embodies the spirit of Shi'ism: "The central thematic of ta'ziyeh as drama is the notion of mazlumiyyat, which is the defining aspect of Shi'ism itself. Mazlumiyyat constitutes the moral/political community in terms of justice and its aberration. Mazlumiyyat is the absence of justice that signals the necessity of its presence" (Dabashi, p. 93). Ta'ziyeh, therefore, gives Shi'is a powerful narrative that they can invoke any time they fight the power, be it a foreign power or their own government: the spirit of Hussein and his fellow martyrs are on the side of revolutionaries who fight for justice, against the tyranny of a modern-day Yazid.

The manner in which ta'ziyeh is performed is more Brechtian than Brecht's own epic theater:

In ta'ziyeh, acting is not mimetic; it is entirely suggestive -- with a full contractual agreement, dramatically articulated, between the actors and the audience that they are just acting. Actors hold their script in their hands, not because they don’t know the lines but because they want to demonstrate distance and suggest a dissimilitude. If the Aristotelian mimesis is based on similitude, ta'ziyeh is predicated on dissimilitude. The director of ta'ziyeh is always present on the stage, not because the actors don’t know what to do, but because the audience needs assurance that this is just acting. The stage is not really a stage, not because the villagers and townspeople who staged the ta'ziyeh are poor and could not afford an amphitheatre, but because the stage must be an extension of the rest of the physical habitat of the actors and the audience. In fact the actors come onstage directly from their houses, alleys, streets, and markets. The stage never loses sight of its not-being-the-stage. Nonactors have easy access to the stage area; actors move in and out of character at will. There is fluidity between reality and acting because the actors are performing no act of fiction. They are acting reality. Imam Hussein and his 72 companions were really killed in the battle of Karbala by Yazid and his cohorts in the year 60/680. . . . One has to understand how, in the doctrinally charged collapse of the then and the now, the moral and the political, and the real and the ideal, the charismatic paradox at the heart of Shi'ism informs the dramatic tension at the heart of ta'ziyeh and all of its suggestive symbolics of acting, staging, showing, and representing. (Dabashi, pp. 95-94)

Such a theater of protest, which prompts actors and the audience to understand conflict in their own society allegorically through the battle of Karbala and vice versa, has a potential to destabilize any state, including a state ruled by Shi'ite clerics, for, after all, clerics in power may very well come to resemble Yazid rather than Hussein in popular imagination. Thus the state seeks to domesticate and neutralize ta'ziyeh: "Ta'ziyeh has been thematically theatricalized, overtly aestheticized, Orientalized, anthropologized, and ultimately museumized" (Dabashi, p. 98). And yet, that is "not the destiny of either Shi'ism or of ta'ziyeh" (Dabashi, p. 98). The day will come when Shi'is will, again, grasp the constellation which the present has formed with the era of Hussein, establishing "a conception of the present as the ‘time of the now’ which is shot through with chips of Messianic time" (Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History").

Like Shi'ism, Marxism, too, is "a religion of protest. It can only speak truth to power and destabilize it. It can never be 'in power.' As soon as it is 'in power' it contradicts itself" (Dabashi, p. 91). The career of Marxism as the official philosophy of socialist states has been, if anything, sadder than that of Shi'ism as the official philosophy of a theocratic state. Communism, when it becomes the opium for the people administered by a state, tends to narcotize and depoliticize them more than any religion can. But that is not the destiny of Marxism either. It has returned to its original vocation in Latin America and Nepal. Can it in the Middle East?

Benjamin lived in an age when theology was "wizened" and "[had] to keep out of sight." He thought that historical materialism, if it enlisted the service of theology, could easily be a match for any force. Today, it is historical materialism that is "wizened" and "has to keep out of sight," but its service will be indispensable to any theology of discontent.

Worse than Iran's Parliament

Those of you who read the Marxism list archive know: the moderator speedily reversed my purge after I posted "Socialist Men, Muslims, and the 'Woman Question'" putting his feminist credential into question.

Even with me back, though, the listserv, as well as many other listservs on the Left, still has fewer regular women participants than Iran's parliament (4.1% of Iran's MPs are women according to Inter-Parliamentary Union).

UPDATE:

Then, Proyect purged me the second time. :-0

I Don't Want to Love You, But I Do

Here is a blog entry from Cecilia Lucas's blog Mariposa Rhythms -- Creative Dissent: "My Love for Hizbullah, Revisited." Lucas published a moving essay "A Love Poem" in Common Dreams on 24 July 2006, with her love poem for Hizbullah "I Don't Want to Love You, But I Do."

I am coming to terms with something that I’ve tried to deny, something I’ve been taught to deny. And so I have written a love poem. For Hizbullah. Like love that inspires poems often is, this love is not all rosy and sweet. It is complicated, tortured, frustrated, somewhat inappropriate, certainly scandalous, sometimes hesitant. It is irrational and overly rational. But still, it is love. A dear friend told me today, “Nobody ever really learns something without feeling something.” So, to Hizbullah, I offer this poem.

Lucas received "a lot of hate mail" in response to it, which included "the ways you should be raped," suggestive that many of the hate messages came from men. Here's an interesting intersection of sex and politics: women who love Muslims in resistance and men who hate them. I take it that many of the emotionally negative responses to my remarks on Iran, also from men only, come from the same intersection, that is to say, how men feel about my regard for my Persian Prince.^*

Lucas says, however, that hate messages are "outweighed by messages from people who are also struggling to come to terms with their support of Hizbullah by learning more about who they are, what they have done, and what they believe," and so are they in my case as well. I don't know what these messages in conflict will add up to, but surely they are part of a war of position.

* The term is mainly my allusion to Machiavelli and Gramsci, whose thoughts frame my understanding of Iran, its masses, and its opposed factions of leadership and make me entertain a hope for a passive revolution in Iran, as well as it is due to my love of alliteration, but it is also intended to speak in several other registers, obviously, including love and irony.

Chávez in Tehran

Today is Hugo Chávez Frías's birthday. He will arrive in Tehran this evening, beginning his three-day visit to the country. I want Iranians and Arabs, Shiites and Sunnis, especially youths among them, to hear what he has to say. I want them to want to study Latin America, visit it, make friends with Latin Americans. I want them to come up with their own regional project comparable to what's going on in Latin America.

Arabs, Muslims, Jews, and Latin Americans ought to remember 1492 together, the year of Reconquista, the beginning of the end of their old worlds. They ought to create a solidarity of popular memory that unites their intertwined experiences of dispossession that began in that year, to counter the deleterious impacts of small-minded secular nationalism which dashed the half-hearted attempts at regional integration both in the Middle East and Latin America in the past.

To Die For

Find me an Arab socialist woman whose mother is a Shi'i and whose father is a Sunni or vice versa, who thinks like me, and who writes like Shelley in The Revolt of Islam. If her name is Fatima, it will be great. If she looks like Leila Khaled, she is to die for.

Socialist Men, Muslims, and the "Woman Question"

Louis Proyect, the moderator of the Marxmail discussion listserv who keeps the Unrepentant Marxist blog, purged me from his list yesterday, falsely claiming that I taunted "Marxmail subscribers as candidates for making common cause with the imperialists in this fashion will also be removed" ("Re: [Marxism] Moderator's Note," 23 July 2006). What did I actually say? "BTW, to all of you, born or adopted Westerners, on the left who are DYING to overthrow a government in North Africa and West Asia: may I recommend Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt (in that order), instead of Iran?" ("Re: [Marxism] Divide and Conquer," 23 July 2006). Notice that there is no mention of anyone collaborating with imperialists to overthrow anything in my quip. Besides, what imperialist wants to overthrow the Saudi Arabian, Jordanian, and Egyptian governments? They are the best allies of Washington and Tel Aviv in the whole Middle East!

Where did Proyect's misinterpretation come from? Apparently, the state of the Left is such that he can't imagine, even as a joke which my quip obviously was, leftists overthrowing any government ON THEIR OWN without the aid of imperialists. There is at least one virtue in this misinterpretation: it's an unconscious admission that Western leftists are indeed irrelevant, the perennially powerless who can criticize others but are incapable of presenting an attractive practical alternative to the status quo that would win the allegiance of masses in their own countries, let alone anywhere else. In my view, the admission of our irrelevance today, rather than denial of it, is the first necessary step toward overcoming it.

In any event, Proyect's purging of me accomplished another important goal: his listserv now has one fewer women as well as one fewer queers, diminishing racial diversity of participants by one to boot! (Ever wonder why discussion mailing lists on the Left have very few female participants?) Now the remaining socialist men are free to debate the relative conditions of women's rights in Iran, the rest of the Middle East, socialist countries, and others in a congenial atmosphere free from an outspoken bisexual woman of color who dares to disagree with them (if you are curious about how discussion went, visit Marxmail's public archive)! Yes, that really shows that socialist men like Proyect are most qualified to speak up for the importance of gender equality! Women are equal to men, provided that women agree with men. :->

Now, how that kind of practice makes secular socialist men better feminists than Muslim men and women, as they claim, is beyond me. The local chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, for instance, is headed by an accomplished woman -- Asma Mobin-Uddin, a pediatrician and author of My Name Is Bilal, a children's book -- and its events -- from protests to fundraisers -- have gender-equal participation, women found in leading positions as well as the rank and file. The way I look at it, secular socialist men have much to learn from Muslims of the CAIR-Ohio.

