Showing posts with label Gender. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gender. Show all posts
Monday, July 04, 2011
No Green Goddesses
Here is an important intervention by Janet Biehl, published in the latest issue of Le Monde diplomatique: "No Green Goddesses: Ecofeminism Isn't Feminist or Eco Either." Unfortunately, the English version is for subscribers only, and the French version won't be available till next month. But the Portugese and Italian versions are already online. A funny thing is that people who wouldn't put up with the god of the Abrahamic religions often love Pachamama. One reason is that Pachamama is cast as female while the God of Jews, Christians, and Muslims is commonly cast as male. Goddesses can be useful for reactionary, patriarchal thought, though. Amaterasu is female and kind of cool in the original tellings of the myth about her, but Japan's ruling class at one time successfully built patriarchal capitalism and imperialism in part using an ideology based on the claimed kinship with her. Another reason is that there are two kinds of "otherness": one (e.g., Muslims, hijab) is cast as frightening; the other (e.g., indigenous peoples of the Americas, Indian saris) is cast as cute. A deeper reason, though, lies in what Janet Biehl touches on in her article: the Left's neglect of the questions of the gendered division of labor and social reproduction. Given that most struggles on the Left today are defensive rather than offensive, there is a tendency to employ the rhetoric of uncommodified = good versus commodified =bad and adopt the posture of defending the remaining space of the former against the encroachment of the latter. But a lot of oppression of women takes place in the sphere of uncommodified relations, which gets scant attention in the aforementioned rhetoric.
Saturday, April 03, 2010
Taliban and the Rights of Women
The dispute between Gita Sahgal and the "Human Rights for All" campaign on one hand and Moazzam Begg and Amnesty International on the other hand is a red herring, which is the reason why it has been "taken up with relish by Britain's self-styled 'decent left' of journalists and commentators, whose superior moral compasses led them to support the invasion of Iraq." All parties directly involved in the dispute profess that they are in favor of women's rights, though they may differ here and there on what exactly the said rights consist of.
But the thing is that women's rights, or lack thereof, in Afghanistan cannot decide the most important questions that Westerners have to ask themselves: will the NATO quit Afghanistan, and, if yes, when?
Under NATO, women's rights will be protected only to the extent that they don't conflict with the military logics of the parties in combat. After NATO's withdrawal, women's rights will be protected only to the extent that the parties governing post-NATO Afghan territories respect them. That probably means that Afghan women will enjoy only such rights as granted by allies of Iran-Russia-India in one part of Afghanistan and Taliban-Pakistan in another part of Afghanistan -- for decades to come.
In either case, with or without NATO, it is not possible for Sahgals, Beggs, or human rights organizations of the West to make the level of women's rights higher than it is given the prevailing objective and subjective conditions of Afghan society. It would help speed up the NATO departure once Western activists admit their inability to make a difference for Afghan women for such a realistic admission would help the Western public concentrate on the only questions on which they have at least some say.
But the thing is that women's rights, or lack thereof, in Afghanistan cannot decide the most important questions that Westerners have to ask themselves: will the NATO quit Afghanistan, and, if yes, when?
Under NATO, women's rights will be protected only to the extent that they don't conflict with the military logics of the parties in combat. After NATO's withdrawal, women's rights will be protected only to the extent that the parties governing post-NATO Afghan territories respect them. That probably means that Afghan women will enjoy only such rights as granted by allies of Iran-Russia-India in one part of Afghanistan and Taliban-Pakistan in another part of Afghanistan -- for decades to come.
In either case, with or without NATO, it is not possible for Sahgals, Beggs, or human rights organizations of the West to make the level of women's rights higher than it is given the prevailing objective and subjective conditions of Afghan society. It would help speed up the NATO departure once Western activists admit their inability to make a difference for Afghan women for such a realistic admission would help the Western public concentrate on the only questions on which they have at least some say.
Tuesday, March 09, 2010
The Iranian Diaspora after the Green Wave
So, what is the new preoccupation of the Iranian diaspora after the Green Wave? Having received 170 comments (and counting), this item posted on International Working Women's Day is the most popular thing today at Iranian.com.
Thursday, February 11, 2010
Iran: The Islamic Revolution Defeats Western Hopes for Regime Change
. . . and Hashemi's hopes for a palace coup.
Having defeated the Western hopes for regime change and the endogenous upper-class hopes for a palace coup, Salomes of Iran will have a better chance to fight for freedom.
* For the social and political character of the Green Wave, consult Iran's Last Marxist Nasser Zarafshan: Setareh Derakhshesh, "Interview with Dr. Nasser Zarafshan and Farrokh Negahdar" (VOA Persian, 6 January 2010).
| Isfahan | Tehran |
Having defeated the Western hopes for regime change and the endogenous upper-class hopes for a palace coup, Salomes of Iran will have a better chance to fight for freedom.
* For the social and political character of the Green Wave, consult Iran's Last Marxist Nasser Zarafshan: Setareh Derakhshesh, "Interview with Dr. Nasser Zarafshan and Farrokh Negahdar" (VOA Persian, 6 January 2010).
Wednesday, December 02, 2009
A New John Brown?
"If a new John Brown arose today -- fundamentalist, patriarchal, and yet devoted to the cause of racial equality, or anti-imperialism, environmentalism, or some other good cause -- and moreover employed "direct action" (which would be naturally called "terrorism") to advance the cause, how many leftists would hail him as a hero? Would he not be scorned on account of his less than enlightened views about women, homosexuals, and so on?" -- Suleman Sheikh
Monday, August 31, 2009
Notes on the Japanese Elections of 2009
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Why did the Japanese Left fail to advance? Take a look at this video of the 21 August 2009 press conference of JCP Chaiman Shii Kazuo (which comes with English translation), and you'll get a clue.
JCP criticisms of the DPJ agenda are to the point more often than not (which you can see in more detail in 「国民が主人公」の新しい日本を -- 日本共産党の総選挙政策), but those criticisms don't amount to a compelling vision of a new socialist society that the party should be presenting.
The strongest point of the JCP criticisms of the DPJ is that the DPJ will pay for its promise to expand the social safety net, including the formerly excluded, by increasing the taxes on working-class incomes, leveling down the existing structures of entitlements such as pensions toward the new social minimums, decreasing public works and public-sector jobs, and so on, the trade-off that the DPJ will make inevitable given its refusal to tax big businesses and capitalists and to cut military spending.
But, in the process of making this point, the JCP ends up defending the old, such as tax exemptions for dependent spouses (usually housewives), which have discouraged many a woman from seeking full-time jobs since wives earning only part-time incomes (roughly up to 1,300,000 yen) are counted as dependents for the purpose of calculating taxes, insurance and pension contributions and benefits, etc. What's good for working-class families in material terms can be bad for working-class women looking to enhance their gender-bargaining power vis-a-vis men, and the structures of the Japanese welfare state that tacitly assume male family wages, lifetime monogamous marriages, female spousal dependency, etc. are textbook cases of the common class-gender contradiction under capitalism. This contradiction is intensifying as more and more Japanese women are clearly losing interest in marriage and childbearing, powerfully demonstrating their sharp rejection of the old gender settlement and silently erecting a strong demographic obstacle to the old methods of restoring economic growth. The JCP, or any other left-wing current in Japan, needs to offer women -- and young people in general -- a new socialist vision that addresses women as individuals in their own right and creates new networks of social solidarity other than biological families, rather than a maternalist Keynesian vision in which women are tacitly assumed to be, or become, or have been wives and mothers.
