Showing posts with label Palestine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Palestine. Show all posts

Saturday, August 15, 2009

Be Fire with Fire

Imperialists are obviously not up to the task when it comes to fighting al Qaeda and its ilk. Nor are international leftists, no matter how many tracts against imperialism and Islamism they publish. I suggest that, more often than not, it takes a mass Islamist organization to liquidate terrorist Islamist cells and neutralize international Islamist jihads: Avi Issacharoff, "Hamas: We Killed Head of Al-Qaida Affiliate in Gaza" (Haaretz, 15 August 2009). "Be stirring as the time; be fire with fire." -- Shakespeare, The Life and Death of King John, Act 5, Scene 1

Thursday, January 22, 2009

Israel: A State of Irresponsibility

Look for "Gaza" and "collateral damage" in Google News now, and you'll get 640 results (as of 22 January 2009, 8:15 PM). Search for "Gaza" and "human shield," and you'll get 6,741 results. That does not bode well for Israel.

"Collateral damage" and "human shield" are, among other things, both terms employed by belligerents to excuse themselves of responsibility for civilian casualties they caused. But they are not the same excuse.

The idea of "collateral damage" says that we aimed to kill enemy combatants but have ended up accidentally killing hapless civilians, too, who happened to be in a wrong place at a wrong time. The deaths of civilians, for which no one can be held responsible, are to be regretted.

The idea of "human shield," on the other hand, says that it is enemy combatants who caused not only deaths of civilians on our side but those on their own side as well. In the case of Gaza, it goes like this:
Hamas uses despicable tactics -- such as targeting Israeli civilians while using Palestinian civilians as human shields. As a result, the Israeli Defense Forces are forced to combat the terror infrastructure in the midst of the civilian Palestinian population. This leads to pain and suffering not only on the Israeli side, but also to innocent Palestinians, who are forced by means of violence and dictatorship to collaborate with Hamas and its commanders. (Histadrut -- General Federation of Labour in Israel)
Israeli civilians killed by Hamas = Hamas's responsibility.
Palestinian civilians killed by Israel = Hamas's responsibility.

In short, Israel is proclaiming to the world: it is irresponsible, less by accident ("We are not responsible for accidental collateral damage") than by nature ("Hamas made us do it, whatever it is. We are helpless. Israel is a victim of Hamas, and so are Palestinian civilians"), and all responsibility belongs to its enemy.

Israel says it wants the world, including Arabs, to recognize its right to exist -- in other words, it wants legitimacy in the eyes of the world and normal relations with other states, especially Arab states. Arabs, however, must wonder: Israel takes no responsibility for the choices it has made -- the choice to occupy other people's territories, the choice to keep building settlements on them, the choice to blockade and impoverish people, the choice to make war to begin with and the choice to bomb schools and other civilian infrastructure in the course of it. Should a state that claims only rights and no responsibility enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of the world? Should the state of irresponsibility be normalized?

And it is not just Arabs who wonder about such questions. In one European Commission survey, taken a little over a year after Israel's "Operation Defensive Shield," during which it reduced Jenin to rubble, nearly 60% of the respondents said: "Israel is the greatest threat to world peace." Imagine how many more will say so after Gaza.

Saturday, September 20, 2008

Iran, Syria, and Israel: War and Peace in the Middle East

With America busy nationalizing its mountains of bad debts, ever more dependent on capital import from East Asia and major oil exporters, will peace finally break out in the Middle East? If yes, what kind of "peace" will it be? If no, then what?

Several possibilities:
  1. Syria makes peace with Israel without extracting concessions from it (in which case the leader of Syria can get assassinated like Sadat), and Iran, now without its closest ally,1 will become the last defender of the heart -- Palestine -- of the Arab cause (to the chagrin of Iranian liberals and anti-Shia Arab sectarians).

  2. Both Iran and Syria make peace with Israel without extracting concessions from it,2 and the Palestinian people will become a homeless orphan in the Middle East (in which case the leaders of Iran and Syria can both get assassinated like Sadat).

  3. Both Iran and Syria make peace with Israel, having extracted concessions (which can get the leader of Israel assassinated -- Rabin was for only seeming to make a concession) from it that would allow the Palestinian people to establish a state (which will be to Israel at best what Mexico -- the provider of cheap labor and natural resources -- is to the United States3).

  4. Iran, Syria, and Israel settle for "cold peace": no normalization, but mutual self-restraint (i.e., both Israel and Hezbollah focus more on their respective domestic politics than on each other).

  5. Israel, having acquired 1,000 Boeing GBU-39 smart bombs (so-called bunker busters4) from the USA, attacks Hezbollah again.