What Do the Iranians Want?

Here's a new article that I wrote for MRZine: "What Do the Iranians Want?" (13 July 2006).

Ali Shariati and Liberation Theology

Ali Shariati's thought, in my view, is liberation theology, very much influenced by Marxism of the era of anti-colonial struggles, especially Frantz Fanon's ideas. He was a lay man and very anti-clerical, teaching the masses a history of popular revolts "against foreign domination, internal deceit, the power of the feudal lords and wealthy capitalists" (Ali Shariati, "Red Shi'ism (the Religion of Martyrdom) vs. Black Shi'ism (the Religion of Mourning)"). He was immensely popular, one of the chief influences on young revolutionaries of the Iranian Revolution, which, not so coincidentally, was one of the last great anti-neo-colonial revolutions in the sixties and seventies, happening exactly at the same time as the Sandinista Revolution.

Ervand Abrahamian says that, after Shariati's untimely death (which many think was the work of SAVAK), Shariati's favorable interpretations of Marx and Marxist thought were expurgated from his texts that were published in Iran, whereas his criticisms of Marxism were left intact in them, thus giving Iranian masses a wrong impression of what Shariati really thought (see Iran Between Two Revolutions, Princeton University Press, 1982).

And yet, his thought still lives on among Iranians, no doubt.

What would Shariati say to the ruling clerics of Iran were he alive today? "Shi'ism left the great mosque of the common people to become a next-door neighbor to the Palace of 'Ali Qapu in the Royal Mosque" ("Red Shi'ism (the Religion of Martyrdom) vs. Black Shi'ism (the Religion of Mourning)").

Iran's AIDS-Prevention Program Among World's Most Progressive

This article is a must read, so I'm reproducing it in full, in case it becomes unavailable elsewhere.

Published on Friday, April 14, 2006 by Knight Ridder
Iran's AIDS-Prevention Program Among World's Most Progressive
by Hannah Allam

TEHRAN, Iran - It took 30 meetings just to create a slim AIDS-awareness handbook for Iran's conservative high schools. A drawing of a condom disappeared early on; a photo of a syringe survived. A mention of sexual transmission was approved, but only with a reminder that sex before marriage is forbidden.

Even after the government's wordsmiths were satisfied, AIDS workers in Tehran had to take the book south to the holy city of Qom, the spiritual center of Iran's all-powerful clergy. To everyone's surprise, the clerics endorsed it.

Iran's fight against the spread of HIV hinges on a delicate give-and-take between activists who talk frankly about sex and drugs and the ruling ayatollahs, who fiercely protect the Islamic Republic's puritan image. The combination has made Iran the Middle East leader in preventing HIV and AIDS.

The country's program, which melds deep-rooted religious values with cutting-edge research, is being exported to Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Pakistan and other Muslim nations.

"I told my colleagues in the United Arab Emirates, `You're not more rigid than us. We're the only country in the world where it's the law to wear a head scarf, where it's a pure Islamic government, where you can't drink,'" said Dr. Arash Alaei, one of Iran's most respected AIDS researchers. "`If we have a prevention program, why don't you?'"

In a region where other Muslim governments ignore the epidemic, quarantine HIV-infected people or preach abstinence as the only solution, Iran's approach is especially remarkable.

It still doles out floggings to Iranians caught with alcohol, but it gives clean syringes and methadone treatment to heroin addicts. Health workers pass out condoms to prostitutes. Government clinics in every region offer free HIV testing, counseling and treatment. A state-backed magazine just began a monthly column that profiles HIV-positive Iranians, and last year the postal service unveiled a stamp emblazoned with a red ribbon for AIDS awareness. This year the government will devote an estimated $30 million to the program.

One of Iran's most acclaimed advances comes from its notoriously secretive network of prisons, where hundreds of drug-addicted inmates sometimes share the same makeshift syringe to inject heroin smuggled in by guards or visiting relatives. In a startling acknowledgment of sex and drugs even in its most closely guarded quarters, the Tehran administration has made condoms and needles available in detention centers across the country.

"Iran now has one of the best prison programs for HIV in not just the region, but in the world," said Dr. Hamid Setayesh, the coordinator for the U.N. AIDS office in Tehran. "They're passing out condoms and syringes in prisons. This is unbelievable. In the whole world, there aren't more than six or seven countries doing that."

Iran's national response still faces obstacles, especially when it comes to reducing the shame and isolation that HIV-infected Iranians endure. The government reports 12,000 people with HIV; health workers say the real figure is closer to 70,000. Many HIV-positive Iranians are reluctant to tell relatives and co-workers about their diagnosis, fearful they'll be cast out of their homes or fired from their jobs.

But the program's architects are turning to the clergy for help in combating the stigma of a disease that's inextricably linked to sex in the minds of many Muslims.

A year ago, Setayesh sent questionnaires to the most influential Shiite Muslim clerics to elicit their views on condom use, government's role in AIDS prevention and how society should deal with HIV-infected Iranians. He received 17 handwritten responses, nearly all in favor of the government's efforts. The U.N. AIDS office plans to compile them into a book to be distributed at mosques.

"You should not discriminate against these people," one mullah wrote. "You have no excuse not to use condoms," another responded. "You should pay for this from the public funds of the government," an ayatollah ordered.

Iran's first reported HIV infection came in 1987, when a hemophiliac child tested positive after a blood transfusion. The government formed a national committee, but it wasn't until nearly a decade later that it began to take prevention seriously, said Alaei, one of the pioneers of Iranian AIDS research.

In 1997, the government tested for the virus among high-risk populations such as prisoners, truck drivers and patients with other infectious diseases. The highest rate of infection was in Iran's prisons, one of which was in Alei's hometown of Kermanshah, northwest of Tehran. Alaei was startled to learn that 400 cases had been detected there.

In 1999 he and his brother, Kamiar, had just finished their medical studies. They persuaded the nervous director of a local medical school to give them space for research.

"We had one room, the files of 400 infected prisoners and one office worker. We couldn't even have a sign on the door," Alaei recalled. "It was top secret."

The Alaei brothers used the prison files to scour the city for HIV-positive convicts and their families. After the government-testing program had confirmed the infections, he said, most of the men received no care or counseling. By the time Alaei tracked them down, 176 of the 400 already were dead. Most had committed suicide.

"If they were released, their families had disowned them. In jail, other prisoners avoided them and prison workers who didn't know about transmission just kept them in one room and rolled in a food cart for their meals," Alaei said. "When we shook hands with them, they cried. Before that, everyone had rejected them."

When Kermanshah's representative in Parliament asked the government to build an AIDS hospital, residents ransacked his office. Alaei said they were terrified that an AIDS facility in their city would turn the country against them, making them the butt of jokes and limiting their children's chances for marriage. The legislator lost his seat in the next election.

Then the wives of Kermanshah's addicts began testing HIV-positive, 35 in the first year alone. Next came the children. The families were terrified. Opposition to an HIV clinic dried up.

With community and government backing, the Alaei brothers soon expanded their operation to two rooms, then the entire floor of the medical school and, finally, to cities throughout Iran. The World Health Organization named Alaei's clinics the best-practice model for the Middle East and North Africa.

"Paying attention to the programs and progress of the developed countries is very good," Alaei said. "But you should never forget to base your program on your own society, your own demographics, your own religion and culture."

With the election last summer of the ultraconservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, many AIDS workers feared a rollback of their hard-won progress. Indeed, some new Cabinet members expressed disapproval of the national campaign's growing boldness in addressing the sexual transmission of HIV.

Ahmadinejad's health minister told a news conference that AIDS wasn't a priority for the government. The education minister stopped the printing of pamphlets for young students, saying they needed revisions, Setayesh said. Another government official told Alaei that the red handbook he'd worked so hard to publish was embarrassing to Iran's image. It was uncertain whether distribution would continue.

Then Iran's characteristically unpredictable president surprised AIDS workers at a governmental meeting on the intertwined problems of opiate addiction and HIV by coming out in favor of distributing methadone.

AIDS-prevention specialists admit they can't know whether that remark signals that Iran's program won't be scaled back, but researcher Alaei, for one, says he's optimistic that progress will continue.

"Four years ago, if you talked about condoms, you couldn't go on the air," he said, referring to state-run television. "This year, they said, `You are free to say what you like.' I just kept saying, `Use condoms. Use condoms. Use condoms.'"

© 2006 KR Washington Bureau and wire service sources

FAIR USE NOTICE
This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.