The same goes for the JCP's defense of the Peace Constitution. On one hand, any constitutional revision that the DPJ will put on the agenda will likely be one that pushes Japan onto the course that Germany took in the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, embarking on humanitarian imperialist adventures of its own, not just as a subordinate member of the US-led coalition of the willing. On the other hand, there is nothing democratic, let alone socialist, about defending the constitution that the occupier wrote for Japan, on which the Japanese people have not been allowed to vote. Socialists must present a new democratic vision for Japan. Why not a constitutional assembly in Japan, to write a new constitution as a step toward 21st century socialism?
* The proportion of the total vote for the Communists, however, registered a slight decline, from 7.25% to 7.03%.
Sunday, August 23, 2009
"Saving the World's Women"
The entire issue of the New York Times Sunday Magazine this weekend is dedicated to the idea of "Saving the World's Women," essentially prompting the reader to blame everything from poverty to terrorism on patriarchal men in the South and to regard aid and philanthropy from the North as the solution. Such an idea is fit only for satire, but the magazine presents it earnestly, as a new idea, as if the world hadn't been through centuries of tandem development of liberal feminism and imperialism.
What little sense of irony in the issue is found in a short piece on the phenomenon of feminist-hawk spam.
The idea of giving aid to "female deliverance" seems to give a lot of liberals of both sexes the same pleasure as the idea of buying aid for "male enhancement" gives to all too many men. The difference is that the former, unlike the latter, is not felt as a guilty pleasure but on the contrary as a righteous one, especially since it's entirely forgotten that, once upon a time, America paid the same type of fundamentalists -- now featured as dark villains in a new literary genre called R2P, which is part Gothic-novel, part captivity-narrative -- to fight a jihad, throwing acid on the faces of women and castrating men who were, or were seen to be, in favor of the Marxist Modern.
What little sense of irony in the issue is found in a short piece on the phenomenon of feminist-hawk spam.
The idea of giving aid to "female deliverance" seems to give a lot of liberals of both sexes the same pleasure as the idea of buying aid for "male enhancement" gives to all too many men. The difference is that the former, unlike the latter, is not felt as a guilty pleasure but on the contrary as a righteous one, especially since it's entirely forgotten that, once upon a time, America paid the same type of fundamentalists -- now featured as dark villains in a new literary genre called R2P, which is part Gothic-novel, part captivity-narrative -- to fight a jihad, throwing acid on the faces of women and castrating men who were, or were seen to be, in favor of the Marxist Modern.
Monday, August 17, 2009
Ahmadinejad to Propose "at Least Three Female Ministers in His New Cabinet"
Reuters reports: "President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Sunday he would propose at least three female ministers in his new cabinet following Iran's disputed election, an unprecedented move in the conservative Islamic state. . . . It would be the first time a woman would hold a ministerial position in Iran since its 1979 Islamic revolution" (Zahra Hosseinian, "Ahmadinejad Plans Female Ministers in Iran Cabinet," 16 August 2009).
Three female cabinet ministers would be more than Iran has ever gotten in its entire modern history, not just in the history of the Islamic Republic. Khatami had only Masoumeh Ebtekar (head of the Environment Protection Organization of Iran) and Zahra Shojaei (head of the Center for Women's Participation) in his cabinet, who were replaced by Fatemeh Javadi and Nasrin Soltankhah respectively in Ahmadinejad's first cabinet. It looks like it's easier to improve Ahmadi's cultural program than reform Khatami-Mousavi-Rafsanjani's economic and foreign policy programs.
Three female cabinet ministers would be more than Iran has ever gotten in its entire modern history, not just in the history of the Islamic Republic. Khatami had only Masoumeh Ebtekar (head of the Environment Protection Organization of Iran) and Zahra Shojaei (head of the Center for Women's Participation) in his cabinet, who were replaced by Fatemeh Javadi and Nasrin Soltankhah respectively in Ahmadinejad's first cabinet. It looks like it's easier to improve Ahmadi's cultural program than reform Khatami-Mousavi-Rafsanjani's economic and foreign policy programs.
Tuesday, August 04, 2009
Imagining a New Political Majority in Iran
The change that has come to Iran since the end of the Iran-Iraq War is more or less in line with the kind of change that has come to much of the rest of the world (though each nation's change is of course inflected with its own peculiar material and cultural conditions before the beginning of the neoliberal regime of accumulation): a package that combines economic liberalization, cultural liberalization, and political liberalization.
That is not a desirable package, from the point of view of historical materialism, though liberals are happy with it and social democrats adjust themselves to it.
In theory, it should not be impossible to construct a new political majority in Iran taking supporters from both the Ahmadinejad/Khamenei camp and the Rafsanjani/Mousavi/Khatami camp, under a program that puts premium on resistance to economic liberalization, creates space for "rooted cosmopolitan" culture, and develops a strategy to deepen democracy, empowering directly elected leaders (the presidency and the parliament) to eclipse indirectly elected leaders (the Leader and the Guardian Council) as well as promoting democratic participation and political education of the popular classes. But I have yet to see any social force in Iran proposing anything like that.
That is not a desirable package, from the point of view of historical materialism, though liberals are happy with it and social democrats adjust themselves to it.
In theory, it should not be impossible to construct a new political majority in Iran taking supporters from both the Ahmadinejad/Khamenei camp and the Rafsanjani/Mousavi/Khatami camp, under a program that puts premium on resistance to economic liberalization, creates space for "rooted cosmopolitan" culture, and develops a strategy to deepen democracy, empowering directly elected leaders (the presidency and the parliament) to eclipse indirectly elected leaders (the Leader and the Guardian Council) as well as promoting democratic participation and political education of the popular classes. But I have yet to see any social force in Iran proposing anything like that.
Wednesday, July 01, 2009
Iran: Beyond Electoralism
To get what they want, both Ahmadi and Mousavi voters need to develop an ideology that lets them go beyond electoralism. Winning elections in a class society doesn't mean being able to make major changes, whether voters are looking for more economic justice (Ahmadi voters) or more freedom (Mousavi voters). This is true in any class society, but it's especially so in Iran, with its complex system of checks and balances.
In Iran, you have to win not only the presidency and a majority of the parliament but also a majority of the Assembly of Experts, an elected institution charged with electing or recalling the Leader of the Revolution, who in turn has the power to decide the composition of the Guardian Council.
Beyond the aforementioned elected offices, you have to win over or neutralize the power of those in civil society and the bureaucracy who do not subscribe to your agenda, whether cultural or economic. This applies to all societies.
In Iran, the bourgeoisie do not own the state as in the case of most other class societies, rather they are subordinated to it, but they still wield considerable influence over politics, and they can also use their economic power directly through the market rather than the state, e.g., causing capital flight, withholding investment, and so on. How to counteract that is no easy question.
Cultural obstacles to changes of the sort that Mousavi voters want are more diffuse than economic obstacles, crossing class lines. One Zogby poll of Iranians, conducted in 2006, revealed that 36% "want the country to become more religious and conservative," a slightly larger group than those who want it to become more liberal and secular (31%). It takes a lot of cultural work to convert those fence-sitters in the middle into political actors who actively support change, rather than passively giving consent to the status quo, and to neutralize the veto power of the 36 percent.
In Iran, you have to win not only the presidency and a majority of the parliament but also a majority of the Assembly of Experts, an elected institution charged with electing or recalling the Leader of the Revolution, who in turn has the power to decide the composition of the Guardian Council.
Beyond the aforementioned elected offices, you have to win over or neutralize the power of those in civil society and the bureaucracy who do not subscribe to your agenda, whether cultural or economic. This applies to all societies.
In Iran, the bourgeoisie do not own the state as in the case of most other class societies, rather they are subordinated to it, but they still wield considerable influence over politics, and they can also use their economic power directly through the market rather than the state, e.g., causing capital flight, withholding investment, and so on. How to counteract that is no easy question.