  6. Israel, having successfully bombed Syria and having acquired 1,000 Boeing GBU-39 smart bombs from the USA, bombs Iran, too, and all hell breaks loose.
2, 3, 5, and 6 are much less likely than 1 and 4.


1 Sarkozy's Mediterranean Union is a far more successful first step in this direction than Bush's Annapolis.

2 That would be the final realization of a new Middle East as envisioned by the United States government:
A central component of this vision is the normalization and integration of Israel into the Middle East. The US envisions a Middle East resting upon Israeli capital in the West and Gulf capital in the East, underpinning a low-wage, neoliberal zone that spans the region. What this means is that Israel's historic destruction of Palestinian national rights must be accepted and blessed by all states in the region. (Adam Hanieh, "Palestine in the Middle East: Opposing Neoliberalism and US Power: Part 1," MRZine, 19 July 2008)
3 The Israeli vision of a Palestinian state looks like this:
Dov Lautman, the former president of the Association of Israeli Industrialists and one of the owners of "Delta-Galil Industries," stated in a meeting with Palestinian manufacturers in 1993: "The important issue is not whether a Palestinian state, an autonomy, or a Palestinian-Jordanian state is established, the important thing is that the economic borders between Israel and the territories remain open." For Lautman, and many others, economic relations between the states of Israel and Palestine should be modeled after "the free trade agreement that exists between Mexico and the U.S." For him (and others), there was no doubt as to who would play the role of the United States and who, the role of Mexico. (endnotes omitted, Efraim Davidi, "The Sewing Factory in Gaza, the Administration in Tel-Aviv, and the Owners in New York: Israeli Industrialists' Strategy in the Global Supply Chain," MRZine, 18 May 2006)
4 I say "so-called," for GBU39s are said to have an ability to penetrate only six feet of concrete. Therefore,
the GBU-39 would have limited utility against deeply-buried, hardened targets like those at Iran's nuclear research facilities. Covered by layers of concrete and earth, some of the research labs at Natanz (and other locations) are at least 30 feet underground, and perhaps as deep as 60 feet. ("The Consolation Acquisition," In from the Cold, 15 September 2008)
They represent a powerful threat against Hezbollah, but they are of uncertain utility against Iran.

Sunday, August 10, 2008

Mahmoud Darwish

Celebrated Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish died on 9 August 2008, at the age of 67, after open-heart surgery. Here is a video of his most famous poem "Identity Card" (published in 1964):

A poet of exile par excellence, Darwish died in exile. The village of his birth in western Galilee, al-Birwa (whose Arabic name is said to have been first recorded in Persian poet and traveler Nasser Khosro's Safarnameh), had been demolished, in whose place Moshav Ahihud was built in 1950.

Simone Bitton's 1997 documentary film Mahmoud Darwich: As the Land Is the Language traces some of the paths of Darwish's exile.

Mahmoud Darwich, et la terre comme la langue




Mahmoud Darwish, who refused to rest in peace without justice in his life, will now wander in the hearts of people, not only the Palestinians, but all who have been made homeless by the relentless drive to displacement and dispossession that is the engine of capitalist modernity.

Thursday, May 22, 2008

In Lebanon, the Spectre of Peace

In Lebanon, the Spectre of Peace
by Alain Campiotti

Hezbollah is the big winner in the accord on Lebanon signed in Doha, Qatar. But everyone -- including Washington -- is welcoming this asymmetrical compromise. Why? Hard bargaining is underway. . . .

In the Middle East, neither the worst nor the best is ever certain. But what happened in Doha, the capital of Qatar, on Wednesday, at 3 o'clock in the morning, is a historic event. The accord putting an end -- for now -- to the political crisis that tore Lebanon for the past eighteen months (and many more in fact) contains a tough lesson for the West: its weakened friends in Beirut had to bend themselves to the force of Hezbollah and its allies Amal, another Shi'i party, and the Christians led by Michel Aoun. The Party of God will enter the government without laying down its arms, as a minority with veto power.

A peculiar defeat, however: it is welcomed everywhere, except in Israel, which exhausted itself in a war against Hezbollah less than two years ago. Iran under Imam Khamenei, whose politico-religious tutelage the leadership of the Lebanese Islamist party accepts, and its ally Syria welcomed the Doha accord. But France has also applauded, and US Assistant Secretary of State David Welch has endorsed "this necessary and positive step." At the same time, George Bush has continued (last week in Jerusalem again) to denounce Hezbollah as a "terrorist organization"! But the stubborn Texan is on the way out.

If the rivals in Beirut have accepted a compromise whose terms were dictated by the opposition months ago, it's because their guardians (Tehran and Damascus on one hand and Washington, and Paris in its shadow, on the other hand) have given their green light. Why this sort of unanimity?