"There Currently Is No Active Policy of Prosecution of Charges of Homosexuality in Iran"

Arsham Parsi is an Iranian gay man who currently resides in Canada. Parsi is the spokesperson and secretary of human rights affairs of the Persian Gay and Lesbian Organization, and he helped organize a Toronto protest to call on Iran to stop killing gays, a part of international protests organized by OutRage (led by Peter Tatchell), International Day Against Homophobia, and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission among others on June 19, the day to commemorate the executions of Mahmoud Asgari and Ayaz Marhoni, which the June 19 protest organizers allege were due to their homosexuality (the spin that originated in the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political arm of the MEK), the allegation that has been questioned by human rights organizations (Richard Kim, "Witnesses to an Execution," The Nation 7 August 2005).

Parsi claims: "I had to escape from my homeland as a death warrant was issued by the Islamic government" ("Arsham Parsi's Speech Text in Toronto Gala 2006," Homan, 13 June 2006). He certainly won refugee status in Canada in May 2006 (David Graham, "Fearless in Canada," The Toronto Star, 25 June 2006). But is his claim of having been issued "a death warrant" true? If it is, how did he manage to escape custody (since an execution warrant isn't issued till a suspect gets arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced, i.e., unless the suspect is in state custody)? Is that a ground on which the Canadian government granted him refugee status? If not, on what grounds did the government grant him refugee status? Can you discover facts that would allow us to answer these questions?

I ask these questions because the Committee against Torture at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights determined in a 2003 case of Dutch asylum denial of an Iranian national that "[t]he Committee [against Torture, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights] also notes from different and reliable sources that there currently is no active policy of prosecution of charges of homosexuality in Iran" and there is no well-documented evidence that leads me to believe that policy has changed since then.

The full text of the Committee's decision is copied below.

UNITED NATIONS

Distr.
GENERAL
CAT/C/30/D/190/2001
26 May 2003
Original: ENGLISH
Communication No 190/2001: Netherlands26/05/2003
CAT/C/30/D/190/2001. (Jurisprudence)

Convention Abbreviation: CAT

Committee Against Torture
Thirtieth session
28 April - 16 May 2003

Decisions of the Committee Against Torture under article 22 of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

- Thirtieth session -

Communication No.190/2001

Submitted by: K.S.Y. (represented by counsel)

Alleged victim: K.S.Y.

State party: The Netherlands

Date of complaint: 5 January 2001 (initial submission)

The Committee against Torture, established under article 17 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

Meeting on 15 May 2003,

Having concluded its consideration of complaint No. 190/2001, submitted to the Committee against Torture by Mr. K.S.Y. under article 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

Having taken into account all information made available to it by the author of the complaint, his counsel and the State party,

Adopts the following:



Decision under article 22, paragraph 7, of the Convention

1.1 The complainant is Mr. Khaliollah Soorani Yancheshmeh, a citizen of Iran, born on 23 August 1950, whose application for refugee status was rejected in the Netherlands. He claims that his deportation to Iran would constitute a violation by the Netherlands of article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereafter, the Convention). He is represented by counsel.

1.2 In accordance with article 22, paragraph 3 of the Convention, the Committee transmitted the communication to the State party on 16 October 2001. Pursuant to rule 108 of the Committee's rules of procedure, the State party was requested not to deport the complainant to Iran pending the consideration of his case by the Committee.

The facts as presented by the complainant

2.1 The complainant states that he has encountered problems in Iran on account of his homosexuality and because of the political activities of his brother, A.A.

2.2 The complainant had difficulties with Iranian authorities since his brother was recognized as a refugee in the Netherlands in the early eighties. He was interrogated by the Monkerat Committee four or five times and, after each interrogation, had to sign the next convocation.

2.3 In March 1992, the complainant travelled to the Netherlands for the wedding of his brother. When he returned to Iran, he was interrogated by the authorities about the reasons of his trip and the activities of his brother in the Netherlands. The Iranian authorities confiscated his passport, issued an order prohibiting him to travel abroad. He was ordered to report daily to the passports' office of the criminal investigation department.

2.4 In Iran, the complainant had a homosexual relationship with one K.H., whose homosexuality allegedly was easy to recognize due to his "female" behaviour. Because of his homosexuality, he separated from his wife, with whom he had three kids.

2.5 On 10 August 1992, the complainant was arrested in Shiraz by the Monkerat (Special Unit of the Revolutionary Committee) on account of complaints by neighbours about his homosexual activities. His partner was not arrested as he went into hiding. The complainant was taken to a prison in the Lout desert and interrogated about his homosexuality and his brother's activities. During his detention, he allegedly was tortured, beaten with cables on the sole of his feet, on his legs and in the face, and hanged to the ceiling by one arm during half a day over three weeks. The complainant was later sentenced to death (1) but never received a written verdict of the sentence. After five months of detention, he succeeded to escape with the help of prison cleaning services who hid him in the garbage truck. The escape was facilitated by the absence of guards in the evening, the prisoners being all confined in their cell.

2.6 The complainant first went to Mashad and then to Ispahan, where some relatives resided. From there he organized his travel to Europe. In August 1993, the complainant and his partner travelled separately to the Netherlands. The complainant used an Iranian passport provided by the "passeur" with his own photograph. When he arrived in the Netherlands, he destroyed the passport as he had been told to do so.

2.7 On 16 March 1994, the complainant applied for both refugee status and residence permit on humanitarian grounds. Both applications were rejected on 26 August 1994. On 29 August 1994, the complainant applied for a review of this decision. On 22 December 1994, the Advice Committee on Alien Affairs advised the State Secretary of the Department of Justice to deny asylum to the complainant but to grant him a residence permit because of his physical and psychological condition.

2.8 Since his arrival in the Netherlands, the complainant shared accommodation with his partner, K.H., until the latter started relationships with other men. After a fight about this situation, the complainant killed his partner. On 22 June 1995, the complainant was convicted of murder by the District Court Leeuwarden and sentenced to six years' imprisonment. He was imprisoned between 21 January 1995 and 21 January 1999. The body of K.H. was repatriated to Iran, after intervention of the Iranian Embassy in the Netherlands.

2.9 In the meantime, on 12 September 1996, the application for review of the initial decision denying asylum and residence permit to the complainant was rejected. The complainant appealed this decision on 13 September 1996 before the District Court of The Hague.

2.10 Moreover, further to the crime committed by the complainant, the State Secretary of the Department of Justice declared the complainant to be an "undesirable person" on 10 September 1996. A request to review this decision was rejected on 6 December 1996. The complainant made a further appeal against this decision on 24 December 1996 before the District Court of The Hague.

2.11 On 22 December 1999, the District Court of The Hague dismissed both appeals of 13 September 1996 and 24 December 1996.

2.12 In the meantime, on 1 October 1999, the complainant introduced a new application for asylum which was rejected on 5 October 1999. His appeal against this decision was finally rejected on 11 May 2001.

The complaint

3.1 The complainant claims that if he is returned to Iran, he is at risk of being subjected to torture, and that his forcible removal to Iran would entail a violation of article 3 of the Convention by the State party.

3.2 In support of his claim, the complainant argues that he was tortured when he was detained in Iran in 1992. The consequences of these abuses are confirmed by a number of medical reports submitted to the Committee. According to the medical reports, the complainant suffers from severe post traumatic stress disorder, including a suicidal tendency, and his right shoulder is seriously restricted in its movements because he had been hanged by one arm for prolonged periods.

3. 3 The complainant considers that the main element supporting the risk of torture are his homosexuality and the events that occurred in the Netherlands after his arrival. He argues that his homosexuality was confirmed by his partner, K.H., during hearings related to his own asylum application and by the judgement of 22 June 1995, in which the complainant was convicted of murder.

3.4 The complainant explains that after the death of K.H., his body was repatriated to Iran and that the Iranian authorities have undoubtedly tried to obtain explanations about the reasons for K.H.'s death. If he were removed now to Iran, he would certainly face problems related to the murder he committed and, particularly, his homosexuality. This would put him at risk of again being detained and subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment.

3.5 The complainant, referring to a report of Amnesty International of 30 July 1997, notes that homosexual activities are a criminal offence under the Iranian Penal Code. He points out that the mere declaration of four witnesses may lead to punishment as well as the opinion of a judge based on his own knowledge. The report further says that a person suspected of "committing" homosexual activities risks arrest, torture (lashes) or ill-treatment.

3.6 As to sources that confirm the existence of acts of torture in Iran, the complainant refers to the report of the United Nations Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on Iran of 21 September 1999, according to which "[p]ress accounts suggest that corporal punishment is prevalent. In January 1999, an Iranian newspaper reported that two 15-year-old boys had been sentenced to a flogging for 'offending public democracy' by dressing up as girls and wearing make-up. They explained to the Court that they did this to 'extract money from rich young men'. In June an Iranian newspaper reported that a young man in Mashad had been given 20 lashes for 'wounding public moral sentiments' by plucking his eyebrows and wearing eyeshadow. In March an Iranian newspaper reported that six persons had been sentenced in Mashad to 18 months in jail and 228 lashes for goading passers-by to dance in the street".