Cultural obstacles to changes of the sort that Mousavi voters want are more diffuse than economic obstacles, crossing class lines. One Zogby poll of Iranians, conducted in 2006, revealed that 36% "want the country to become more religious and conservative," a slightly larger group than those who want it to become more liberal and secular (31%). It takes a lot of cultural work to convert those fence-sitters in the middle into political actors who actively support change, rather than passively giving consent to the status quo, and to neutralize the veto power of the 36 percent.
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
Iran: This Is Not a Revolution
Let the Iranian people solve their conflict on their own. Defend Iran -- including both sides of the conflict -- from the Western powers. Then, one day, the Iranian people will perhaps choose a man -- or even a woman -- who is truly worthy of their fidelity, someone who thinks like Arshin Adib-Moghaddam and is capable of synthesizing the aspirations of those who voted for Mir-Hossein Mousavi (freedom) and those who voted for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (faith and democracy) and uniting people behind the new synthesis.
Iran: This Is Not a Revolution
by Arshin Adib-Moghaddam
Political power is never good or bad, never really just or unjust; political power is arbitrary, discriminatory, and most of the time violent. In Iran, the ongoing demonstrations sparked by the election results in favor of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad indicate that such power can never really be monopolized by the state. Iran's civil society is fighting; it is giving blood for a just cause. It is displaying its power, the power of the people. Today, Iran must be considered one of the most vibrant democracies in the world because it is the people who are speaking. The role of the supporters of the status quo has been reduced to reaction, which is why they are lashing out violently at those who question their legitimacy.
In all of this, the current civil unrest in Iran is historic, not only because it has already elicited compromises by the state, but also because it provides yet more evidence of the way societies can empower themselves against all odds. These brave men and women on the streets of Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, and other cities are moved by the same utopia that inspired their fathers and mothers three decades ago: the utopia of justice. They believe that change is possible, that protest is not futile. Confronting the arrogance of the establishment has been one of the main ideological planks of the Islamic revolution in 1979. It is now coming back to haunt those who have invented such slogans without necessarily adhering to them in the first place.
And yet the current situation in Iran is profoundly different from the situation in 1978 and 1979. First, the Islamic Republic has proven to be rather responsive to societal demands and rather flexible ideologically. I don't mean to argue that the Iranian state is entirely reflective of the will of the people. I am saying that is it is not a totalitarian monolith that is pitted against a politically unified society. The fissures of Iranian politics run through all levers of power in the country, which is why the whole situation appears scattered to us. Whereas in 1979 the bad guy (the Shah) was easily identifiable to all revolutionaries, in today's Iran such immediate identification is not entirely possible. Who is the villain in the unfolding drama? Ahmadinejad? Those who demonstrated in support of him would beg to differ. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei? I would argue that he commands even stronger loyalties within the country and beyond. The Revolutionary Guard or the Basij? Mohsen Rezai, one of the presidential candidates and an opponent of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who is contesting the election results, used to be the head of the former institution.
The picture becomes even more complicated when we take into consideration that some institutions of the state such as the parliament -- via its speaker, Ali Larijani -- have called for a thorough investigation of the violence perpetrated by members of the Basij and the police forces in a raid of student dormitories of Tehran University earlier this week. "What does it mean that in the middle of the night students are attacked in their dormitory?" Larijani asked. The fact that he said that "the interior ministry . . . should answer for it" and that he stated that the "parliament is seriously following the issue" indicate that the good-vs-bad verdict in today's Iran is more blurred than in 1979.
There is a second major difference to 1979. Today, the opposition to Ahmadinejad is fighting the establishment with the establishment. Mir Hossein Mousavi himself was the prime minister of Iran during the first decade of the revolution, during a period when the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was president. Mohammad Khatami, one of the main supporters of Mousavi, was president between 1997 and 2005. Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, another political ally, is the head of the Assembly of Experts and another former president. They are the engineers of the Islamic revolution and would never devour their project. When some commentators say that what we are witnessing is a revolution they are at best naive and at worst following their own destructive agenda. The dispute is about the future path of the Islamic Republic and the meaning of the revolution -- not about overthrowing the whole system. It is a game of politics and the people who are putting their lives at risk seem to be aware of that. They are aware, in other words, that they are the most important force in the hands of those who want to gain or retain power.
Thus far the Iranian establishment has shown itself to be cunningly adaptable to crisis situations. Those who have staged a revolution know how to sustain themselves. And this is exactly what is happening in Iran. The state is rescuing its political power through a mixture of incentives and pressure, compromise and detention, due process and systematic violence. Moreover, when push comes to shove, the oppositional leaders around Mousavi would never question the system they have built up. As Mousavi himself said in his fifth and most recent letter to the Iranian people: "We are not against our sacred regime and its legal structures; this structure guards our independence, freedom, and Islamic Republic."
Born in Istanbul and educated at the University of Hamburg, American Universtiy (Washington DC), and Cambridge, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam lectures on politics and international relations at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. The author of Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic (Hurst/ Columbia University Press, 2007/2008) and The International Politics of the Persian Gulf (Routledge, 2006), he was the first Jarvis Doctorow Fellow at St Edmund Hall, University of Oxford. He was also elected Honorary Fellow of the Cambridge European Trust Society at the University of Cambridge. His latest publication Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic is now available for worldwide distribution from Hurst & Co., Amazon.com, and Columbia University Press.
Iran: This Is Not a Revolution
by Arshin Adib-Moghaddam
Political power is never good or bad, never really just or unjust; political power is arbitrary, discriminatory, and most of the time violent. In Iran, the ongoing demonstrations sparked by the election results in favor of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad indicate that such power can never really be monopolized by the state. Iran's civil society is fighting; it is giving blood for a just cause. It is displaying its power, the power of the people. Today, Iran must be considered one of the most vibrant democracies in the world because it is the people who are speaking. The role of the supporters of the status quo has been reduced to reaction, which is why they are lashing out violently at those who question their legitimacy.
In all of this, the current civil unrest in Iran is historic, not only because it has already elicited compromises by the state, but also because it provides yet more evidence of the way societies can empower themselves against all odds. These brave men and women on the streets of Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, and other cities are moved by the same utopia that inspired their fathers and mothers three decades ago: the utopia of justice. They believe that change is possible, that protest is not futile. Confronting the arrogance of the establishment has been one of the main ideological planks of the Islamic revolution in 1979. It is now coming back to haunt those who have invented such slogans without necessarily adhering to them in the first place.
And yet the current situation in Iran is profoundly different from the situation in 1978 and 1979. First, the Islamic Republic has proven to be rather responsive to societal demands and rather flexible ideologically. I don't mean to argue that the Iranian state is entirely reflective of the will of the people. I am saying that is it is not a totalitarian monolith that is pitted against a politically unified society. The fissures of Iranian politics run through all levers of power in the country, which is why the whole situation appears scattered to us. Whereas in 1979 the bad guy (the Shah) was easily identifiable to all revolutionaries, in today's Iran such immediate identification is not entirely possible. Who is the villain in the unfolding drama? Ahmadinejad? Those who demonstrated in support of him would beg to differ. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei? I would argue that he commands even stronger loyalties within the country and beyond. The Revolutionary Guard or the Basij? Mohsen Rezai, one of the presidential candidates and an opponent of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who is contesting the election results, used to be the head of the former institution.