Rami Khouri, a Palestinian professor at the American University of Beirut and one of the best analysts in the region, advances this hypothesis: this extraordinary development perhaps means the emergence of "the first unspoken US-Iranian condominium in the Arab world."

After the "Cedar Revolution" of 2005, the United States and its friends wanted, through the United Nations, to disarm Hezbollah. An impossible task, save surrender. And ten days ago, the Islamist party demonstrated that it could, by force, impose its will on the government that intended to deprive it of its independent telephone network.

But the Shi'i militants used their weapons. There have been roughly 80 deaths. The inter-communal tensions instantly heightened to a dangerous level. The leaders of Hezbollah are no fools. They know they cannot impose their control on Lebanon against more than a half of its population. They have therefore accepted an accord, which is very favorable, with the opponents who are in a state of weakness. A two-sided government will be established, with each side supported by the leading powers of the region: America and the Gulf states on one side, Iran and Syria on the other.

In the immediate future, the Doha arrangement will allow the election, on Sunday without doubt, of General Michel Suleiman, head of the army, who remained neutral in the recent incidents to the Presidency of the Republic. He is a Maronite Christian, he was appointed to his post when the Syrians dominated Lebanon, he gets on quite well with everyone. The general was the compromise candidate on whom all parties agreed at the end of last year. But the opposition, dominated by Hezbollah, put down a condition: before the vote of the assembly, the Party of God wanted assurances that it would control one third of ministerial portfolios, which would allow it to veto the decisions of the government that displeased it. The party laid down this demand after withdrawing its ministers in November 2006: it wanted then -- like Syria -- to oppose the formation of an international tribunal to try the assassins of former Sunni Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. And it wanted to protect its weapons.

Given the balance of power in Beirut, Arab mediators, led by Qatar, accepted Hezbollah's conditions. The current majority will have sixteen ministers, the opposition will get eleven, and the new president will appoint three. The Party of God obtains the veto power it wanted. It also demanded, in view of the elections next year, a new electoral law in an attempt to expand its representation. Fierce discussions lasted until early morning yesterday: Saad Hariri, pallid son of the assassinated head of state, wanted to save a maximum of 19 seats in the parliament in Beirut, all of which he controls today.

Is it a coincidence that the Qatar arrangement fell on the same day when Ehud Olmert announced that "indirect" negotiations with Syria (but two delegations are in Ankara) started through the good offices of Turkey? This new approach has been strongly encouraged by the United States. At the same time, serious negotiations continue in Cairo to try to reach a ceasefire in Gaza, and discreet contacts with Hamas are multiplying.

Naturally, everything can turn upside down again in a clash of arms. But hard bargaining, crisscross, is underway. And in the United States, Barack Obama (who is not the candidate of Hamas!) said, without spelling it out, while thinking hard, that all diplomatic avenues must be followed to take the edge off the game in the Middle East . . . and to exit Iraq.

The original article in French was published in Le Temps on 22 May 2008. Translation by Yoshie Furuhashi.

Thursday, May 15, 2008

Thursday, April 10, 2008

Russia's Role in the Middle East

Moscow is said to be planning to sponsor a Middle East peace conference of its own. Will this Russian-sponsored conference take off? If so, when? And who will be invited? The New York Sun claims that Russia may invite Hamas: Benny Avni, "Hamas Could Be Included in Moscow Parley" (10 April 2008). If that happens, the conference will be an important event; if not, it won't be very different from Annapolis in terms of lack of progress one way or another, though it will certainly be free from Washington's anti-Iran campaign which was the unstated aim of the US-sponsored conference last year, a fact that is significant in itself. (It will be even more momentous if Russia can bring Iran and Israel to the same table, along with Hamas and Hizballah, though that can't happen now.)

Hamas delegates, on Russian President Vladimir Putin's invitation, visited Moscow in March 2006, and in March this year Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met Hamas leader Khaled Meshal in Syria, so the inclusion of Hamas is not out of question. But if Hamas were going to be invited, Washington would be vigorously opposed to the idea, whereas Igor Neverov, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's North America Department, claims it isn't according to a 10 April 2008 Kommersant article "Russia's Role in Middle East Discussed" (though he may have said what he said because he was speaking in Jerusalem).

Monday, March 31, 2008

Al Dhameer Al Arabi

Watch a video of "Al Dhameer Al Arabi," The Arab Conscience, produced and directed by Ahmed Al Arian, featuring 106 Arab singers. Much of the video cuts back and forth between harrowing images of deaths and destructions inflicted upon Arabs by American and Israeli wars and occupations, from Iraq to Lebanon to Palestine, and shots of singers reminding the audience that Arabs must overcome the game of divide and conquer played by the empire.