3.7 The complainant underlines that the decisions of the State party to deny him refugee status were based on alleged discrepancies and, in particular, on the fact that K.H. did not mention during his own asylum hearings that the complainant had been detained in Iran. The complainant argues that K.H. only mentioned his homosexual relationship with him and explained that his partner also had problems but did not give any more details. The complainant also refers to the jurisprudence of the Committee according to which complete accuracy can seldom be expected from victims of torture.

3.8 Finally, the complainant draws attention to the fact that the complainant was not admitted in the State party because he was convicted of a serious crime. The complainant that is not compatible with the absolute character of article 3 of the Convention. Furthermore, the complainant argues that he is not a threat to the Dutch society because his crime was committed out of passion, as confirmed in the judgement of 22 June 1995.

State party's observations on the admissibility and merits

4.1 In a submission dated 21 November 2000, the State party made its observations on the merits of the case as it did not propose any grounds for inadmissibility.

4.2 Referring to the jurisprudence of the Committee, the State party recalls that in order to be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the sense of article 3 of the Convention, there must not only be a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights in the country where the complainant is expelled but also specific grounds indicating that the complainant is personally at risk of being subjected to torture. It also reminds that the terms "substantial grounds" imply that torture is highly likely and that the individual must face a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being tortured, as interpreted in the light of the Committee's general comment No. 1 on the implementation of article 3.

4.3 Concerning the situation in Iran, the State party, referring to some Views of the Committee, argues that although the situation is disquieting it is not to a point that any person removed to Iran would be in danger of being subjected to torture. Moreover, the complainant's homosexuality does not in itself constitute a risk incompatible with article 3 of the Convention. Referring to a number of country reports carried out by its own services, the State party is of the view that although homosexual acts are prohibited in Iran and may incur the death penalty, there is no active policy of prosecution. Even if a charge of homosexuality is in some cases added to a range of other criminal charges, there are no known cases of convictions, including at the court's own discretion, solely for homosexual acts. It is further noted that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has not "been able to trace any cases of execution of persons found guilty of homosexual relations".

4.4 Concerning the political activities of his brother, A.A., the State party considers that the complainant has not substantiated that they would imply a personal, real and foreseeable risk of torture for him because his statements in that regard have been inconsistent, vague and contained little detail. According to different interviews, the complainant has been arrested once, 5 or 6 times, or more than 40 times in connection with his brother's political activities. Moreover, while the complainant had stated that his brother had been the leader of a Mujaheddin group, his brother himself told the State party's authorities that he was only a sympathiser of the Mujaheddin and distributed pamphlets, but undertook no further activity against the Iranian Government.

4.5 The State party considers that it is implausible that, while the complainant had encountered no problems in this respect until he travelled to the Netherlands in March 1992 with the permission of the authorities, he was arrested upon his return to Iran, that his passport was confiscated and that he was interrogated in relation with his brother's activities. The State party refers to ministerial reports according to which it is impossible for persons researched by the authorities to travel abroad and notes that thousands of Iranians travel annually abroad without encountering problems at their return in the country.

4.6 Moreover, the State party argues that, even assuming that the complainant was indeed arrested after his return to Iran in April 1992, the fact that he was released shortly afterwards without having been molested and that the political activities of his brother took place 17 years ago could not constitute evidence that the complainant would run the risk of being tortured for that reason.

4.7 Concerning his sexual preference, the State party notes the complainant's declarations that until August 1992 and prior his departure from Iran, in August 1993, he did not have any problems with the Iranian authorities in this respect. The State party further considers that his arrest in August 1992 because of his homosexuality lacks credibility because the complainant was not open about his sexual preference. It is similarly implausible that his partner, K.H., whose appearance was patently homosexual, was not arrested. The fact that K.H. did not mention the complainant's arrest in his asylum hearings because of their relationship also permits the doubts about the veracity of this claim given the importance of such a detail.

4.8 Concerning the death penalty to which he was sentenced because of his homosexuality, the complainant stated in his first interview that he did not receive any document recording his sentence. In April 1994, he stated that his sentence had been slipped under his cell door, attached to a piece of string. He later stated that he was told that he had to die because he was homosexual. Finally, in December 1994, he stated that his death sentence had been read out to him at the Monkerat office.

4.9 The State party observes that the complainant's account of his detention and escape, in that there was no guard in the evening and that he was able to escape into a garbage truck without encountering any problems, are inconsistent with the detention of a person under sentence of death.

4.10 The State party considers that the jurisprudence of the Committee related to the issue of inconsistencies and contradictions made by victims of torture in their account of past abuses is not applicable to the present case because the complainant's alleged contradictions relate to essential parts of his persecutions.

4.11 Concerning the medical reports submitted by the complainant, the State party argues that they conflict with the complainant's lack of credibility regarding his reasons for seeking asylum. The State party therefore considers that it is not necessary to examine whether the alleged physical symptoms are indicative of torture and thus relevant for the assessment of the complainant's claim and that it is incumbent to the complainant to demonstrate their relevance by presenting a credible claim. Moreover, physicians make their medical findings solely within the limited context of the statements made to them so that the causes of the complainant's medical situation cannot be ascertained objectively.

4.12 Finally, the State party considers that the complainant has not demonstrated that, since his arrival in the Netherlands, his sexual preference has come to the attention of the Iranian authorities, and referring again to the reports made by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs according to which homosexuality remains a social taboo in Iran, that it is implausible that K.H.'s family would have reported to the authorities about the reasons for his death. The complainant has not further demonstrated that he is likely to be imprisoned in Iran, let alone tortured, because of the murder of K.H. committed in another country.

Counsel's comments

5.1 In a submission dated 30 May 2002, the complainant transmitted his comments on the observations of the State party.

5.2 Regarding the absence of known cases of recent prosecutions solely on a charge of homosexuality, the complainant emphasizes that this does not mean that there are not any and that it is known that Iranian authorities are reluctant to give information about criminal prosecutions. Moreover, according to an Amnesty International report transmitted to the State party on 7 November 2001, 100 people were tortured in Iran only in July 2001, at least 10 people were hanged and 100 death sentences were upheld by the Supreme Court. As the background of these incidents is most of the time difficult to ascertain, homosexuality may in some cases have been at issue.

5.3 The complainant underlines the State party's observation that homosexual acts are often prosecuted together with other criminal charges. He states that this is exactly what he expects to happen in his case since the body of his partner was repatriated to Iran. This will give the Iranian authorities a reason to add a criminal charge of murder to that of homosexuality. The complainant considers that the murder he committed constitutes in itself a risk of being tortured if returned to Iran and that the fact that he has already been punished in the Netherlands is irrelevant.

5.4 Regarding the alleged contradictions and inconsistencies of his account of the facts, the complainant considers that the State party misinterpreted his words, particularly on the question of his detention on account of his brother's political activities. During the first interview with the Dutch authorities, the complainant mentioned that he was arrested once because of his homosexuality and several times in connection with his brother's political activities. His following declarations about his separate and different arrests were either related to arrests by the Sepah or by the Committee. The complainant finally notes that he is not in a position to compare his interviews with those of his brother as he was transmitted the file by the State party.

5.5 Regarding the alleged implausibility that he was arrested in August 1992 for his homosexuality because he was not open about his sexual preference, the complainant reiterates that he was arrested further to complaints made by neighbours who saw him with K.H., who was openly homosexual. Moreover, the complainant considers that it is perfectly conceivable that K.H. went into hiding.

5.6 Regarding the fact that K.H. did not mention the detention of the complainant during his own asylum hearing, it is noted that K.H. was not specifically interrogated on this issue and that interviews were short.

5.7 The complainant confirms that he never received any document recording his death sentence, and that he was only informed of it when the sentence was pushed under his cell door and then pulled back.

5.8 The complainant finally submits an additional report made by "Stichting Centrum '45", an organization dealing with traumatized war victims and asylum-seekers, according to which his situation is worsening and that serious risk of "balance suicide" exists. Contrary to the State party, the complainant considers that medical reports constitute evidence in support of his claim. Moreover, he notes that he has already demonstrated the relevance of the medical reports.

Issues and proceedings before the Committee

6.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Committee must decide whether or not it is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. The Committee has ascertained, as it is required to do under article 22, paragraph 5 (a) of the Convention that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.

6.2 Moreover, the Committee notes that the State party has not submitted any objections on the admissibility of the communication, including with regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Committee therefore declares the communication admissible and proceeds without further delay to its consideration of the merits.

7.1 The Committee must decide whether the forced return of the complainant to Iran would violate the State party's obligation, under article 3, paragraph 1 of the Convention, not to expel or return (refouler) an individual to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. In order to reach its conclusion, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, including the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The aim, however, is to determine whether the individual concerned would personally risk torture in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not imply that a person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.

7.2 In the present case, the Committee notes that the political activities of the complainant's brother took place more than 17 years ago and that they may not in themselves constitute a risk for the complainant himself to be subjected to torture, if he were returned to Iran.

7.3 Concerning the alleged difficulties faced by the complainant because of his sexual orientation, the Committee notes a number of contradictions and inconsistencies in his account of past abuses at the hand of the Iranian authorities, as well as the fact that part of his account has not been adequately substantiated or lacks credibility.