The picture becomes even more complicated when we take into consideration that some institutions of the state such as the parliament -- via its speaker, Ali Larijani -- have called for a thorough investigation of the violence perpetrated by members of the Basij and the police forces in a raid of student dormitories of Tehran University earlier this week. "What does it mean that in the middle of the night students are attacked in their dormitory?" Larijani asked. The fact that he said that "the interior ministry . . . should answer for it" and that he stated that the "parliament is seriously following the issue" indicate that the good-vs-bad verdict in today's Iran is more blurred than in 1979.
There is a second major difference to 1979. Today, the opposition to Ahmadinejad is fighting the establishment with the establishment. Mir Hossein Mousavi himself was the prime minister of Iran during the first decade of the revolution, during a period when the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was president. Mohammad Khatami, one of the main supporters of Mousavi, was president between 1997 and 2005. Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, another political ally, is the head of the Assembly of Experts and another former president. They are the engineers of the Islamic revolution and would never devour their project. When some commentators say that what we are witnessing is a revolution they are at best naive and at worst following their own destructive agenda. The dispute is about the future path of the Islamic Republic and the meaning of the revolution -- not about overthrowing the whole system. It is a game of politics and the people who are putting their lives at risk seem to be aware of that. They are aware, in other words, that they are the most important force in the hands of those who want to gain or retain power.
Thus far the Iranian establishment has shown itself to be cunningly adaptable to crisis situations. Those who have staged a revolution know how to sustain themselves. And this is exactly what is happening in Iran. The state is rescuing its political power through a mixture of incentives and pressure, compromise and detention, due process and systematic violence. Moreover, when push comes to shove, the oppositional leaders around Mousavi would never question the system they have built up. As Mousavi himself said in his fifth and most recent letter to the Iranian people: "We are not against our sacred regime and its legal structures; this structure guards our independence, freedom, and Islamic Republic."
Born in Istanbul and educated at the University of Hamburg, American Universtiy (Washington DC), and Cambridge, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam lectures on politics and international relations at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. The author of Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic (Hurst/ Columbia University Press, 2007/2008) and The International Politics of the Persian Gulf (Routledge, 2006), he was the first Jarvis Doctorow Fellow at St Edmund Hall, University of Oxford. He was also elected Honorary Fellow of the Cambridge European Trust Society at the University of Cambridge. His latest publication Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic is now available for worldwide distribution from Hurst & Co., Amazon.com, and Columbia University Press.
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Interview with Farian Sabahi
Interview with Farian Sabahi
by LibrInTerra
Here we publish an interview with Farian Sabahi, an Italian-Iranian professor at Sapienza University of Rome and the University of Turin. A professional journalist, Sabahi has been writing for Corriere della Sera for several months. She was a guest of LibrInTerra on the 26th of March, presenting her two books Storia dell'Iran [A History of Iran] and Un'estate a Teheran [A Summer in Tehran] and showing her two documentary films "Out of Place" and "Che ne facciamo di Teheran?" [What Should We Do with Tehran?]. These days, Iran is again under the spotlight, especially due to its difficult relation with Israel, so this interview should be of greater interest to the public, given its timeliness.
Q: In recent months, Iran has been harshly criticized and continually commented on by the media, especially with regard to its nuclear program and difficult relation with the United States. Does Iran need to produce energy through nuclear power or is the fear about its nuclear program justified?
A: The biggest problem is the lack of trust in Iran on the part of the international community. That said, Iran's electricity demand amounts to 40,000 megawatts, so it would need forty nuclear power plants like Bushehr.
Q: To what extent can Obama's video message create a new channel of dialogue with Iran, especially in view of the upcoming elections, which will take place on the 12th of June? What will happen, politically, in Iran?
A: It's difficult to make a prediction ahead of the presidential elections on 12 June, especially since the predictions of analysts have regularly turned out to be mistaken. But I wouldn't directly link the Obama video to the elections because foreign policy is, like the nuclear program, the exclusive prerogative of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, not of the President of the Islamic Republic.
Q: The difficult relation between Iran and Israel is dealt with in your report "Che ne facciamo di Teheran?" But the Jewish presence in Iran is proportionally the largest in the Middle East outside Israel. What is the real relationship between the Jewish minority and the other Iranians?
A: The Jews living in Iran numbered 80,000 at the time of the creation of Israel in 1948, and now the number is estimated to be 25,000. They have a deputy in the parliament, and they are a recognized minority who have their own schools, hospitals, and nursing homes. There are families who have for generations -- we might say for millennia -- been living in Iran. Iranian Jews are considered to be Iranians first and of the Jewish faith second. And as Iranians they enjoy civil, political, and religious rights and thus have their synagogues and cemeteries.
Q: In "Out of Place," you tell the story of an Iranian-Jewish woman living in Israel since 1987, who would like to return to her country. What, conversely, are the relations between the other Israelis and the Iranian minority in Israeli territory?
A: According to a study by the Center for Iranian Studies in Tel Aviv, the Iranian Jews living in Israel would number 250,000. Some hold positions of prestige, even in politics and the armed forces, while others are simply merchants. Among them is Rachel, the protagonist of my short film "Out of Place," in which I deliberately left international politics in the background to foreground the issue of motherhood. And I believe that from the video it clearly comes across that Iran is, for Rachel, a metaphor for her own now faded youth. In any case on my Web site www.fariansabahi.com, you can find, in the "Journalism" section, my article "Essere e non essere israeliani" [To Be and Not To Be Israeli], published in Ventiquattro, the monthly supplement of Il Sole 24 Ore.
Q: You wrote that the color of Iran is black, the black color of women's chador. Iranian women play different roles in Iranian society, but since the elections of 2005 what has changed regarding the female part of society? Has the situation worsened in terms of personal freedom, for women?
A: Since the 2005 elections, a campaign against the bad-hejabi, the so-called "ill veiled," has been put into effect. But at the same time the One Million Signatures campaign was launched to repeal those rules within the legal system of the Islamic Republic that penalize women.
The original interview "Intervista a Farian Sabahi" was published by LibrInTerra on 21 April 2009. Translation by Yoshie Furuhashi.
by LibrInTerra
Here we publish an interview with Farian Sabahi, an Italian-Iranian professor at Sapienza University of Rome and the University of Turin. A professional journalist, Sabahi has been writing for Corriere della Sera for several months. She was a guest of LibrInTerra on the 26th of March, presenting her two books Storia dell'Iran [A History of Iran] and Un'estate a Teheran [A Summer in Tehran] and showing her two documentary films "Out of Place" and "Che ne facciamo di Teheran?" [What Should We Do with Tehran?]. These days, Iran is again under the spotlight, especially due to its difficult relation with Israel, so this interview should be of greater interest to the public, given its timeliness.
Q: In recent months, Iran has been harshly criticized and continually commented on by the media, especially with regard to its nuclear program and difficult relation with the United States. Does Iran need to produce energy through nuclear power or is the fear about its nuclear program justified?
A: The biggest problem is the lack of trust in Iran on the part of the international community. That said, Iran's electricity demand amounts to 40,000 megawatts, so it would need forty nuclear power plants like Bushehr.
Q: To what extent can Obama's video message create a new channel of dialogue with Iran, especially in view of the upcoming elections, which will take place on the 12th of June? What will happen, politically, in Iran?
A: It's difficult to make a prediction ahead of the presidential elections on 12 June, especially since the predictions of analysts have regularly turned out to be mistaken. But I wouldn't directly link the Obama video to the elections because foreign policy is, like the nuclear program, the exclusive prerogative of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, not of the President of the Islamic Republic.
Q: The difficult relation between Iran and Israel is dealt with in your report "Che ne facciamo di Teheran?" But the Jewish presence in Iran is proportionally the largest in the Middle East outside Israel. What is the real relationship between the Jewish minority and the other Iranians?