The only source of pride for Arabs today, as suggested by the video, is Hizballah. Arabs who listen to this song must go beyond its pan-Arabist framework and consider why the only governments in the Middle East that are giving material support to Hizballah are the governments of Iran and Syria. When the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon began, the governments of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia were in fact quick to condemn Hizballah till the overwhelming Arab support for the Party of God forced them to retreat, at least in rhetoric. Hamas's breach of the Egyptian border to break the siege of Gaza in January this year also briefly highlighted the Egyptian government's role in imprisoning Palestinians under the Israeli occupation. The same role is played by the other pro-American Arab governments as well, albeit less visibly.

Arabs who care about Palestine and admire Hizballah, a majority of common people in the Arab world, therefore must reject the empire's attempt to pit Sunnis against Shi'is and Arabs against Iranians and establish new governments in their own countries that actually reflect the Arab public opinion.

By the same token, Iranians mustn't fall for an illusion that, if they abandon Hamas and Hizballah and help the Americans in Iraq, the empire will make peace with them. It won't.

Now, an aside to Western leftists. Western leftists must stop and think about who in Iran are the least enthusiastic about supporting Hamas and Hizballah: secular and religious liberals who solicit the support of the West in the name of human rights and democracy, the very type of people whom Western leftists professed to love. The only thought about Palestine that occurs to Iranian liberals, in Iran as well as in the diaspora, is usually "a waste of money" (the same thought that Russian liberals thought under the Soviet government as they contemplated the expenses of the Soviet Union's international commitments). A line from a Persian band Kiosk's song "Eshgh-e Sorat," Love for Speed, speaks for them: "scraped up the very last dime / sent it all to Palestine."

The most fervently anti-Arab Iranians, dogmatic secularists, even think that their nation began a long decline when Arabs conquered Persia and brought Islam to its people.

In conclusion, all major problems for Arabs and Iranians -- the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the US occupation of Iraq, the US-Israeli threat to Iran -- really require regional, not national, solutions. Whether such regional solutions can be found depends on whether Arabs and Iranians can learn to collaborate with each other in search of them and include both Turks and Kurds as part of their common regional project in the end.

Thursday, March 06, 2008

F-16 Missiles Destroy the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions Headquarters

Two F-16 missiles destroyed "the five-storey headquarters of the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions," killing one and injuring 37, "mostly women and children" (Mohammed Omer, "Missile Goes Down a Union's Throat," IPS 4 March 2008). Hear the sound of silence from the labor wing of the empire?

Why would top US union officials lift a finger? They are busy investing American workers' pension funds into Israeli bonds.
The AFL-CIO's support for Israel is monetary as well as rhetorical. The federation is the largest non-Jewish holder of Israeli bonds in the world, according to a report by Lenni Brenner in the June/July 1997 issue of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. AFL-CIO affiliates have more than $300 million in Israeli bonds invested in pension funds. In all, the US labor community holds $5 billion worth of Israeli bonds, according to Jerry Goodman, director of the National Committee for Labor Israel. (Lauren Anzaldo, "Labor for Palestine," Left Turn, 1 August 2005)
The only trade unionists in the Middle East whom the labor wing of the empire pretend to really care about are Iranians, for whom they are holding a "Global Day of Action" today (who knew besides me?) -- not that they can mobilize more than a handful of American workers, who are having trouble standing up for their own rights, for that.

What's really funny is that they claim, among other things, that "a mass rally or march" for Iranian workers is planned in "the West Bank" (see the "Worldwide Update" on the International Transport Workers' Federation's Iran campaign page)!

Worldwide Update

Needless to say, there is no "Global Day of Action" organized by the empire's trade union bureaucracy in opposition to the sanctions on Iran, even though the sanctions hurt Iran's working class more than its ruling class and the third round of sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council just now is especially dangerous, authorizing cargo inspection that may trigger a military attack on Iran (see Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, "UN Deepens the Iran Nuclear Crisis," Asia Times, 5 March 2008; Siddharth Varadarajan, "The U.N. Is Escalating the Iran Nuclear Crisis," The Hindu, 5 March 2008; and Mohammad Kamaali, "The Politics of Non-Proliferation", MRZine, 6 March 2008).

Far from it, some of the worst US union officials are augmenting the sanctions on Iran by calling for divestment from the country: e.g., "Hoffa Calls on Pension Funds to Divest in Companies Conducting Business in Iran" (Teamster.org, 22 August 2007).