7.4 The Committee also notes from different and reliable sources that there currently is no active policy of prosecution of charges of homosexuality in Iran.

7.5 In the light of the arguments presented by the complainant and the State party, the Committee finds that it has not been given enough evidence by the complainant to conclude that the latter would run a personal, present and foreseeable risk of being tortured if returned to his country of origin.

8. The Committee against Torture, acting under article 22, paragraph 7, of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, considers that the complainant has not substantiated his claim that he would be subjected to torture upon return to Iran and therefore concludes that the complainant's removal to that country would not constitute a breach by the State party of article 3 of the Convention.

____________________________

[Adopted in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the English text being the original version. Subsequently to be issued also in Arabic and Chinese as part of the Committee's annual report to the General Assembly.]

Notes

1. The complainant explains that he has never received a copy of the judgement and that he was only informed of his death sentence through a document that was pushed under his cell door and then immediately pulled back. He is therefore not in a position to give the date of the judgement.

© Copyright 1996-2003
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Geneva, Switzerland

www.hri.ca/fortherecord2003/documentation/
tbodies/cat-c-30-d-190-2001.htm

France v. Italy

The World Cup has not been good to the Third World this year, the only highlight being a better-than-expected showing of Ghana. (I serially rooted for Iran, Angola, Ghana, and Brazil, and having lost all non-Europeans, I backed Portugal.) The final today is France v. Italy. I say, give it to the Italians: they got rid of Berlusconi, so they deserve a reward.

Parviz Dawoodi and Privatization in Iran

The Fars News Agency reports that "Iran's first Vice-President Parviz Dawoodi was appointed as the official in charge of implementing Article 44 of the Constitution," i.e., privatization ("First VP Responsible for Execution of Article 44," 9 July 2006). Moreover, it says:

Following the recent directive by the Supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei on the major policies for the implementation of Article 44 of the Constitution which rules for the transferring of a large part of governmental assets to the private sector, the cabinet decided in its last meeting that a special committee must be formed for implementing the Article with a number of cabinet ministers as its members.

The cabinet is yet to decide during its Sunday meeting that which of the statesmen should become a member of the said committee, but it has already appointed first Vice-President Parviz Dawoodi as the official in charge of the committee. ("First VP Responsible for Execution of Article 44," 9 July 2006)

Why "a special committee"?

What do we know about Dawoodi? Very little.

It is said that Dawoodi received his Ph.D. from the University of Iowa in 1981.

(Does Iran have any economist in a top economic position who has not been trained in the United States? Good grief. Ebrahim Sheibany, Governor of the Central Bank, has a Ph.D. from Indiana University; Mohammadreza Shojaeddini, Vice Governor of the Central Bank on Administrative & Training Affairs, has a Ph.D. from Iowa State University and was an advisor to the IMF Director from 1998 to 2001; Akbar Komijani, Vice Governor on Economic Affairs, has a Ph.D. from University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee; Mohammad Jafar Mojarrad, Vice Governor on Foreign Exchange Affairs, has a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania.)

What else?

• Dawoodi was a professor of economics at Shahid Beheshti University and served as economic advisor to the Judiciary Chief, Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi.


• "During the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997), he was deputy minister in economic affairs of ministry of economics and finance, as well as deputy of Judiciary in economic affairs." (President Ahmadinejad Appoints First Vice-President," 11 September 2005)

Wikipedia claims that Dawoodi is very unlike Ahmadinejad in his economic vision, that he "teaches liberal economic perspectives in his classrooms," that it "is believed that his economic ideas are highly influenced by modern economic theory," and that he "is for free markets and open economies," though it doesn't cite sources for the claim.

All in all, it's a BAD sign.

Needs further investigation.

Update

Yoshie Furuhashi, "Privatization Iranian Style," Critical Montages, 14 October 2007.

Iran and Iraq

My Persian Prince ought to be careful. Sectarian foreign terrorists in Iraq, yes, must be put down, but he can lose in Iraq all the capital he earned in Palestine, if things go wrong, especially if he practices sectarianism of his own. He can't afford any ethnic insurgency at home either.

Iran, accused by the United States of stirring up an Iraqi insurgency, said on Saturday "terrorist" groups should be stopped from entering Iraq because they created an excuse for foreign troops to stay.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also said in a speech to a meeting of ministers from Baghdad's neighbours that surrounding states were committed to ensuring stability in Iraq.

"It is necessary to stop the crossing of terrorist groups into Iraq who aim at creating insecurity, hatred and differences, and pave the way for the presence of foreign forces in Iraq," Ahmadinejad told the foreign ministers in Tehran.

He did not say from where or how the groups were entering Iraq.

Washington accuses Tehran of backing anti-U.S. insurgents in Iraq, a charge Tehran denies saying the U.S. occupation is to blame for the instability.

"Stability, security and progress of Iraq strengthens stability, security and progress in the whole Islamic world," Ahmadinejad said.

"We are all committed to try to restore stability, security and progress in Iraq," he told the gathering.

Syria, which sent its foreign minister to Tehran, has also been accused by Washington of not doing enough to stop militants crossing into Iraq. Damascus insists it is doing its best.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, whose government has launched a national reconciliation plan, said on Tuesday during a tour of the region that Gulf Arab states had promised to crack down harder on funding for the Sunni Muslim insurgency.

Most Arab states are ruled by Sunni Arabs, the majority sect within Islam, and some of these view with suspicion Iraq's Shi'ite majority. Non-Arab Iran is also mainly Shi'ite.

Iraqi officials have said some Iraqi insurgents have asked other Arab states to act as mediators following the government's offer of dialogue to end the violence.

Ministers and officials from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey were among those attending the meeting, as well as Egypt, which does not share a border with Iraq. Arab League chief Amr Moussa also attended.

Ahmadinejad used his speech to launch one of his regular attacks on Israel, a country his Islamic government does not recognise. He said: "The root of the problems of the Islamic world is the existence of the Zionist regime." ("Iran Says 'Terrorists' Should Not Be Let into Iraq," Reuters, 8 July 2006)

Khamenei: A Bigger Threat than Washington to Iran

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's foreign and economic policies are a bigger threat than Washington to Iran: "Iran Enters The Liberalism Era," Iran Press Service, 3 July 2006; and Karl Vick, "Ayatollah's Moves Hint Iran Wants To Engage: Supreme Leader Sets Course for WTO Membership," Washington Post, 5 July 2006, A10. Khamenei created the Strategic Council for Foreign Relations, a new organ that directly answers to him and that is "chaired by Mr. Kamal Kharrazi, the reformist Foreign Affairs minister of the former moderate president Mohammad Khatami," and issued a directive to privatize 80% of major state enterprises. As Iran Press Service and the Washington Post correctly observe, both moves are meant to check Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has come to overshadow Khamenei and other clerical gerontocrats and representatives of bazaari interests in the minds of the economically disenfranchised in Iran.

The drive toward privatization in Iran is not new. The first decade of the Islamic Republic set up what might be called an Islamic welfare state, but the welfare state has been steadily chipped away since the beginning of the Rafsanjani years, and the ascendancy of neoliberal reformists during the Khatami era accelerated the attack on it, which culminated in the Iranian parliament's amendments of Articles 43 and 44 of the Iranian Constitution in 2004. It is true that, in contrast to the most radical neoliberals in Iran and the West, Khamenei and his allied clerics were a little more wary of destroying the welfare state (without which, after all, support for the clerical rule may completely melt down) too rapidly, but the neolibeal reforms during the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations, as well as the constitutional amendments, would not have happened without Khamenei's support for them.

However, Western imperialism and its manufactured "crisis" over Iran's nuclear technology development postponed the domestic class conflict (or, more precisely, a political faction fight rooted in class contradiction, which is fought very subtly), for Washington never made clear to Khamenei that it would make a deal with him. It still hasn't, but Khamenei wants to make sure that Ahmadinejad will not displace him and demote clerical rule through passive revolution, so Khamenei has taken chances.

Ahmadinejad is not without resources. The day after Khamenei's announcement of privatization, the President submitted a plan that is intended to moderate its radical character:

Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei on Monday accepted a request from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to cede 50 percent of shares of state-run enterprises by installment to provincial investment cooperatives and the two lowest-level income groups of the society.

The Supreme Leader issued executive order for privatization drive on Sunday in line with Article 44 of the Constitution and said that the plan will help speed up economic development, social justice and elimination of poverty.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Supreme Leader made it clear that share prices should be determined in the Stock Exchange and the two lowest level income groups in the poverty line would be given 50 percent discount and their payment should be made on a 10-year installment. ("Supreme Leader Accepts President's Request on Privatization," IRNA, 3 July 2006)

But that will only slow down the process of privatization, for the poor and provincial cooperatives who get the shares will be allowed to sell them on the market after four years as it is currently planned (and they will, on terms disadvantageous to them).