A: The Jews living in Iran numbered 80,000 at the time of the creation of Israel in 1948, and now the number is estimated to be 25,000. They have a deputy in the parliament, and they are a recognized minority who have their own schools, hospitals, and nursing homes. There are families who have for generations -- we might say for millennia -- been living in Iran. Iranian Jews are considered to be Iranians first and of the Jewish faith second. And as Iranians they enjoy civil, political, and religious rights and thus have their synagogues and cemeteries.
Click here to watch an excerpt from the film "Out of Place." |
A: According to a study by the Center for Iranian Studies in Tel Aviv, the Iranian Jews living in Israel would number 250,000. Some hold positions of prestige, even in politics and the armed forces, while others are simply merchants. Among them is Rachel, the protagonist of my short film "Out of Place," in which I deliberately left international politics in the background to foreground the issue of motherhood. And I believe that from the video it clearly comes across that Iran is, for Rachel, a metaphor for her own now faded youth. In any case on my Web site www.fariansabahi.com, you can find, in the "Journalism" section, my article "Essere e non essere israeliani" [To Be and Not To Be Israeli], published in Ventiquattro, the monthly supplement of Il Sole 24 Ore.
Q: You wrote that the color of Iran is black, the black color of women's chador. Iranian women play different roles in Iranian society, but since the elections of 2005 what has changed regarding the female part of society? Has the situation worsened in terms of personal freedom, for women?
A: Since the 2005 elections, a campaign against the bad-hejabi, the so-called "ill veiled," has been put into effect. But at the same time the One Million Signatures campaign was launched to repeal those rules within the legal system of the Islamic Republic that penalize women.
The original interview "Intervista a Farian Sabahi" was published by LibrInTerra on 21 April 2009. Translation by Yoshie Furuhashi.
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
Do Communists Have Better Sex?
In a word, yes, according to André Meier's 2006 documentary film comparing sex in East and West Germany. Just watch:
Now, that's an uplifting message as we face the prospect of the Greatest Depression!
But the film is only about heterosexuals. Among the 20th-century communists, only the Cubans have survived long enough to begin to get the question of sexual diversity right (after many trials and errors).
Now, that's an uplifting message as we face the prospect of the Greatest Depression!
But the film is only about heterosexuals. Among the 20th-century communists, only the Cubans have survived long enough to begin to get the question of sexual diversity right (after many trials and errors).
Saturday, September 20, 2008
Le Divorce
"French, Russian PMs Bond over Economy" (AFP, 20 September 2008). Maybe this is the beginning of a beautiful friendship. Little did we know that it would take the most American of all French presidents to initiate Europe's divorce from the Atlantic Alliance.
By the way, it was on 20 September 1792 when the French Revolution made divorce lawful, to the happiness of women, like Europe, trapped in unhappy marriages:
By the way, it was on 20 September 1792 when the French Revolution made divorce lawful, to the happiness of women, like Europe, trapped in unhappy marriages:
During the radical years of the Revolution a number of pieces of legislation were designed to improve family life, deemed hitherto to have been cruel and immoral, like the Ancient Régime itself. Family courts were instituted to deal with family conflict, penalties for wife beating were introduced which were twice as heavy as for assaulting a man, and the age of majority was reduced from 25 to 21. Of greatest importance was a divorce law voted at the last session of the Legislative Assembly, on 20 September 1792. This gave women remarkably broad grounds for leaving an unhappy or violent marriage. Nationally, perhaps 30,000 divorces were decreed under this legislation, especially in towns; in Paris, there were nearly 6,000 in 1793-5. (Philip G. Dwyer and Peter McPhee, The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook, Routledge, 2002, p. 84)
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
The State of the Sexual Union in Iran and America
As M. Junaid Levesque-Alam observes, Sarah Palin, the 2008 GOP vice presidential nominee, wants the state of the sexual union in the United States to be more conservative than that in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Iran: Condom Factory & Sex Education
Iran: A New Approach to Drugs
Sunday, June 29, 2008
Junto a Ti
Junto a Ti
On the eve of 1 December 2007, World AIDS Day, singer Joel Guilian, aka Joe, first released a video for the HSH-Cuba (Hombres que Tienen Sexo con Hombres, Men Who Have Sex with Men) Project of the National Center for Prevention of STIs and HIV/AIDS and the Ministry of Public Health in Cuba.
In the middle of the year, after HSH-Cuba spoke with several artists whose prejudices held them back from becoming its campaign image for sexual diversity, Joe accepted its proposal because he, being gay, especially felt the importance of the topic. First he presented the song "Junto a Ti," which he composed with two of his straight friends: Jessee Suárez y Germán Nogueria. "Junto a Ti" is a song inspired by his relationship of over eleven years, six years of which were spent in a long-distance one, as his partner moved to Miami. The song was accepted, and from then on he worked on the script of a music video for it, which he would also direct. Upon the approval of the script, he began to look for individuals who could play his gay characters in the real streets of Havana's gay quarters. Most heterosexuals in his video are members of the Yoldance Company, who had participated as dancers in the earlier video for "Libertad desde Mi Tierra."
The concept of the video is that a group of friends decide to have a good time and get together on the beach. To show many of the popular gay hangouts in Cuba, they wove together several stories within the video. These gay hangouts are internationally well known: Calle 23, Cine Yara, El Malecón Boulevard, Habana Libre Hotel, Old Havana, El Prado, the Havana Bay Tunnel, La Monumental (gateway to the beaches in the east of Havana), and East Havana Beaches with its white sands, coconut palms, blue sky, and crystal-clear water. The characters are of all races and sexual orientations, enjoying one another's company wholesomely and respectfully. Health educators who do social work for the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, also make appearances.
With this video, a group of young Cubans wish to appeal to the world, especially Hispanics: "Respecting, Understanding, and Accepting Sexual Diversity Helps Prevent AIDS."
They expect Cuban Television to echo this noble cause when it is handed copies for public broadcast.
The video has also been distributed to many international television networks, Web sites, and night clubs around the world.
The original article in Spanish was published in Pressenta on 8 June 2008. Translation by Yoshie Furuhashi.
On the eve of 1 December 2007, World AIDS Day, singer Joel Guilian, aka Joe, first released a video for the HSH-Cuba (Hombres que Tienen Sexo con Hombres, Men Who Have Sex with Men) Project of the National Center for Prevention of STIs and HIV/AIDS and the Ministry of Public Health in Cuba.
Joe, "Junto a Ti"
Joe feat Omara Portuondo, "Libertad desde Mi Tierra"
In the middle of the year, after HSH-Cuba spoke with several artists whose prejudices held them back from becoming its campaign image for sexual diversity, Joe accepted its proposal because he, being gay, especially felt the importance of the topic. First he presented the song "Junto a Ti," which he composed with two of his straight friends: Jessee Suárez y Germán Nogueria. "Junto a Ti" is a song inspired by his relationship of over eleven years, six years of which were spent in a long-distance one, as his partner moved to Miami. The song was accepted, and from then on he worked on the script of a music video for it, which he would also direct. Upon the approval of the script, he began to look for individuals who could play his gay characters in the real streets of Havana's gay quarters. Most heterosexuals in his video are members of the Yoldance Company, who had participated as dancers in the earlier video for "Libertad desde Mi Tierra."
The concept of the video is that a group of friends decide to have a good time and get together on the beach. To show many of the popular gay hangouts in Cuba, they wove together several stories within the video. These gay hangouts are internationally well known: Calle 23, Cine Yara, El Malecón Boulevard, Habana Libre Hotel, Old Havana, El Prado, the Havana Bay Tunnel, La Monumental (gateway to the beaches in the east of Havana), and East Havana Beaches with its white sands, coconut palms, blue sky, and crystal-clear water. The characters are of all races and sexual orientations, enjoying one another's company wholesomely and respectfully. Health educators who do social work for the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, also make appearances.