In striking contrast, a who's who of US labor officialdom, including AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney and Change to Win Chair Anna Burger, issued a joint statement opposing boycotts of and divestment from Israel last year, criticizing the few progressive trade unions that had come out in support of Palestinian workers calling for them to end the Israeli occupation: "Statement of Opposition to Divestment from or Boycotts of Israel" (July 2007).

Oppose the boycotts of and divestment from Israel which a majority of Palestinian workers support; support the economic sanctions on Iran which a majority of Iranian workers oppose. That's the logic of labor imperialism.

Sunday, March 02, 2008

"Why Have Moderate Reformers Failed So Uniformly across the Middle East?"

Patrick Cockburn, in his review of Robin Wright's Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East, asks: "Why have moderate reformers failed so uniformly across the Middle East?"
Opening on an optimistic note, [Robin] Wright describes how in 1983 she stood across the street from the ruins of the United States Embassy in Beirut after more than 60 Americans had been killed by a suicide bomber. At that time, she recalls, it seemed that Islamic fundamentalists had the initiative and were shaping the future of the region. "Yet a generation later," she writes, "Islamic extremism is no longer the most important, interesting or dynamic force in the Middle East."

It would be good if this were true, but in general the stories Wright relates of brave reformers battling for human and civil rights show them as having had depressingly small influence. She claims there is "a budding culture of change" represented by "defiant judges in Cairo, rebel clerics in Tehran, satellite television station owners in Dubai, imaginative feminists in Rabat and the first female candidates in Kuwait, young techies in Jeddah, daring journalists in Beirut and Casablanca, and brave writers and businessmen in Damascus." Sadly, her own research largely contradicts this thesis. Of the many opponents of the status quo she writes about, the only ones to have achieved a measure of success are religious movements: Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank and Hezbollah in Lebanon. She does not cover Pakistan, but the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi in December shows that suicide bombers retain their deadly ability to shape events. (Patrick Cockburn, "The End of Jihad," New York Times, 2 March 2008)
My answer to Cockburn's question is that so-called "moderate reformers" tend to come from upper classes and stratas, which distances their policies -- liberalism in political economy, appeasement of Tel Aviv and Washington in foreign policy -- and their cultures -- very secularized and, what is worse, sometimes committed to secularism of the elite -- from those of the poorer majority who, unlike their betters, actually care about the Palestinians, and whose economic troubles (creating legions of young men too poor to marry in societies where extra-marital sex with women of their own cultures is very much discouraged1 -- a structural problem now aggravated by rising inflation, which is in part due to the declining dollar) can't be solved by liberalism (more gender equality to enable more women to engage in wage labor and to make up for the end of "family wages" and scarcity of government jobs -- a classic liberal solution to the end of the post-WW2 economic boom).

Moreover, a number of such "moderate reformers" are quick to jettison political liberalism, whose cornerstone is habeas corpus, and side with dictatorial governments when they are confronted by terrorism . . . or sometimes a mere rise of an Islamic movement.2

The only successful liberals in the Middle East have been religious ones, such as Mohammad Khatami and his fellow reformists in Iran and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. Reformists in Iran, however, were done in by a poorer majority who didn't think that cultural liberalization made up for the rising earning inequality resulting from economic liberalization (cultural and economic liberalizations tend to be two sides of the same coin).

Click on the graph for a larger view.Iran: GINI, Individual Earnings
SOURCE: Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, "Revolution and Redistribution in Iran: Poverty and Inequality 25 Years Later," August 2006, p. 34

The AKP, which also combines cultural and economic liberalism, may suffer the same fate after a decade or so in power.

1 The rulers of the Middle East have yet to assimilate the Japanese lesson: political tranquility can only be assured by thoroughgoing alienation and commodification of sex that leaves little libido for the personal and none at all for the political.

2 See, for instance, Anouar Boukhars, "North Africa: the Dilemma of the Secularists," Bitterlemons-international.org, 25.5, 28 June 2007; and Marina Ottaway, "Continued Decline Is Not Inevitable," Bitterlemons-international.org, 25.5, 28 June 2007.

Sunday, February 10, 2008

Culture

Aharon Shabtai, born in 1939 in Tel Aviv, is one of the most acclaimed Israeli poets and the foremost Hebrew translator of Greek drama. This poem was published in his book J'Accuse (Trans., Peter Cole, New Directions Publishing, 2003) on p. 14.
Culture
by Aharon Shabtai

The mark of Cain won't sprout
from a soldier who shoots
at the head of a child
on a knoll by the fence
around a refugee camp --
for beneath his helmet,
conceptually speaking,
his head is made of cardboard.
On the other hand,
the officer has read The Rebel;
his head is enlightened,
and so he does not believe
in the mark of Cain.
He's spent time in museums,
and when he aims
his rifle at a boy
as an ambassador of Culture,
he updates and recycles
Goya's etchings
and Guernica.
Shabtai refused to participate in the Fifth International Poetry Festival in Jerusalem in 2006, living by his conviction that "even poets were not allowed in the past, and not in the present, to ignore persecutions and discriminations on a racial or national basis," and will be boycotting the Turin Book Fair (8-12 May 2008) and the Salon du Livre de Paris (14-18 March 2008) where Israel will be the "guest of honor."