In that intervening period, it may be possible, however, for the masses to push Ahmadinejad to modify the plan further (e.g., prohibiting the sale of shares).

Besides, the conflict with the West will also slow things down. The Washington power elite, both Republican and Democrat, tend to be keener on ideology and geopolitics than economics per se when it comes to Iran in particular and the Middle East in general (unlike their relatively flexible attitude toward China), so Khamenei's WTO dream may not come about in any case.

Gone with the Wind, Remade by Lars von Trier

It would be interesting if Lars von Trier remade Gone with the Wind. He could pick the elements that are already in the book and/or the film, sharpen the characters' political differences, change the plot, film it from slaves' and ex-slaves' points of view, and add voiceover narration by John Hurt.

Ashley Wilkes is a southern plantation master and member of the Ku Klax Klan, attached to the Lost Cause. Rhett Butler is a businessman from a big city, who knows that the South would lose the war, is not attached to the Lost Cause, would rather do business with Yankees than fight them, but is not about to become a race traitor either. Scarlett O'Hara is presented with two ruling-class political visions. She is first attracted to Ashley's, and then she becomes disillusioned with it, as Ashleys of the South restore white supremacy with terrorism. She embraces Rhett's as the "progressive" political alternative to Ashley's, only to be disillusioned with it, too, as Rhetts of the South decide to live with white restoration rather than build a "new South." She moves back to Tara, alone, and tries to manage it according to her "new South" principle, only to find her plantation threatened to be taken over by a joint-stock company in which Ashley and Rhett have major interests, for her "new South" plantation is boycotted by Ashleys and Rhetts of the South. Then, the film quotes Scarlett's famous soliloquy, substituting Tara for Rhett: "I can't let Tara go. I can't. There must be some way to keep it. Oh I can't think about this now! I'll go crazy if I do! I'll think about it tomorrow. But I must think about it. I must think about it. What is there to do? What is there that matters?" Scarlett's face dissolves into a montage of scenes that show her new management style, in keeping with what it takes to keep her plantation and make it prosper, which in turn dissolves into a montage of modern plantations and sweatshops in America and the rest of the world.

But von Trier has already made a film like that; it's called Manderlay.

Venezuelan President due in Iran in Late July

Our man in Venezuela never disappoints. IRNA reports that he will arrive in Iran soon and talk with Ahmadinejad about not only energy cooperation but also "transfer of Iran's peaceful nuclear technology to its allies."

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez begins an official three-leg visit to Iran, North Korea and Vietnam in late July.

The Persian-language daily `Etemad' on Saturday quoted the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry as saying Chavez is expected to meet with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his visit.

The two presidents, in their upcoming meeting, will discuss bilateral ties and cooperation particularly in the energy field.

Meanwhile, Iranian Ambassador to Caracas Ahmad Sobhani also said that Chavez, during his Tehran visit, will undoubtedly raise the issue of transfer of Iran's peaceful nuclear technology to its allies. ("Venezuelan President due in Iran in Late July," IRNA, 1 July 2006)

The best way to counter Washington's attempt to isolate, sanction, and make war on Iran is for nations allied with Iran to express their own intention to develop nuclear technology or, better yet, begin developing it already.

Ahmadinejad to Visit Iraq?

The Fars News Agency reported that Ahmadinejad is planning to visit Iraq, the first Iranian President to visit the country since the 1979 Islamic Revolution: "Ahmadinejad Due to Visit Iraq" (26 June 2006). Is it true? Dangerous, but daring. It would be a coup if he could broker an agreement among Iraqi nationalist factions of Sunnis, Shiites, and others, insurgents and parliamentarians, clerics and lay leaders, and help organize a national liberation front that uses mass actions, not just force of arms, to demand the end to the US occupation of Iraq, thus outmaneuvering Washington. But that's probably hoping too much. Besides, such an initiative would have to come from Iraqis themselves, not from Tehran. Nevertheless, one hopes that he will at least meet with Moktada al-Sadr, many of whose following probably come from Iraqi counterparts of Ahmadinejad's working-class supporters in Iran.

Confronting Bipartisan Empire: The Case of the Iran Freedom Support Act

Here's a new piece that I published in MRZine: "Confronting Bipartisan Empire: The Case of the Iran Freedom Support Act" (29 June 2006).

Ahmadinejad in the Arab Streets

Naturally, my Persian Prince is getting all the support he could want from the Arab streets. Here are voices quoted in the San Francisco Chronicle: "'He has the courage to stand up to America and Israel. What other leader in the world is doing that?' said Ahmed Yassin, a 46-year-old bank employee, as he watched friends play backgammon in a Cairo coffee house"; and "'It is Iran's right to have nuclear energy and nuclear weapons,' said Tarek Badri, 48, a Cairo construction foreman. 'Why is Israel allowed to have these weapons and Muslim countries are not allowed?'" (Dan Morrison, "Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: Voice of Iran Echoes through Arab World," 25 June 2006).

The support shows up in polls, too:

In a 2005 survey by Telhami and Zogby International, a majority of respondents in six Arab countries said they didn't believe Iran's claims that it isn't building a bomb. But 60 percent -- even in the Gulf, where anti-Shiite prejudice is strongest -- said Iran should be free of international pressure.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In a survey conducted in May by Saad's center, 79 percent of Lebanese said a nuclear-armed Iran would be good for "the Palestinian struggle against Israel." (Morrison, 25 June 2006)

The rulers of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia had better take a hint and quit siding with the West so shamelessly.

Maurice Motamed

Maurice Motamed, the lone Jewish MP in Iran's parliament, has the world's most thankless job, but he, bless him, is doing what he can as an Iranian patriot, with his integrity intact:

"When our president spoke about the Holocaust, I considered it my duty as a Jew to speak about this issue," Mr Motamed said in his office in central Tehran. "The biggest disaster in human history is based on tens of thousands of films and documents. I said these remarks are a big insult to the whole Jewish society in Iran and the whole world."

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Although he took on Mr Ahmadinejad over the Holocaust, Mr Motamed supports the president on other issues, including the stand-off with the US, Europe and Israel over the country's nuclear programme. "I am an Iranian first and a Jew second," he said.

He acknowledged there were problems with being a Jew in Iran, as there were for the country's other minorities. But he said that Iran was relatively tolerant. "There is no pressure on the synagogues, no problems of desecration. I think the problem in Europe is worse than here. There is a lot of anti-semitism in other countries." (Ewen MacAskill, Simon Tisdall, and Robert Tait, "Iran's Jews Learn to Live with Ahmadinejad," The Guardian, 27 June 2006)

According to Nasser Hadian-Jazy, a friend of the President's, Ahmadinejad promised to "do something to show he is not anti-Jewish. . . . He will make a gesture to the Jews in Iran and that has implications for Jews elsewhere" (MacAskill, Tisdall, and Tait, 27 June 2006). Whatever he has in mind, it had better be good. What about ending the exclusion of Jews and other minorities from "'sensitive' senior posts in the military and judiciary" (MacAskill, Tisdall, and Tait, 27 June 2006)?

Iran, WTO, and Gasoline

A "looming battle" over what to do with Iran's dependence on gasoline imports (a strategic liability and a development problem that must be solved) and subsidies for gasoline consumption (necessary for the Iranian working class in the short term, but undoubtedly wasteful economically and environmentally in the long term) is a tough one for the President of Iran to handle. Iran's oil minister Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh, who wasn't Ahmadinejad's choice, is a leftover from the Khatami era (a deputy oil minister at that time), and he, as well as his parliamentary allies, isn't really down with the President's economic agenda and may also be using this problem in a faction fight against the President and his allies.

• "A looming battle over those subsidies typifies Mr. Ahmadinejad's coming dilemma. In the fall, as part of its WTO obligations, the government plans to limit the amount of subsidized gasoline consumers can buy. Above that level, consumers will have to pay higher prices. That will raise the cost of living for Mr. Ahmadinejad's constituents by pushing up prices of nearly everything else in Iran's gas-guzzling economy. The government is already talking about dipping into the oil fund to continue financing the subsidies" (Bill Spindle, "Burning Oil -- Behind Rise of Iran's President: A Populist Economic Agenda; Ahmadinejad Wins Power Promising Lavish Outlays; Inflation Is a Major Worry; Crunch Time at Biscuit Factory," Wall Street Journal, Eastern ed., 22 June 2006, A.1).


• Iran could ration motorists to less than five liters of gasoline per day from September but will keep prices heavily subsidized to ward off inflation, Iran's Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh said.
  
  Vaziri-Hamaneh said earlier Iran would have to ration gasoline from September 23 after parliament slashed the budget for importing the fuel. He said gas-guzzling Iran would end petrol imports but traders said they doubted Tehran could do so.
  
  Despite holding the world's second biggest oil reserves, Iran lacks refinery capacity and imports more than 40 per cent of the 70 million litres of gasoline it burns each day.
  
  Most gasoline imports come from western Europe, with trading house Vitol the leading supplier, market sources said. India has also featured as a key exporter, at times supplying up to 25,000 bpd.
  