With this video, a group of young Cubans wish to appeal to the world, especially Hispanics: "Respecting, Understanding, and Accepting Sexual Diversity Helps Prevent AIDS."
They expect Cuban Television to echo this noble cause when it is handed copies for public broadcast.
The video has also been distributed to many international television networks, Web sites, and night clubs around the world.
Joe, "Junto a Ti" (shot on Mi Cayito Beach)
The original article in Spanish was published in Pressenta on 8 June 2008. Translation by Yoshie Furuhashi.
Saturday, June 28, 2008
Christopher Street, Gay Liberation Day
On 27-28 June 1969, the Stonewall Riots began, and one year later, gay men and lesbians organized the Christopher Street Liberation Day committee to put on "this first march -- march, militant march, not parade," says Jerry Hoose, a Gay Liberation Front founding member. Chelsea Dreher and Laura Collins, the plaintiffs of Samuels and Gallagher v. NY, add: "The gay pride parade was not a parade when we were involved in it. It was a political statement and a political movement. A march."
Friday, June 27, 2008
Iraq: We All Work for the Casino in the Green Zone
Iraq: We All Work for the Casino in the Green Zone
An Interview with Martin Eisenstadt
As you know, there's a talk of developing the Green Zone. The Marriott Hotel chain is here, and I too am involved in hospitality. I'm representing interests that are building a hotel. . . . Five stars, a casino, gambling, and it's going to be here in the Green Zone.
The sponsors are a Dubai-based company which has a lot of experience with hotels and casinos in the Middle East. And there's also a Las Vegas partner.
There's a lot of disposable wealth now in this region, as you must know -- a lot of foreign investors, foreign contractors, the troops are paid in dollars.
I'd call it a cultural center. We're excited to build hotels, to build golf courses, to bring Madonna, and to bring Elton John.
Money does talk. Democracy is the first step, but it needs to be followed by capitalism and entertainment, because that's what brings people together, and it's worked many times before. I noticed that now in the Green Zone there's even a Wendy's. Wendy's is a very famous American hamburger restaurant. . . . Do what tastes right! Yeah, Wendy's, it's an exciting process. I see the Green Zone transforming before my eyes.
And it's to the benefit of the Iraqi people, because that disposable income trickles down, as we say in America trickles down, when the people with the big money are spending that at roulettes they are also leaving tips to waiters. We have 6,000 rooms, we need many young girls to clean them. We're going to have a golf course, which needs gardeners, people with the gardening background.
The massage. We're gonna be able to bring people from all around the world, so your masseuse might actually be from the former Soviet Union or from Thailand. A boxer might come from America, mixed martial artists might come from Brazil. That's what I'm trying to convey. And there's been some lobbying, because there's a vote this week in the parliament. Democracy is vibrant, it's alive, and the Iraqis feel . . . right, the feeling is here, the feeling of democracy.
There's an issue of legalized gambling. I know in Kurdistan there is a casino that is very successful, and that's what we are trying to bring to Iraq. And I'm telling you, Iraq is already transforming, but soon it's gonna be like Berlin, it's gonna be like Okinawa, it's gonna be like Seoul, it's gonna be like Las Vegas, but within the Iraqi context, sensitive to the sensibilities of local people, of course. There'll be a mosque, a room for prayers, five times a day, there will be a call for prayers. We're gonna have a special section for Shesh Besh. Backgammon. Not just roulettes, blackjack, and poker, but a special section for Shesh Besh. So, we are going to incorporate local norms. And we are going to have off-track betting for the camel races in Dubai and countries nearby.
But yes, the pizzazz, the Vegas pizzazz, the American, can-do, let's-have-fun, we're-all-one attitude, yes, unapologetically, we're going to bring that here, but mixed with local sensibilities.
When you have a jack and a six, and you hit, everybody is in it together. That rush transcends your language, your culture, your religion. That I think is what's gonna really bring people together.
Whether you are Shia, Sunni, or Kurd, you're gonna be seen wearing the same casino uniform, with the same nameplates. which says we're all one, we all work for the casino, there are no differences between us. Our employment is going to be one third, one third, one third, so that all the peoples of Iraq are represented.
I haven't spoken as much about this in America, but I think here it's ok, it's gonna happen soon. I'm probably soon gonna be an advisor for the McCain campaign, because my candidate, Rudi Giuliani, dropped out. And I can assure you that John McCain supports this effort. John McCain will likely be the next American president. And I think the people here in Baghdad should understand that a future American president supports this endeavor.
John McCain as the head of the Indian Affairs Committee in the Senate knows hands-on, full well, the importance of development, how a casino, haw a sauna, how a golf course can transform a people, can transform a region and bring peace to groups that otherwise fight. We also had a racial conflict, between Indians, the white people, the Caucasians from Europe, and the Black people from Africa. And somehow casinos have managed to fix that divide. Only twenty years ago the Indians were drunk, and homeless, and committing crimes. Today, they're prosperous and wealthy, driving a Mercedes, with their kids with Game Boys and PlayStations, satellite dishes on their homes. And so too the Black people with sports have managed to advance themselves in this kind of entertainment sector. It's brought harmony between all the peoples. And we intend to bring the same thing here to Baghdad.
Iraq has changed. I think it's because of casinos. You find that today there's a wide consensus, across the board the American people are committed to helping Iraq see this problem through to its end. We're not gonna cut and run, we're partners, we're in this together for at least a hundred years. And I'll see you at the blackjack table. And what happens in the Green Zone stays in the Green Zone.
This is a partial transcript (omitting the interviewer's questions) of a program that is said to have been broadcast on Al-Iraqia in February 2008, featuring Martin Eisenstadt speaking at the "Baghdad Business 2 Business EXPO." H/T to Juan Cole, Raed Jarrar, and Rick B. The video is (most likely) a satire.
An Interview with Martin Eisenstadt
As you know, there's a talk of developing the Green Zone. The Marriott Hotel chain is here, and I too am involved in hospitality. I'm representing interests that are building a hotel. . . . Five stars, a casino, gambling, and it's going to be here in the Green Zone.
The sponsors are a Dubai-based company which has a lot of experience with hotels and casinos in the Middle East. And there's also a Las Vegas partner.
There's a lot of disposable wealth now in this region, as you must know -- a lot of foreign investors, foreign contractors, the troops are paid in dollars.
I'd call it a cultural center. We're excited to build hotels, to build golf courses, to bring Madonna, and to bring Elton John.
Money does talk. Democracy is the first step, but it needs to be followed by capitalism and entertainment, because that's what brings people together, and it's worked many times before. I noticed that now in the Green Zone there's even a Wendy's. Wendy's is a very famous American hamburger restaurant. . . . Do what tastes right! Yeah, Wendy's, it's an exciting process. I see the Green Zone transforming before my eyes.
And it's to the benefit of the Iraqi people, because that disposable income trickles down, as we say in America trickles down, when the people with the big money are spending that at roulettes they are also leaving tips to waiters. We have 6,000 rooms, we need many young girls to clean them. We're going to have a golf course, which needs gardeners, people with the gardening background.
The massage. We're gonna be able to bring people from all around the world, so your masseuse might actually be from the former Soviet Union or from Thailand. A boxer might come from America, mixed martial artists might come from Brazil. That's what I'm trying to convey. And there's been some lobbying, because there's a vote this week in the parliament. Democracy is vibrant, it's alive, and the Iraqis feel . . . right, the feeling is here, the feeling of democracy.