Sunday, January 06, 2008

La izquierda en crisis

La izquierda en crisis

Por Yoshie Furuhashi
Traducción Néstor Gorojovsky

Tanto las respuestas al debate Robert Brenner-Sam Gindin (7 de diciembre de 2007) como el debate en sí mismo me hacen pensar nuevamente que los izquierdistas deberían olvidarse de la remanida pregunta sobre si el capitalismo está en crisis, y hacerse otras preguntas.

El capitalismo, como modo de producción, jamás entrará en crisis a nivel planetario. Siempre hay tendencias económicas globales, y a veces algunas golpean negativamente a las tasas de ganancia, pero hay diferencias dramáticas en el modo en que impactan en los diversos países; el impacto depende de sus economías políticas, sus estructuras sociales, y (lo más importante) de sus condiciones culturales (que son las únicas sobre las cuales en este momento pueden intervenir los izquierdistas, hasta cierto punto al menos, antes incluso de encontrarse en condiciones de cambiar la economía política y la estructura social de un país determinado).

El capitalismo siempre está cambiando, pero hay períodos durante los cuales los cambios son más profundos y marcan la transición de un régimen de acumulación a otro; se pasa entonces de viejas estructuras políticas nacionales e internacionales que eran funcionales al viejo régimen a otras, nacionales e internacionales, que se ajustan mejor al nuevo régimen. La Segunda Guerra Mundial hizo posible la hegemonía estadounidense que puso fin a la era de las guerras interimperialistas: fue uno de esos pasajes. El fin de la expansión de posguerra fue otro. Quizás hoy nos encontremos ante otro pasaje, marcado por la posibilidad del fin de la hegemonía del dólar, que está asomando en el horizonte.

En cada transición se ofrecen aperturas políticas a las clases populares. La pregunta está en saber si están motivadas y organizadas de modo de aprovecharlas. Sobre este asunto crucial, Brenner y Gindin están de acuerdo: esté o no en crisis el capitalismo, lo seguro es que lo están los izquierdistas, en especial los del Norte; en buena medida debido al problema innegable de que los trabajadores del Norte, sobre todo en los EEUU, están cada vez más atomizados, y en una medida no menor debido a la ausencia de una alternativa sistémica1 al capitalismo que inspire al pueblo y consiga su lealtad.

Cuando el pueblo no está organizado ni motivado para aprovechar las aperturas, las clases dominantes lo hacen, y establecen un nuevo régimen de acumulación.

Y no siempre que los pueblos están motivados y organizados lo están por fuerzas e ideas originados en la tradición marxista.2 "En realidad, y al menos por ahora, Marx ha cedido el escenario de la historia a Mahoma y el Espíritu Santo. Si Dios murió en las ciudades de la revolución industrial, se ha vuelto a poner de pie en las ciudades postindustriales del mundo en desarrollo", declara Mike Davis ("Planet of Slums," New Left Review 26, Marzo-Abril 2004).

Aijaz Ajmad reconoce el mismo fenómeno, y agrega:
El mundo secular tiene que ser justo por partida doble: tiene que serlo según los términos que definió para sí mismo, y también para defenderlo de la afirmación de que Dios hubiera ofrecido mejor justicia. Dicho de otro modo, tiene que contener suficiente justicia como para que no haga falta invocar la justicia de Dios contra la injusticia de los no creyentes. ("Islam, Islamism and the West," Socialist Register 2008)
Pero, ¿cómo? Randhir Singh aclara lo que hay que hacer en mejores términos que Davis y Ajmad: "negociar mejor las transacciones inevitables entre desarrollo económico y justicia social, entre requerimientos de productividad y eficiencia, por un lado, y por el otro sustentabilidad ambiental y calidad de vida, que no son reducibles a progreso material o crecimiento económico" ("Future of Socialism," MRZine, 29 de diciembre de 2007). Pero está muy lejos de ser evidente por sí mismo, y para los religiosos está más lejos que para nadie, que los izquierdistas seculares puedan negociar mejor esas transacciones -- así como otra, la que se da entre libertad y seguridad -- que aquellos que "invocan la justicia de Dios contra la injusticia de los no creyentes", dada la experiencia del socialismo de Estado del siglo XX y los gobiernos de quienes se autoidentifican como socialistas u otros izquierdistas seculares que existen hoy.