  International traders watch major gasoline importer Iran closely for any sign of fluctuations in demand, but doubt the Islamic Republic will have the political courage to aggravate motorists by halting its 15 monthly tanker shipments.
  
  'Each car will receive a ration of less than five liters if rationing happens,' state television quoted Vaziri-Hamaneh as saying. 'Only taxis and public transport will receive more than the ration.'
  
  The government, in which Vaziri-Hamaneh is the most powerful minister, is due to issue its final verdict on gasoline rationing this week.
  
  Some economists had called for Iran to raise the price of gasoline to market levels or introduce a dual-pricing system under which motorists could pay unsubsidized rates for anything they bought beyond the ration. The minister dismissed this.
  
  'Announcing a sudden rise in the gasoline price will cause an inflation shock which society cannot take now,' he said, adding the real price of gasoline was 55 cents per liter, not the nine cents it fetches at pumps.
  
  Conservative Iranian politicians have dismissed fears that rationing could spark social unrest, stressing how Iranians accepted a coupon system during the 1980-1988 war against Iraq.
  
  But political analysts have expressed doubts that Iranians will be so stoical today. Most traded goods move by road and hikes in fuel prices and transportation have traditionally sparked sharp spikes in the cost of basic good.
  
  Iran's cheap gasoline culture chokes big cities with heavy pollution. Economists identify Iran's ubiquitous subsidies as one of the principal reasons for uncompetitive industry.
  
  Many officials have also argued that Tehran's dependence on imported gasoline threatens national security. It is a sensitive target for any sanctions imposed over atomic work.
  
  Iran has ambitious plans to upgrade refineries over the next five years and lift daily gasoline output to 120 million liters. But investment has been sluggish. (Reuters, "Iran Daily Petrol Ration under 5 Liters," 25 June 2006)

Ahmadinejad in Rural Iran

From Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-born Israeli analyst, one gains another glimpse of Ahmadinejad as Persian Chavez:

Through his constant trips to the provinces (13 so far), Mr. Ahmadinejad has made non-Tehranis feel as if they also belong to Iran.

More important, Mr. Ahmadinejad is putting his money where his mouth is. In his budget approved in December, expenditures in rural areas increased by as much as 180 percent in his first year as president.

The rural population in Iran likes and appreciates him for his generosity because in the years before Mr. Ahmadinejad, those outside Tehran were treated as if they were distant relatives when it came to government investment and expenditure. This appreciation of the president exists even though far more of the rural population made sacrifices for the sake of the 1979 Islamic revolution than were made by residents of Tehran.

So these days, when "their" man is in town, rural Iranians turn up in the hundreds of thousands to greet him. Many of the people want to share their problems with him. This became apparent recently when, during a trip to Golestan Province in the northeast, 135,000 letters addressed to Mr. Ahmadinejad were handed to his delegation and to him personally by people in the crowd. (Meir Javedanfar, "At Home, Iranian Leader Admired," Baltimore Sun, 25 June 2006)

WSJ: "Mr. Ahmadinejad Is Emerging as an Iranian Version of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez"

The Wall Street Journal agrees with me on one thing: "Mr. Ahmadinejad is emerging as an Iranian version of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez" (Bill Spindle, "Burning Oil -- Behind Rise of Iran's President: A Populist Economic Agenda; Ahmadinejad Wins Power Promising Lavish Outlays; Inflation Is a Major Worry; Crunch Time at Biscuit Factory," Wall Street Journal, Eastern ed., 22 June 2006, A.1) . . . except, of course, the WSJ, as well as Iranian neoliberals, doesn't like the fiscal and monetary policies of the Ahmadinejad administration:

In recent weeks, he has proposed a $4 billion national school-renovation program and has raised not only salaries for workers in Iran's vast, government-controlled industrial sector but also the minimum wage for everyone else. He doubled government grants for newlyweds and forced banks to lower interest rates by several percentage points.

Mr. Ahmadinejad is emerging as an Iranian version of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez: a pugnacious politician, buoyed by oil money, whose anti-elite message and defiance of the West is causing his popularity to soar. Mr. Ahmadinejad isn't nearly as powerful as Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But his policies, which interrupt Iran's tentative stabs at economic liberalization, have helped him wield more influence than many thought possible for an Iranian president.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In the late 1990s, under a series of reform-minded governments, Iran tried to emerge from the economic and political isolation that followed the Islamic revolution and eight years of war with Iraq. In 2001, the government adopted a 20-year plan to boost imports and exports by lowering trade barriers. The ultimate goal was to join the World Trade Organization.

One key to that plan was diversifying an economy heavily dependent on oil revenues. That means implementing a long list of free-market recommendations, including freeing up labor markets and phasing out subsidies.

Mr. Ahmadinejad's policies are rapidly reversing that tentative economic liberalization. In addition to his spending plans, his government has spurned foreign investment and recently raised tariffs on mobile-phone handsets by 60%. Another plan: doling out shares -- he calls them "Justice Shares" -- of government-controlled companies to the poor.

In Ghavart, a conservative, working-class town of 9,000 near the Jey industrial center, Mr. Ahmadinejad's pay raises and subsidies have provided relief -- for some. Hamid Kachoui, a grocer, says he's noticed customers buying extra chicken or meat recently.

"It's much better. People don't have to scrape by," said Mr. Kachoui, 18 years old, standing by a storefront stall packed with rice, bread and other staples. Many food basics are heavily subsidized by Iran's government, using oil money to bridge the gap with international market prices.

Mr. Kachoui credits the improvement to Mr. Ahmadinejad, whom he says nearly everyone in the village supported in last year's election. "With President Ahmadinejad, things will get much better," he says.

Down the road in Jey's industrial center, private biscuit maker Esfahan Farkhondeh Co. has been thrown into a crisis. Last year, the 14-year-old company produced 6,500 tons of biscuits, the kind served with tea and coffee at almost every social gathering in Iran. A few months ago, new laws pushed up the minimum salary for most of the industrial bakery's workers by nearly 50%. The others got 22% raises, according to Mohammed Reza Vaez Shoushtari, an owner and manager.

Meanwhile, the government lowered subsidies on sugar and flour bought by industrial bakers, a nod to Iran's designs on joining the WTO. "Biscuits are not a necessity for people," says Mr. Shoushtari, suggesting a reason why his industry was singled out. The government left subsidies for retail consumers unchanged.

The decision pushed up the price of the two main ingredients in the company's biscuits. The company's bank tightened loan requirements after government-mandated interest-rate cuts and now won't extend additional money to keep the company operating.

Pinched, the biscuit concern informed buyers it would raise prices by 15%. They immediately cancelled about 80% of their orders, Mr. Shoushtari says. He figured most were delaying purchases to see if the government will reverse its decision on the subsidies. Without the ability to fire workers, he plans to wait, hoping the business climate stabilizes.

"When the president changes, the country always becomes a bit chaotic," he says.

For the year that ended March, 2006, Iran is projected to have earned about $49 billion selling oil and natural gas, more than double its take of four years ago, primarily because of rising prices. Much of the president's spending is coming from Iran's Oil Stabilization Fund, which is supposed to pay for long-term infrastructure projects or to buoy the country if oil revenues falter. Iran has dipped into the fund almost every year to fill holes in the government budget. Last year, it spent $7.7 billion from the fund, much of it for government subsidies on basic products, from wheat to gasoline.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


Few things appealed more to Iranian voters, especially the working poor, than Mr. Ahmadinejad's promise to "put the oil revenue on the dinner table of every Iranian." Since being elected, he's made frequent trips to Iranian provinces -- political barnstorming previously unheard of in Iran's aloof theocracy. He encourages supporters to write with their requests and has promised funds for thousands of local projects.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Indeed, Mr. Ahmadinejad's standing among the poor and working class has allowed him to challenge domestic foes, including many in the clerical establishment, throwing Iran's political establishment off balance in ways few expected. With 17-hour workdays and a reputation for rectitude, Mr. Ahmadinejad has refashioned a post with few formal powers. The parliament, more representative of Iran's conservative establishment, has tried to parry Mr. Ahmadinejad's activism, rejecting three of his candidates for oil minister as well as nominees for other important economic portfolios.

But he's stunned Tehran's political elite by winning many battles. He has replaced several senior clergymen in the Ministry of Culture with non-clerical allies, apparently with the blessing of the Ayatollah Khamenei, a senior cleric himself. While less important than the Supreme Leader, Iran's president holds considerable influence over economic and social policies through his ability to nominate the heads of government ministries. He also appoints the head of the central bank.

To outsiders trying to penetrate Iran's opaque political system, it's still unclear whether the president remains under the control of the clerical establishment or whether this is a genuine bid for power.

"Everybody's too busy just trying to catch up with him," says Nasser Hadian, a political science professor at Tehran University and childhood schoolmate of Mr. Ahmadinejad. Although he disagrees with many of the president's policies, he grudgingly admires the way he has shaken up Iran's political culture. "He's challenging the entire spectrum of society, from the super-secular to the super-religious." (Spindle, 22 June 2006)

Persian Chavez

How's my Persian Chavez doing lately? The Guardian says he's popular like our man in Venezuela:

The popularity of Iran's controversial leader, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is surging almost a year after he unexpectedly won closely contested presidential elections, Iranian officials and western diplomats said on Tuesday.

Attributing his success to his populist style and fortnightly meet-the-people tours of the country, the sources said, as matters stand, Mr Ahmadinejad was the clear favourite to win a second term in 2009. The perception that the president was standing up to the US over the nuclear issue was also boosting his standing.

"He's more popular now than a year ago. He's on the rise," said Nasser Hadian-Jazy, a professor of political science at Tehran University. "I guess he has a 70% approval rating right now. He portrays himself as a simple man doing an honest job. He's comfortable communicating with ordinary people." (Ewen MacAskill and Simon Tisdall, "Ahmadinejad 'Has 70% Approval Rating,'" The Guardian, 20 June 2006)

Naturally, I'm very pleased to hear this. Now, like Chavez, Ahmadinejad has to think about what to do with the term limits thingy.

The neoliberal "reformists" are correct, however, that the President of Iran has yet to get control of the oil industry (headed by a leftover from the Khatami years) and the Central Bank (staffed by US-trained economists) in Iran -- even the Parliament, let alone the Guardian and Expediency councils, is not quite on his side on structural economic changes beyond fiscal policy:

Mohammad Atrianfar, founder of the leading reformist newspaper Shargh and an ally of Hashemi Rafsanjani, the president's rival, said Mr Ahmadinejad would not have it all his own way. "The reform movement is alive, despite last year's defeat," he said, although he added it would take some time to regroup. Meanwhile, the government was mishandling economic policy, and that could be its undoing.

"The present economy, due to the rate of oil prices, is in a good situation. But the management of the state sector is very bad. I can compare him to a wicked child who has inherited a large amount of money and goes on a spending spree. He has taken horrid and rushed decisions."

Mr Atrianfar said that windfall oil revenue was being squandered through state handouts to impoverished provinces and commodity subsidies. But there was insufficient investment in long-term projects and infrastructure, foreign investment was falling, and the country was suffering capital flight and a brain drain. (MacAskill and Tisdall, 20 June 2006)

I added this bit from IRNA to Rostam Pourzal's latest that I published in MRZine:

"President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad . . . criticized the ongoing privatization scheme, which has turned into a means for the 'looting of national wealth.'

'I've heard that a factory, worth rls 300 billion (USD 32.715 million), is offered at rls 1.050 billion (USD 114,504) . . . . Had the law allowed, we would have given the production unit to laborers free of charge so that it would both remain active and earn profit for the government,' said Ahmadinejad in a speech to the locals.

He said his government does support private investment and business, while believing that the policy should not encourage bankruptcy of workshops, low production, lay-offs and plunder of national wealth.

He insisted, 'The Iranian nation does not accept the sort of privatization at all'" ("Ahmadinejad Protests Plundering National Wealth," IRNA, 9 June 2006).

I hope that, soon, he will be so popular that the Majlis, the Guardian Council, etc. will be compelled to go along and he will be able to pass a law that would allow laborers to get factories free of charge and run them.

Iran at the World Cup

I watched the World Cup match of Iran and Mexico -- two peoples with whom Washington is at odds! -- with my Iranian friends (mainly men).

Not knowing anything about Iranian football, before the match began, I told my friends to point out to me cute guys on the Iranian squad, so I would know where to focus. My friends said that Mehdi Mahdavi-Kia is good-looking, though I thought that Vahid Hashemian and Ebrahim Mirzapour (who turned out to be one of the players responsible for Iran's defeat!) are more appealing. But none of the Iranians is as pretty as Rafael Marquez. Naturally, my sympathies were torn. After the President of Iran issued a decree allowing women to attend sports events at stadiums, Iran's ruling clerics immediately vetoed it: "[W]hen Ahmedinejad made his announcement it forced the clerics to take a position and they said women couldn't look at the naked legs and arms of the male players" (Jafar Panahi, qtd. in Frances Harrison, "Iran's Female Fans Yet to Win Equality," BBC News, 6 June 2006). Yes, indeed, only MEN can appreciate the naked legs and arms of other MEN! What the clerics truly fear, however, might be that female fans might find guys on the other team cuter than guys on their team.

Iran held its ground in the first half; but, in the second half, the Iranian team was on the defensive from the beginning, and the team's morale seemed to collapse after Mexico scored its second goal, and then the team allowed Mexico to score an easy third goal. According to my Iranian friends, that's typical of Iranian football: losing confidence altogether after losing a little. Today, Iran is playing against Portugal. Iran, once again, held its own in the first half: 0-0. But now at 86 minutes it's Portugal 2 - Iran 0. Is there a pattern here? I hope that's not a bad political omen!

The way the Iranians are playing, I suppose the high point of Iranian footballers will remain its 1998 World Cup victory over the American team in the near future, though it must be mentioned that Iran has not recovered from Ali Karimi's injury.

We watched the Iran-Mexico match on ABC, at a viewing party (big screens under a tent outside the Columbus Crew Stadium) provided by the Columbus Crew. It should be noted that, whenever Mexico scored, the camera showed ordinary Mexican men and women jumping up and down and cheering for their team in Mexico City, but it refused to show comparable scenes from Tehran or even the Iranian diaspora when the Iranian team did score its one and only goal that day. That sort of prejudice motivated by American geopolitics, however, did not manifest itself at all among local football fans. Mainly Iranians showed up at the viewing party, but there were also some Mexicans and Somalis (two of the largest immigrant communities in Columbus, Ohio) and Anglos, aside from me and a guy from Bangladesh. During the halftime break, some of them were playing football together, having a good time. "Divide and conquer" doesn't always work!

Whither Team Melli? Abbas Kiarostami, a renowned Iranian film maker, said: "I hope that we'll beat Angola at least". I wished, though, that Iran had been able to get to the Round of 16 -- as Kiarostami noted, the Iranians "need something to cheer about".

Fanaa and Kashmir; Aamir Khan, Narmada, and the BJP

Watch Fanaa if it comes to a theater near you, out of solidarity with Aamir Khan if nothing else.

Apparently, the BJP is angered by Khan, the handsome star of Fanaa (who plays Rehan Qadri, a Kashmiri boy who is serving in the Indian military but secretly working for the Kashmiri independence movement -- Rehan gets betrayed and killed by his love Zooni, a Kashmiri girl who is "a patriotic Indian," choosing "her country" over her man), because he supported the anti-Narmada Dam campaign; and the party wants to ban it in Gujarat.

• Anti-Narmada dam agitators, sitting on Dharna and hunger strike at the Jantar Mantar Road in New Delhi for past 20 days demanding that the height of the dam not be raised, got a shot in the arm when leading film actor Aamir Khan paid them a visit on Friday.
  
  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  
  Aamir listened to the grievances of the agitators with patience but did not utter a word. Clad in black T-shirt and jeans, the film actor also visited the 1984 Bhopal gas victims who have been demonstrating for release of relief fund.
  
  "Last week when I was in Delhi, I passed by Jantar Mantar and was told about the two campaigns. I decided to come back and learn more about their problems," he later told reporters.
  
  Khan said he was pained upon learning of the sufferings of the dam displacees. "I do not know about the technicalities involved in raising the height of the dam. What I do know is that farmers have been displaced from their land and they have lost their livelihood. Till the people who have already been displaced by the dam are not rehabilitated, the height of the dam should not be raised." (Onkar Singh, "Aamir Lends Support to Narmada Campaign," Rediff, 14 April 2006)


• Aamir Khan addressed a press conference outside his home in Khar, north Mumbai, saying he will not apologise about his comments on the Narmada issue.
  
  "I am saying exactly what the Supreme Court has said. I only asked for rehabilitation of poor farmers. I never spoke against the construction of the dam. I will not apologise for my comments on the issue," he says. (Rediff Entertainment Bureau, "Aamir on Narmada: I Won't Apologise," Rediff 25 May 2006)


• Describing the virtual ban on screening Fanaa in Gujarat as an indication of "extreme intolerance" displayed by the ruling party and its organisations in Gujarat to any dissent, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) demanded that the Modi Government uphold the law of the land.
  
  In a statement, the party Polit Bureau said the reported assurance by Chief Minister Narendra Modi of police protection to cinemas showing the film was an eye-wash as it was under his leadership that front organisations of the Sangh combine were threatening cinema owners against showing the film.
  
  The ire of the protesters was against the solidarity expressed by actor Aamir Khan with the demand for rehabilitation of thousands of tribals and peasant families displaced by the Narmada project. ("CPI(M) Flays Ban on Fanaa in Gujarat," The Hindu, 26 May 2006)


• The controversial Aamir Khan film Fanaa was released in Gujarat on Tuesday in the presence of a strong police contingent in a single cinema owned by a high-profile Congress family. (Manas Dasgupta, "Fanaa Released in Gujarat amid Security," The Hindu, 7 June 2006)