There's an issue of legalized gambling. I know in Kurdistan there is a casino that is very successful, and that's what we are trying to bring to Iraq. And I'm telling you, Iraq is already transforming, but soon it's gonna be like Berlin, it's gonna be like Okinawa, it's gonna be like Seoul, it's gonna be like Las Vegas, but within the Iraqi context, sensitive to the sensibilities of local people, of course. There'll be a mosque, a room for prayers, five times a day, there will be a call for prayers. We're gonna have a special section for Shesh Besh. Backgammon. Not just roulettes, blackjack, and poker, but a special section for Shesh Besh. So, we are going to incorporate local norms. And we are going to have off-track betting for the camel races in Dubai and countries nearby.
But yes, the pizzazz, the Vegas pizzazz, the American, can-do, let's-have-fun, we're-all-one attitude, yes, unapologetically, we're going to bring that here, but mixed with local sensibilities.
When you have a jack and a six, and you hit, everybody is in it together. That rush transcends your language, your culture, your religion. That I think is what's gonna really bring people together.
Whether you are Shia, Sunni, or Kurd, you're gonna be seen wearing the same casino uniform, with the same nameplates. which says we're all one, we all work for the casino, there are no differences between us. Our employment is going to be one third, one third, one third, so that all the peoples of Iraq are represented.
I haven't spoken as much about this in America, but I think here it's ok, it's gonna happen soon. I'm probably soon gonna be an advisor for the McCain campaign, because my candidate, Rudi Giuliani, dropped out. And I can assure you that John McCain supports this effort. John McCain will likely be the next American president. And I think the people here in Baghdad should understand that a future American president supports this endeavor.
John McCain as the head of the Indian Affairs Committee in the Senate knows hands-on, full well, the importance of development, how a casino, haw a sauna, how a golf course can transform a people, can transform a region and bring peace to groups that otherwise fight. We also had a racial conflict, between Indians, the white people, the Caucasians from Europe, and the Black people from Africa. And somehow casinos have managed to fix that divide. Only twenty years ago the Indians were drunk, and homeless, and committing crimes. Today, they're prosperous and wealthy, driving a Mercedes, with their kids with Game Boys and PlayStations, satellite dishes on their homes. And so too the Black people with sports have managed to advance themselves in this kind of entertainment sector. It's brought harmony between all the peoples. And we intend to bring the same thing here to Baghdad.
Iraq has changed. I think it's because of casinos. You find that today there's a wide consensus, across the board the American people are committed to helping Iraq see this problem through to its end. We're not gonna cut and run, we're partners, we're in this together for at least a hundred years. And I'll see you at the blackjack table. And what happens in the Green Zone stays in the Green Zone.
This is a partial transcript (omitting the interviewer's questions) of a program that is said to have been broadcast on Al-Iraqia in February 2008, featuring Martin Eisenstadt speaking at the "Baghdad Business 2 Business EXPO." H/T to Juan Cole, Raed Jarrar, and Rick B. The video is (most likely) a satire.
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Lebanon: Five Reasons That Demand Women's Participation in Government
Lebanon: Five Reasons That Demand Women's Participation in Government
by Marie Nassif-Debs
In his book entitled Silence of the Poor, French writer Henri Guillemin said that those who were the foundation of the victory of the Revolution of 1789, the urban and rural poor, including women, were excluded from politics by an electoral law giving the right to elect and be elected only to citizens who could read and write. . . . Since that distant century, despite hundreds of wars and revolutions that have changed the face of the planet, the poor and women are still the weak link in all the changes and compromises, even though they are the ones who made them possible.
Based on this historical fact, let's review the current political situation in Lebanon, following the compromise made, on 21 May 2008, between the majority (known as the "14 March Bloc") and the opposition (called the "8 March Bloc"). What draws our attention is, first and foremost, the entente that settled for, despite all the blood and destruction, the only electoral law that could keep them all in power while preserving their (social and sectarian) role at the top of the hierarchy: the law of 1960 which, beginning with highly confessionalized cazas (small districts), alone is capable of guaranteeing the economic position and the share of the cake due to each "emir of a taifa" (political representative of a religious denomination) and the role of various foreign "tutors" near and far. All this in order to keep the Lebanese political system, designed by France and redesigned sometimes by the United States and sometimes by Syria, the place that Lebanon has been assigned on the regional chessboard.
In this situation, where the struggle for power has been brought to its conclusion, since each of the parties based on the alliance of the bourgeoisie and political feudalism had borne arms to improve its portion at the "town hall," the portion of the poor has, once again, fallen off the agenda and, with it, also that of representation of women who, though constituting 53% of the entire Lebanese people, have not been able, so far, to rise to the positions of political decision-making power, except to replace family members, dead husbands in most cases. . . .
When we raised the issue of "women's quota," for some time thereafter, certain representatives of the bourgeoisie complained of dishonor, saying it would degrade the role of women to demand a quota to allow women to be present among them! They have forgotten that most, if not all, of them only rose to their positions of leadership through the quotas granted to the political representatives of Lebanese religious denominations. . . . They attached the adjective "humiliating" to a legitimate demand to better represent women of their country, though we find them being very much worshipful of what they call "Western democracy," willfully ignoring that this democracy is putting female quotas in practice and that Angela Merkel, to mention only one example, has risen to her high office because she was elected first of all because of such a quota. . . .
What is a "female quota"? And how is it formulated by the associations and political parties that have proposed it?
The electoral program of the "National Assembly for the Elimination of All Discriminations against Women in Lebanon," published three years ago (2005), stipulates that Lebanese women be given a 30% share of deputies, i.e., 38 seats. These 38 seats will be, according to the network of 60 associations and many eminent women in the country, filled by the adoption of the most democratic of all known electoral systems, starting with proportional representation and set outside any sectarian confines. That is to say, it will start with a unique experiment, different from all those experienced since the independence of Lebanon. Demanding the abolition of confessionalism and proportional representation, the women of Lebanon aspire to represent not a part of the people but Lebanon as a whole. By doing so, they wish to express their opposition to the electoral laws that were tailored to the measure of sectarian divisions and that could not but engender civil wars.
This program is based, by the way, on very good reasons, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Here, we'll cite only five.
The first reason, one of principle, is based on the Constitution, which proclaims, in its seventh article, full equality among citizens. This reason of principle has been strengthened in 1996 by the signing of the "International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women," which provides, inter alia, the right to quotas as a means to institute complete equality between men and women.
The second reason lies in the great role played by women, especially young women, in the movement for independence in the early forties, and also in the organizations of the Lebanese resistance against the Israeli occupation. In all these battles, Lebanese women have demonstrated leadership qualities.
The third reason is visible in the place currently occupied by women in economy and production. This place, which has been horizontally expanded, has also become more impressive in the senior echelons of economic and even financial power. . . .
The fourth reason is found in the role played by women in the judiciary and the media where limits and differences have been completely abolished.
The fifth and final reason, as was already mentioned, lies in the numbers. While some leaders boast of the percentage of the denomination that they represent in the total population of Lebanon, in any faith, women are the only "part" who enjoy an absolute majority.
Yes to a quota for women, on a provisional basis. Yes to a new electoral law based on proportional representation in Lebanon as a whole considered as a single constituency. Yes to the abolition of sectarianism in politics. These are the foundations of civil peace and political reform.
Marie Nassif-Debs is a spokesperson of the Lebanese Communist Party. Her article was first published in An-Nidaa on 27 June 2008 and made available in French at the Al-Oufok Web site on the same day. English translation by Yoshie Furuhashi.
by Marie Nassif-Debs
In his book entitled Silence of the Poor, French writer Henri Guillemin said that those who were the foundation of the victory of the Revolution of 1789, the urban and rural poor, including women, were excluded from politics by an electoral law giving the right to elect and be elected only to citizens who could read and write. . . . Since that distant century, despite hundreds of wars and revolutions that have changed the face of the planet, the poor and women are still the weak link in all the changes and compromises, even though they are the ones who made them possible.