Así que la crisis de la izquierda secular continuará. Reconocerla como un problema más urgente que el de si hoy el capitalismo es dinámico o se ha estancado es el primer paso hacia su superación.

1 La idea de "socialismo del siglo XXI" por la que se combate en Venezuela, Ecuador y Bolivia, aún está en su infancia y es hoy más una alternativa a la hegemonía estadounidense y al régimen neoliberal de acumulación que una alternativa al captialismo como tal, y las fuerzas que han llevado al poder a Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa y Evo Morales (y allí los mantienen) se componen de clases y corrientes políticas contradictorias.

2 Concientemente, al menos. Pero la tradición marxista ha dejado marcas indelebles en todas las fuerzas de las clases populares, incluso las que la han rechazado expresamente.
A pesar de la moda de compararlo con los movimientos políticos de la extrema derecha, la mejor definición del islamismo sería "islamo-leninismo". Si bien el leninismo es un movimiento secular que niega su origen religioso y el islamismo es un movimiento que se reconoce religioso mientras suprime su deuda con el pensamiento secular, el pensamiento escatológico es igualmente central para ambos. (John Gray, "Faith in Reason: Secular Fantasies of a Godless Age," Harper's Magazine, Enero 2008, p. 88)
Haría un comentario a la observación de Gray: se debería reservar el término "islamo-leninistas" para aquellos islámicos que, como los de Irán, Hizballah y Jamas, pueden construir organizaciones de masas de las clases populares en función de sus propios proyectos nacionales de inflexión populista y antiimperialista, que no hay que confundir, por ejemplo, con el islamismo de las células terroristas al estilo de Al-Qaeda.

Saturday, January 05, 2008

Left in Crisis

Responses to the Robert Brenner-Sam Gindin debate (7 December 2007), as well as the debate itself, make me think, yet again, that it would be better for leftists to drop the oft-asked question -- "Is capitalism in crisis?" -- and ask different questions.

Capitalism as a mode of production will never be in crisis on the global scale. There are always global economic trends, some of which negatively impact profit rates sometimes, but their impacts differ dramatically from one nation to another, depending on their political economies, social structures, and (most importantly) cultural conditions (which alone are subject to leftists' interventions at least to a certain extent even before leftists find themselves in a position to change political economy and social structure on the national level).

Capitalism is always changing, but more profound changes happen during some periods than others, changes that amount to transition from one regime of accumulation to another regime, shifting from old national and inter-national political structures functional to the old regime to new national and inter-national ones that better fit the new regime. The emergence of US hegemony, made possible by the Second World War whose outcome ended the age of inter-imperialist wars, was one such shift; the end of the post-WW2 boom was another such shift; the possibility of the end of the dollar hegemony on the horizon today may be yet another shift.

Each transition presents popular classes with political openings. The question is whether popular classes are so organized and motivated to take advantage of them. It is on this crucial question that Brenner and Gindin agree: whether or not capitalism is in crisis, it is certain that leftists, especially leftists in the North, are, in large part due to the undeniable problem of increasing atomization of working people in the North, working people in the USA above all, and in no small part due to the absence of a systemic alternative1 to capitalism that inspires people and commands their allegiance.

When people are neither organized nor motivated to take advantage of the openings, the ruling classes will, establishing a new regime of accumulation.

Even when and where people are organized and motivated, they are not necessarily organized and motivated by forces and ideas that come from the Marxist tradition.2 "Indeed, for the moment at least, Marx has yielded the historical stage to Mohammed and the Holy Ghost. If God died in the cities of the industrial revolution, he has risen again in the postindustrial cities of the developing world," declares Mike Davis ("Planet of Slums," New Left Review 26, March-April 2004).

Recognizing the same phenomenon, Aijaz Ahmad says:
The secular world has to be just twice over: in terms of what it has defined for itself, and also to ward off the claim that God would have given better justice. That is to say, the secular world has to have enough justice in it for one not to have to constantly invoke God’s justice against the injustices of the profane. ("Islam, Islamism and the West," Socialist Register 2008)
But how? In more practical terms than Davis and Ahmad, Randhir Singh clarifies what is to be done: "better negotiate the necessary trade-offs between economic development and social justice, between requirements of productivity or efficiency and environmental sustainability or quality life which is not entirely a matter of material progress or economic growth" ("Future of Socialism," MRZine, 29 December 2007). And yet it is far from self-evident to all, the least of all to the religious, that secular leftists are better at negotiating the aforementioned trade-offs -- as well as another trade-off, that between liberty and security -- than those who "invoke God’s justice against the injustices of the profane," given the experience of state socialism of the 20th century and still existing governments led by self-identified socialists or other secular leftists.