Based on this historical fact, let's review the current political situation in Lebanon, following the compromise made, on 21 May 2008, between the majority (known as the "14 March Bloc") and the opposition (called the "8 March Bloc"). What draws our attention is, first and foremost, the entente that settled for, despite all the blood and destruction, the only electoral law that could keep them all in power while preserving their (social and sectarian) role at the top of the hierarchy: the law of 1960 which, beginning with highly confessionalized cazas (small districts), alone is capable of guaranteeing the economic position and the share of the cake due to each "emir of a taifa" (political representative of a religious denomination) and the role of various foreign "tutors" near and far. All this in order to keep the Lebanese political system, designed by France and redesigned sometimes by the United States and sometimes by Syria, the place that Lebanon has been assigned on the regional chessboard.
In this situation, where the struggle for power has been brought to its conclusion, since each of the parties based on the alliance of the bourgeoisie and political feudalism had borne arms to improve its portion at the "town hall," the portion of the poor has, once again, fallen off the agenda and, with it, also that of representation of women who, though constituting 53% of the entire Lebanese people, have not been able, so far, to rise to the positions of political decision-making power, except to replace family members, dead husbands in most cases. . . .
When we raised the issue of "women's quota," for some time thereafter, certain representatives of the bourgeoisie complained of dishonor, saying it would degrade the role of women to demand a quota to allow women to be present among them! They have forgotten that most, if not all, of them only rose to their positions of leadership through the quotas granted to the political representatives of Lebanese religious denominations. . . . They attached the adjective "humiliating" to a legitimate demand to better represent women of their country, though we find them being very much worshipful of what they call "Western democracy," willfully ignoring that this democracy is putting female quotas in practice and that Angela Merkel, to mention only one example, has risen to her high office because she was elected first of all because of such a quota. . . .
What is a "female quota"? And how is it formulated by the associations and political parties that have proposed it?
The electoral program of the "National Assembly for the Elimination of All Discriminations against Women in Lebanon," published three years ago (2005), stipulates that Lebanese women be given a 30% share of deputies, i.e., 38 seats. These 38 seats will be, according to the network of 60 associations and many eminent women in the country, filled by the adoption of the most democratic of all known electoral systems, starting with proportional representation and set outside any sectarian confines. That is to say, it will start with a unique experiment, different from all those experienced since the independence of Lebanon. Demanding the abolition of confessionalism and proportional representation, the women of Lebanon aspire to represent not a part of the people but Lebanon as a whole. By doing so, they wish to express their opposition to the electoral laws that were tailored to the measure of sectarian divisions and that could not but engender civil wars.
This program is based, by the way, on very good reasons, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Here, we'll cite only five.
The first reason, one of principle, is based on the Constitution, which proclaims, in its seventh article, full equality among citizens. This reason of principle has been strengthened in 1996 by the signing of the "International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women," which provides, inter alia, the right to quotas as a means to institute complete equality between men and women.
The second reason lies in the great role played by women, especially young women, in the movement for independence in the early forties, and also in the organizations of the Lebanese resistance against the Israeli occupation. In all these battles, Lebanese women have demonstrated leadership qualities.
The third reason is visible in the place currently occupied by women in economy and production. This place, which has been horizontally expanded, has also become more impressive in the senior echelons of economic and even financial power. . . .
The fourth reason is found in the role played by women in the judiciary and the media where limits and differences have been completely abolished.
The fifth and final reason, as was already mentioned, lies in the numbers. While some leaders boast of the percentage of the denomination that they represent in the total population of Lebanon, in any faith, women are the only "part" who enjoy an absolute majority.
Yes to a quota for women, on a provisional basis. Yes to a new electoral law based on proportional representation in Lebanon as a whole considered as a single constituency. Yes to the abolition of sectarianism in politics. These are the foundations of civil peace and political reform.
Marie Nassif-Debs is a spokesperson of the Lebanese Communist Party. Her article was first published in An-Nidaa on 27 June 2008 and made available in French at the Al-Oufok Web site on the same day. English translation by Yoshie Furuhashi.
Monday, June 09, 2008
It
It may be better in Iran than the West, depending on what you are looking for.
Just as many Iranians leave and find themselves in new and unfamiliar lands so different than the ones they had imagined before their departure, our western perceptions of Iran are fatally limited, lacking texture and color. We are all guilty of believing the myths about the other, and for the young Iranian stepping into their new lives and can be an extreme letdown.
Iran bursts with so much possibility that one can become exhausted with anticipation. There is a unique brand of chaos best witnessed in Tehran at night. Pulsating traffic jams, make it impossible to move, but provide young people the opportunity to flirt between car windows, trading SMS messages and suggestive glances. You may be offered to buy beer from a guy on a motorbike; a small thing to us, but Islam's take on alcohol makes drinking more thrilling than it ever was in high school. Strangers spark conversations with each other, covering all conceivable topics. Contrary to popular belief, no subject is off limits. Ultimately, it's never boring, with the potential for every sort of imaginable encounter looming around all corners. It is a place that, although officially very repressed emotionally, sexually and creatively, feels alive and vital in the most meaningful way: in terms of human energy.
When they go abroad, especially to the US, many young Iranians are simply bored by the pace of social interaction. Sure, they can drink when and where they want, but so what? Baywatch made an incredible impression on the Islamic Republic and realizing that it's not really like that here can be difficult to swallow.
The courting of the opposite sex, for example, takes on a much greater sense of urgency when a mutual attraction is uncovered. The where, when and how become imperative, and as one of my cousins memorably told me, "Haji, it's like a jungle here. You must be ready and act fast. Get her or someone else will."
When I returned to San Francisco recently I was invited to join the birthday party of another recent Iranian arrival. His girlfriend had called me last minute and told me to meet the group at 7:30 the next evening at Asia SF, a famous restaurant and club that does an all Asian, all transsexual song and dance routine every night. Interesting choice, I thought.
The group consisted of eight people, five of whom had come from Iran to study at UC Berkeley. We drank and laughed, and I loved watching their unsure interaction with the performers. Is it ok to be turned on by these people? was the look on most of their faces. They were a bit shell shocked, I think, by this completely sanctioned sin fest, but not unwilling to participate.
Somehow, though, it seemed boring compared to a night out in Iran, where everything exists as it does here, but in a much rawer, un-institutionalized form. There is no system of public dialogue for hedonism or alternative sexual expression although it exists of course; another example of repression, but also another possibility for true experience.
Just a couple of weeks earlier late one evening in Tehran, I was driving the streets with a good friend Saeed. I find Iran to be most alive when the sun goes down. We were headed north on Valiasr Street, named after the Hidden Imam, an avenue that runs from Tehran deep south to the posh neighborhoods at the foothills of the Alboorz Mountains. At the large intersection still known as "The Peacock Throne" young prostitutes stood around waiting for customers and hopping into the cars of johns, speeding off to locations unknown. A real problem here, but no one seems to be doing much about it.
I started to assume that every girl was working and would sometimes ask, "Is she one, too?" Locals seemed to have developed a radar for them. Saeed laughed at my naiveté. Sometimes, though, when he would point one out I'd tell him, "Maybe. But that one's a guy." Tranny spotting is not yet their forte. (Jason Rezaian, "Iran's Brain Drain More of a Flow, Really," The Warwick Review 1.3, September 2007)
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