The crisis of the secular Left will thus continue. Recognizing that as the more urgent problem than whether capitalism today is dynamic or stagnant is the first step toward overcoming it.

1 The idea of socialism of the 21st century, struggled over in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, is still in its infancy, at present more an alternative to US hegemony and the neoliberal regime of accumulation than an alternative to capitalism as such, and forces that pushed and have kept Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, and Evo Morales in power are composed of contradictory classes and political currents.

2 At least consciously. The Marxist tradition, however, has left indelible marks upon all forces of popular classes, even those that have expressly rejected it:
[D]espite the fashion for comparing it with political movements of the far right, Islamism could more accurately be described as "Islamo-Leninism." If Leninism is a secular movement that denies its origins in religion, Islamism is an avowed religious movement that suppresses its debts to secular thinking; eschatological thinking is equally central to both. (John Gray, "Faith in Reason: Secular Fantasies of a Godless Age," Harper's Magazine, January 2008, p. 88)
I'd qualify Gray's remark: those who may be properly called "Islamo-Leninists" are those Islamists, such as the Islamists of Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas, who have the capacity to build mass organizations of popular classes for their own national projects inflected with populism and anti-imperialism, not to be confused, for instance, with terrorist cells of Al-Qaeda-type Islamism.

Update
Read it in Spanish: Yoshie Furuhashi, "La izquierda en crisis," Traducción Néstor Gorojovsky, Critical Montages, 6 de enero de 2008.

Tuesday, December 25, 2007

La última vocación del Cristianismo

La última vocación del Cristianismo

Por Yoshie Furuhashi
Traducción Julio Fernández Baraibar

El mensaje para la Navidad de 2007 de Michel Sabbah, el Patriarca Latino y Arzobispo de Jerusalem, es muy convincente: critica agudamente la ocupación mientras aconseja contra "hablar de crear 'estados religiosos' en la Palestina histórica. La última vocación del cristianismo puede ser muy bien convertirse en el mediador entre judíos y musulmanes en el Medio Oriente.

Más aún, en el mensaje Sabbah cita a Jeremías 6:14, quizás la más apropiada respuesta a Anápolis:
Ellos curan a la ligera
el quebranto de mi pueblo,
diciendo: "¡Paz, paz!",
pero no hay paz.

Saturday, December 22, 2007

The Last Vocation of Christianity

The 2007 Christmas message of Michel Sabbah, the Latin Patriarch and Archbishop of Jerusalem, is very cogent: it sharply criticizes the occupation while counseling against "talk about creating 'religious' States" in historic Palestine. The last vocation of Christianity may very well be to be the mediator between Jews and Muslims in the Middle East.

Moreover, in the message Sabbah cites Jeremiah 6:14, perhaps the most fitting rejoinder to Annapolis:
They dress the wound of my people
as though it were not serious.
'Peace, peace,' they say,
when there is no peace.

Update

Yoshie Furuhashi, "La última vocación del Cristianismo," Traducción Julio Fernández Baraibar, Critical Montages, 25 December 2007.

Friday, December 21, 2007

Um Kulthum Sings for Palestine

Um Kulthum sings for Palestine.

طريق واحد

The (very sixties) lyrics, in Arabic and in English translation, are found at TLAXCALA.

Sunday, December 16, 2007

Ibrahim Mousawi Speaks

Ibrahim Mousawi, editor of the Hizballah newspaper Al Intiqad, speaks, emphasizing that "What is happening in Palestine, it's not an Islamic issue, it's not an Arab issue, it's not a religious issue -- it's a human issue":

Thursday, November 29, 2007

29 November: From the Partition to Annapolis

In 1947, the UN, led by the USA and the USSR, voted to partition Palestine.

Assembly Votes Palestine Partition

In the words of the New York Times the next day:
The decision was primarily a result of the fact that the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union, which were at loggerheads on every other important issue before the Assembly, stood together on partition. Andrei A. Gromyko and Herschel V. Johnson both urged the Assembly yesterday not to agree to further delay but to vote for partition at once. (Thomas J. Hamilton, "Assembly Votes Palestine Partition")
The Soviet role in the partition of Palestine and the establishment of Israel was the biggest blow against socialism in the Middle East, as Jordanian Marxist Hisham Bustani argues in "Critique of the Arab Left: On Palestine and Arab Unity" (MRZine, 19 November 2007), and Arab socialists have never quite recovered from it.

The Arab power elites walked out in 1947. In 2007, however, they walked right into Annapolis. If 1947 marked the abortion of the Arab Left, 2007 may very well be the final nail in the coffin of secular Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism.